Chapter 3 - § 3.6 • STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY CLAIMS

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 3.6 • STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY CLAIMS

C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), which was enacted in 1994 and applies to motor vehicle accidents occurring on or after July 1, 1994, provides that all tort actions for bodily injury or property damage "'arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle'" must be commenced within three years of the date the cause of action accrues. See Gonzales v. City & County of Denver, 998 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 17 P.3d 137 (Colo. 2001). A cause of action for bodily injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle accident accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when both the physical injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, not when the threshold requirement for maintaining a tort action has been established. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 223-25 (Colo. 1992).

Before the enactment of C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I) in 1994, the statute of limitations for commencing a liability action for personal injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle was the three-year statute of limitations, C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(j), applicable to claims arising under the No-Fault Act. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d at 223. By enacting C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I) in 1994, the legislature ratified the court's decision in Jones v. Cox that the legislative intent had been to establish a three-year statute of limitations to govern bodily injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.

§ 3.6.1—Three-Year Statute of Limitations for Bodily Injury Claims Arising out of the Use or Operation of a Motor Vehicle Begins to Run When Both Injury and Its Cause Are Known or Should Have Been Known

For motor vehicle accidents occurring before July 1, 1994, the statute of limitations for commencing a liability action for personal injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle was the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims arising under the No-Fault Act, C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(j). A cause of action for bodily injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, when both the physical injury and its cause were known, or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, not when the threshold requirement of C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1) was satisfied. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 223-25 (Colo. 1992).

In Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury action on the ground that the action was brought after the running of the two-year general statute of limitations contained in C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(a). The court also considered whether the applicable statute of limitations began running on the date the physical injury was incurred, as opposed to when the threshold requirement of C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1)(e) was met. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' holding and also held that the statute of limitations began to run from the date the physical injury and its cause were known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 828 P.2d at 220.

Sara Cox and Dilworth Jones were involved in an automobile accident on October 7, 1986. Cox incurred medical expenses, but it was not until November 28, 1986, that her expenses exceeded the $2,500 threshold for bringing a tort action under C.R.S. § 10-4-714(1)(e). On October 11, 1988, she filed an action for personal injury against Jones. Jones then moved to dismiss her complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(a). In turn, Cox argued that her cause of action accrued only after she met the threshold requirement for bringing the action. The trial court ruled that the cause of action accrued on the date of the accident and dismissed the complaint because it was filed after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the action, holding that the controlling statute of limitations was the three-year statute applicable to claims arising under the No-Fault Act.

In the supreme court, Jones argued that the court of appeals stretched the meaning of C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(j) by concluding that an ordinary negligence action involving an automobile accident was an action brought under the No-Fault Act. C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(j) provided that all actions under the No-Fault Act had to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrued. Jones argued that the term "under" was plain and unambiguous and meant that only first-party claims by insureds against insurers were claims arising out of the No-Fault Act. He asserted that because the action in this case was a tort action, the statute of limitations generally applicable to torts should apply. Under C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(a), tort actions, including negligence actions, had to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrued.

The court of appeals' conclusion that the three-year statute of limitations applied was based upon the principle that when there are two applicable statutes of limitation, the more specific...