Chapter 2. Traffic Detentions

• Author: Ken Wallentine
• Pages: 25-62

25

CHAPTER 2

TRAFFIC DETENTIONS

Introduction

Initial Detention

Reasonable suspicion of a violation

Length and scope of detention

Pretextual Detentions

United States v. Whren

Tension between pretext stops and profiling stops

Stops based on drug courier profiles

Stops based on terrorist profiles

Stops based on anonymous tips of impaired driving or

other violations

After the Initial Detention

Questioning about non-traffic matters

Asking about drugs and alcohol

Drug interdiction indicators

Seeking consent to search

Ordering driver and occupants out of the car or to remain

in the car

Stopping passengers from walking away from a traffic

detention

Identification and warrant checks for passengers

Vehicle “frisks”

Canine sniffs

Roadblocks

Michigan v. Sitz

Investigative roadblocks

Administrative traffic checkpoints

Avoiding a checkpoint as a basis for detention

Public housing checkpoints

Roadblock ruse operations

“Hand-off” or “wall stops”

CHAPTER TWO26

Introduction

Officers may stop and detain a vehicle upon reasonable

suspicion of a traffic offense or crime. Probable cause to

believe that a crime or traffic violation has been committed

is

not

required. The scope of the traffic detention will de-

pend on the reason for the initial stop, as well as facts de-

veloped during the stop. A court will always look first at the

reason for the stop; if the reason was not lawful, all of the

evidence obtained during the stop will likely be suppressed.

Initial Detention

Reasonable suspicion of a violation

Any traffic violation, no matter how insignificant, and

whether a moving violation or non-moving violation, justi-

fies a traffic stop.

United States v. Botero-Ospina

, 71 F.3d

783 (10th Cir. 1995). Even a minor parking violation may

lead to a lawful traffic detention.

United States v. Burton

,

334 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2003),

cert. denied

, 540 U.S. 1135

(2004). The stop may also be based on a reasonable suspi-

cion that the driver has a suspended driver’s license or is the

subject of an arrest warrant. Equipment violations may jus-

tify a stop. The following are examples of equipment viola-

tion stops that have been allowed by courts:

• License tag light out, where state law requires a light.

State v. Weinheimer

, 2004 WL 323186 (Ohio App. 2004);

State v. Patefield

, 927 P.2d 655 (Utah App.1996). License

plate obscured or not visible from a reasonably safe dis-

tance.

United States v. Edgerton

, 438 F.3d 1043 (10th

Cir. 2006).

• Turn signal on for an extended distance.

State v. Marshall

,

791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990). Some courts have disal-

lowed a stop on this basis where no specific state statute

controls.

United States v. Miller

, 146 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.

1998).

• Wobbly wheel, which may have posed safety concern.

State v. O’Brien

, 959 P.2d 647 (Utah App. 1998).

• Bouncing (skipping on pavement) tire.

State v. Harrison

,

533 P.2d 1143 (Az. 1975).

• Bulging or balding tires.

State v. Myers

, 580 N.E.2d 61

(Ohio App. 1990).

TRAFFIC DETENTIONS 27

• Missing mirror.

State v. Thompson

, 816 A.2d 550 (Vt.

2002).

• Brake light out.

State v. Chevre

, 994 P.2d 1278 (Utah

App. 2000).

• Blinking headlight.

State v. Pinkham

, 565 A.2d 318 (Me.

1989).

• Improper bumper height.

State v. Shiley

, 598 N.E.2d 775

(Ohio App. 1991).

• Lack of mud flaps and tires extending beyond body.

United States v. Cotton

, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Neb.

2002).

• Cracked windshield. Some courts have sustained traffic

stops for cracked windshields only where the officer could

see that the crack was unsafe or violated the equipment

statute.

United States v. Callarman,

273 F.3d 1284 (10th

Cir. 2001) (traffic stop was allowed where officer had

reasonable suspicion that crack obstructed the driver’s

vision),

cert. denied

, 535 U.S. 1072 (2002). Most courts,

however, allow a stop upon observation of any crack.

United States v. Cashman,

216 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2000)

(cracked windshield provided basis for stop even if the

crack was not large enough to violate equipment stat-

ute);

State v. Vera

, 996 P.2d 1246 (Ariz. App. 1999) (stop

proper even though no Arizona statute specifically pro-

hibits cracks).

• Parking violation. An officer may detain a vehicle and

driver to investigate a parking violation even if a state

treats parking violations as civil, rather than criminal.

The pretext stop doctrine established in

Whren v. United

States

, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), does not distinguish between

criminal and civil traffic violations.

United States v.

Choudhry

, 461 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2006). Other courts

have reached similar conclusions, including a case where

officers did not stop a vehicle until following it several

blocks from the scene of the illegal parking.

United States

v. Copeland

, 321 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 2003).

In addition to an observed parking or moving violation, reg-

istration violation, or equipment violation, the driver’s iden-

tity may provide the basis for the stop. Stops may also be

justified by:

• Knowledge, or reasonable suspicion, that the driver or

passenger is the subject of an arrest warrant.

State v.

Lopes

, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976).