Chapter 3 - § 3.20 • MISCELLANEOUS

JurisdictionColorado
§ 3.20 • MISCELLANEOUS

§ 3.20.1—Since Loss of Consortium Is a Personal Injury, Not a Bodily Injury, Coverage for Loss of Consortium Is Combined Within the Single "Each Person" Limit for Bodily Injury

Where plaintiff's husband, a pedestrian, was struck by a car and suffered severe injuries, and husband recovered the $50,000 "each person" limit for bodily injury under motorist's automobile liability policy, plaintiff was not entitled to recover an additional $50,000 from the liability insurer on her claim for loss of consortium. Liability limits for bodily injury under the policy were $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. Plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium was a claim for personal injury, not bodily injury, and was subject to the policy's unambiguous limit on recovery of $50,000 per person for bodily injury. Lampton v. United Services Automobile Association, 835 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1992).

In Lampton v. United Services Automobile Association, 835 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1992), the husband of the plaintiff, Marie Lampton, was a pedestrian who was severely injured in an accident with an automobile. The negligent motorist was insured by USAA under a liability policy that provided coverage for bodily injury of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. The policy stated that the "'limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each person" for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident.'" Id. at 533. USAA paid Lampton's husband the $50,000 per person limit for bodily injury, but Lampton brought an action against USAA to recover an additional $50,000 for her claim for loss of consortium. Relying upon Arguello v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 599 P.2d 266 (Colo. App. 1979), the trial court held that Lampton was not entitled to a separate recovery under the policy, since her claim of loss of consortium was not a claim for bodily injury. The court of appeals affirmed.

The court of appeals pointed out that "[a] person who has lost the society, companionship, and services of his or her spouse has sustained a personal injury." 835 P.2d at 534. The court held that "[t]his loss, although tangible, real and compensable, is not a bodily injury within the commonly accepted meaning of that term." Id. The court of appeals rejected Lampton's argument that the policy was ambiguous, since it did not define the term "bodily injury," and therefore...

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