Chapter 3 - § 3.2 • NO-FAULT THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT (REPEALED)

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 3.2 • NO-FAULT THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT (REPEALED)

[In 2003, the legislature repealed the No-Fault Act, including the threshold requirement of C.R.S. § 10-4-714. See § 4.2 for a discussion of the effects of the requirement's elimination. The cases discussed below are still included in this book mainly to provide a frame of reference for Colorado's current "tort" system, although some of the cases contain points of law that may still apply under the "tort" system.]

Former C.R.S. § 10-4-714 provided that before an action for bodily injury against the owner or operator of a motor vehicle could be maintained, the plaintiff in such an action had to prove that at least one of five threshold requirements was caused by the motor vehicle accident. These threshold requirements included permanent disfigurement; permanent disability; death; reasonable and necessary medical or rehabilitation expenses in excess of $2,500; or loss of income in excess of the amount recoverable as PIP benefits under C.R.S. § 10-4-706(1).

The threshold requirement most frequently at issue was the $2,500 amount. Under the former No-Fault Act, defendants commonly disputed that the plaintiff's medical expenses were reasonable and necessary or were causally related to the motor vehicle accident. These issues are usually left for the jury to decide. In cases of questionable causation, juries frequently returned verdicts in favor of the defendant, even though the plaintiff's medical and rehabilitation expenses far exceeded $2,500. Thus, in many trials under the former No-Fault Act, the threshold requirement was often the most important issue.

§ 3.2.1—Commencement of Action Where Threshold Requirement Not Yet Satisfied

Cause of action for bodily injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle accrued, and statute of limitations began to run, on the date both the physical injury and its cause were known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The accrual date of a cause of action was not when the threshold requirement of C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1) was met. A cause of action could be filed as soon as it was reasonably expected that the threshold would be met. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 223-25 (Colo. 1992), disapproving Pistoria v. Rendon, 765 P.2d 1089 (Colo. App. 1988).

In Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's dismissal of a bodily injury action on the ground that the action was brought after the running of the two-year statute of limitations contained in C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(a). The court also considered whether the applicable statute of limitations began to run on the date the physical injury was incurred, as opposed to the date when the threshold requirement of C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1)(e) was met. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that a three-year statute of limitations applied, and also held that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the physical injury and its cause were known or should have been known.

In addressing these issues, the court also discussed the question of whether a plaintiff could commence an action for bodily injury before he or she has actually satisfied the $2,500 threshold requirement. The court construed C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1)(e) "to allow an action to be filed before the threshold requirement is actually met, as long as medical expenses are reasonably expected to exceed $2,500." 828 P.2d at 224. The court concluded that "because the language of section 10-4-714 does not prohibit the filing of a claim before the threshold amount is reached, an action such as that involved in this case may be filed as soon as the threshold amount of $2,500 is exceeded or is reasonably expected to be exceeded." Id. at 224-25. As the court pointed out, the statute "merely prohibits a person from recovering, not from filing an action, if she does not reach the threshold." Id. at 225. The court found that it would be unjust to require a victim of a motor vehicle accident to wait until expenses exceeded $2,500 before a claim could be filed, while at the same time allowing the statute of limitations to run from the date that the victim knew of his or her physical injury and its cause. Id. The court disapproved of Pistoria v. Rendon, 765 P.2d 1089 (Colo. App. 1988), "in which the court of appeals held that an action which was filed before the threshold amount of § 10-4-714 was reached should have been dismissed without prejudice." 828 P.2d at 225.

§ 3.2.2—Proof Required to Establish Threshold Requirement

a—Testimony of plaintiff may be sufficient

Trial court did not err in holding that plaintiff had met the threshold requirement of C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1) where plaintiff testified that he had incurred $7,000 in medical bills for treatment sustained as a result of accident and defendant offered no proof that these medical services were unreasonable or unrelated to accident. Pyles-Knutzen v. Board of County Commissioners, 781 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo. App. 1989).

In Pyles-Knutzen v. Board of County Commissioners, 781 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1989), a shuttle bus owned and operated by Pitkin County struck a vehicle occupied by James Pyles-Knutzen and Wendy Kidder. The plaintiffs claimed bodily injuries and brought suit against the county. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The county appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

The court of appeals considered and rejected numerous assertions of error by the county, most of which were based upon evidentiary issues. The county also asserted that the trial court had erred by ruling that plaintiff Pyles-Knutzen had met the threshold requirement of C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1). Pyles-Knutzen testified that he had incurred $7,000 in medical bills for treatment necessary due to the accident. The court of appeals held that such testimony "was admissible as evidence of the reasonable value of the medical services rendered." 781 P.2d at 169. Since the defendant introduced no evidence to show that these medical services were unreasonable or unrelated to the accident, the trial court properly found that Pyles-Knutzen had met the threshold requirement. Id.

b—Burden of proof regarding threshold rests with plaintiff — Testimony of plaintiff as to amount of bills incurred may not be sufficient, if plaintiff presents no evidence that medical services were reasonably needed

Trial court properly directed a verdict against plaintiffs in bodily injury action arising from an automobile accident on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to prove they met the threshold requirement of

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