Who Started It? Who Stopped It?: A Modest Proposal to Reverse the Rankings of Type 1 and Type 2 Errors in Predation Jurisprudence

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CHAPTER III
Who Started It? Who Stopped It?: A Modest Proposal to
Reverse the Rankings of Type 1 and Type 2 Errors in
Predation Jurisprudence
Alfred E. Kahn*
There is a certain presumption in my having accepted John
Shenefield‘s invitation to address you today, considering that it is exactly
55 years since S. Chesterfield Oppenheim invited me to serve on the
Attorney G eneral‘s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws—
and during that period I have for the most part not been directly involved
with antitrust issues. Each time I considered r escinding my acceptance,
however, I refreshed my indignation by consulting one or another of the
Supreme Court decisions in cases of asserted predation, in which Justices
steeped in or tainted by the University of Chicago tradition make
essentially economic generalizationswholly unsupported except by
incantationthat have by repetition taken on the aura of biblical truths:
these I do feel qualified to challenge. In doing so, I take moral support,
at least, from some of the anti-Chicago literature over that same period,1
while in no way presuming to offer a balanced exposition and evaluation
* Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Cornell
University; Special Consultant, NERA Economic Consulting, Inc.;
former Chairman of the New York State Public Service Commission and
Civil Aeronautics Board; and Advisor to the President (Carter) on
Inflation.
This is a heavily revised version of a presentation given to the Section of
Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association at their Antitrust
Symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on May 14, 2009.
In exercising his nonagenarian entitlement to play the curmudgeon, the
author disassociates NERA from the views he expresses, while at the
same time justifying his impatient italicizations by the apparent
imperviousness of so much of our judiciary to th e most elementary
relevant facts when presented in mere roman type.
1. See, e.g., ROBERT PITOFSKY, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON
U.S. ANTITRUST (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After
Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985).

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