Chapter 3 - CHAPTER 3 AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
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Chapter 3 AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
§ 3.1 INTRODUCTION
§ 3.2 NO-FAULT THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT (REPEALED)
§ 3.2.1—Commencement of Action Where Threshold Requirement Not Yet Satisfied
§ 3.2.2—Proof Required to Establish Threshold Requirement
a—Testimony of plaintiff may be sufficient§ 3.2.3—Proof of Threshold Does Not Necessarily Entitle Plaintiff to Recover Damages
b—Burden of proof regarding threshold rests with plaintiff—Testimony of plaintiff as to amount of bills incurred may not be sufficient, if plaintiff presents no evidence that medical services were reasonably needed
c—Fact that PIP carrier pays expenses does not establish that they were related to accident — Whether threshold requirement has been met is usually fact question for jury
§ 3.2.4—Exemption from Threshold Requirement for Intentional Torts Under C.R.S. § 10-4-715
§ 3.2.5—Threshold Requirement Is Applicable to a Claim for Loss of Consortium
§ 3.3 NO RIGHT TO RECOVERY OF AMOUNTS PAID OR PAYABLE AS PIP BENEFITS (REPEALED)
§ 3.3.1—General Rule Precludes Recovery of PIP Benefits
§ 3.3.2—PIP Benefits Improperly Awarded as Damages by Jury Are Subject to Reduction by Court
§ 3.3.3—Adoption of C.R.S. § 13-21-111.6 Did Not Overturn No-Fault Act's Prohibition of Recovery of PIP Benefits in Tort Action
§ 3.4 ISSUES RELATING TO LIABILITY AND DAMAGES IN LITIGATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CLAIMS
§ 3.4.1—The "Seat Belt Defense"
a—Defendant entitled to jury instruction on seat belt defense even if no evidence of relationship between failure to use and injuries§ 3.4.2—Parental Immunity Doctrine Not Abrogated by No-Fault Act
b—If vehicle is equipped with separate lap and shoulder seat belts, plaintiff must use both to avoid application of the "seat belt defense" — Evidence of failure to wear seat belt may be used to mitigate plaintiff's non-economic damages, but not as a basis for comparative negligence
c—Mitigation of damages provision in seatbelt defense statute, C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7), encompasses all categories of non-economic damages, not just damages for pain and suffering, but does not include damages for physical impairment and disfigurement
§ 3.4.3—Negligence and Comparative Negligence
a—Plaintiff allowed to recover where plaintiff's negligence is less than combined negligence of defendants or combined negligence of defendants and designated non-parties
b—Presumption of negligence in rear-end collision — When directed verdict is appropriate
c—Pro rata liability statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5, requires apportionment of fault between negligent and intentional conduct that combine to cause the same injury
d—Comparative negligence statute does not preclude state from recovering payments made under Colorado Medical Assistance Act
e—Repair shop has no duty to warn customer about danger of broken seat belt, where customer knows belt is broken and should know of potential hazard
f—Ordinance requiring animal owners to keep them on premises did not impose strict liability upon owner when horse escaped from property and caused collision with plaintiff's vehicle
g—In a wrongful death action arising from a motor vehicle accident, plaintiff may recover as long as decedent's negligence is less than the combined negligence of all tortfeasors, including named defendant's and designated non-parties', but if defendant is liable for wrongful death, solatium award is not subject to reduction by percentage of decedent's negligence
...h—While violation of a traffic ordinance constitutes negligence per se, a conviction for a traffic violation is not admissible in a civil action to prove that the defendant was negligent per se
i—A driver is under a duty to drive with reasonable care, which may, in some circumstances, be violated by failing to pull over to the shoulder of the road
j—Giving of sudden emergency instruction to jury was proper based upon the defendant's testimony alone, without corroborating testimony from other witnesses. The fact that a stationary vehicle is struck by another vehicle does not give rise to a presumption of negligence
k—Where plaintiff was injured when her vehicle collided with a horse, plaintiff was not entitled to a negligence per se instruction based upon defendant's alleged violation of a municipal ordinance precluding the owner of an animal from permitting it to run at large
l—Negligence per se jury instruction based upon a careless driving ordinance was unnecessarily cumulative, but the trial court did not err in giving
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