Vol. 32 No. 4, June 2007
Index
- Corporate governance and the new hedge fund activism: an empirical analysis.
- I. Introduction.
- II. The legal foundations of hedge fund activism today.
- Empirical study and review: hedge fund activism.
- Conflicts of interest and full disclosure.
- Balance of power politics and corporate governance.
- VI. Conclusion.
- I. Introduction.
- Industry hallmarks: conflicted management and redeemable securities.
- The nature and genesis of 12b-1 fees.
- Rule 12b-1's requirements.
- Rule 12b-1 in practice.
- The acid test: does rule 12b-1 benefit mutual fund shareholders?
- Half-hearted SEC regulation has hurt investors.
- Wanted from the SEC: investor-oriented leadership.
- Fund boards as reform leaders-missing in action.
- Legal recourse as a tool for chance.
- XI. Conclusion.
- Disney, good faith, and structural bias.
- Bulletproof: mandatory rules for deal protection.
- The corporate governance industry.
- Why the time has arrived to broaden protection of foreign trademarks in the United States and why it won't happen.
- Merck v. Integra: (section) 271(e) (1) and the common law research exemption.
- United States v. Dentsply: the Third Circuit bites down on the 'alternative distribution channels' defense.