Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for Antitrust

Pages65-117
65
CHAPTER V
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE CURRENT
CRISIS: A GUIDE FOR ANTITRUST
Lawrence J. White
A. Introduction
The U.S. financial crisis of 20072008 has been a searing
experience. The popping of a housing bubble exposed the subprime
lending debacle, which in turn created a wider financial crisis, which has
had international ramifications. The weakened financial sector has
contributed to a U.S. recession that currently is the worst since the early
1980s and that may become the worst since the Gr eat Depression of the
1930s.
One theme in discussions of the crisis has been the roles and
regulation of very large financial institutions: large commercial banks
(e.g., Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo); large
investment banks (e.g., Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs); large insurance conglomerates (e.g.,
American International Group (AIG)); a nd large ―government sponsored
enterprises‖ (GSEs) that are devoted to residential mortgage finance
(e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Many of these institutions are
described as ―too big to fail‖ (TBTF). Discussions of financial size a nd
excessive bigness seem to invoke antitrust issues.
This paper will offer an overview of the financial sector, financial
regulation, the subprime debacle, and the wider financial crisis that
followed.1 An antitrustand thus a competitionperspective will be
Stern School of Business, New York University.
1. A comprehensive discussion of these topics is beyond t he capabilities of
this paper. In many places, however, this paper will draw on other
writings of the author that have addressed these topics at greater depth:
e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Partial Deregulation of Banks and Other
Depository Institutions, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY
HAPPENED 169 (Leonard W. Weiss & Michael W. Klass eds., 1986);
LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR
66 Competition as Public Policy
maintained throughout. This perspective will reveal that there has been a
longstanding tension between the operation of financial regulation and
the promotion of competition. Beginning in the late 1960s, that tension
progressively lessened in many areas of financial regulation, as important
anticompetitive elements of financial regulation were eliminated
(although there was one important areathe regulation of large credit
rating agencieswhere new regulation fostered less competition, with
consequences that can be linked to the subprime lending debacle). The
financial sector has considerably fewer regulatory impediments to
competition today than was true 40 years ago, although regulatory
impediments still remain in too many places. This perspective will also
reveal that, although TBTF is a size issue, it is not an antitrust issue since
competition issues are not at stake; and modern antitrust is about
competition, not about size.
This paper will proceed as follows: Section B will set the stage by
providing an overview of the important features of finance and of
financial regulation in the United States Section C will add a discussion
BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991); Lawrence J. White, The Credit
Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES, AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 41 (Richard M. Levich,
Carmen Reinhart & Giovanni Majnoni eds., 2002) [hereinafter White, The
Credit Rating Industry]; Lawrence J. White, Focusing on Fannie and
Freddie: The Dilemmas of Reforming Housing Finance, 23 J. OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES RESEARCH 43 (2003) [hereinafter White, Focusing on Fannie
and Freddie]; Lawrence J. White, Fannie & Freddie: Part of the Solution,
or Part of the Problem?, 10 MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW 15 (2008)
[hereinafter White, Fannie and Freddie]; Lawrence J. White, F inancial
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform, 11 MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW 15
(2009) [hereinafter White, Financial Regulation]; Lawrence J. White, The
Community Reinvestment Act: Good Goals, Flawed Concept, in REVISITING
THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT 185 (Prabal Chakrabati, David Erickson, Ren S.
Essene, Ian Galloway, & John Olson eds., 2009) [hereinafter White, The
Community Reinvestment Act]; Lawrence J. White, The Role of Capital and
Leverage in the Financial Markets Debacle of 20072008, 37 MERCATUS
ON POLICY (2009) [hereinafter White, The Role of Capital and Leverage];
Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle,
21 CRITICAL REVIEW 389 (2009) [hereinafter White, Subprime Debacle];
Lawrence J. White, Wal-Mart and Banks: Should the Twain Meet? A
Principles-Based Approach to the Issues of t he Separation of Banking
and Commerce, 27 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY 440 (2009)
[hereinafter White, Wal-Mart and Banks].
Financia l Regulation and the Current Cr isis: A Guide for Antitrust 67
of U.S. policy toward housing finance, since housing finance has figured
so prominently in the financial crisis. Section D will offer a selective
history of financial regulation and some of the anticompetitive features
of financial regulation that have arisen at various times, which will
highlight the history of tensions between financial regulation and
antitrust. Section E reviews the subprime lending debacle and the wider
financial crisis that followed and uses that backdrop to discuss the
concept of financial institutions that are considered to be TBTF. Section
F concludes with a set of procompetitive policy recommendations for the
financial regulation area.
B. Finance and Financial Regulation
1. Understanding Finance
a. Finance Is Special
Finance is special in at least three ways. First, finance is ubiquitous.
Almost all enterprises need finance in order to obtain the resources for
investments and to bridge the gap between the time when inputs are paid
and the time when outputs are sold. Almost all governments need
finance, again to obtain the resources for investments and to bridge the
gap between the time when expenditures are made and the time when tax
revenues are received. Almost all individuals need finance, so as to
accommodate large investments and purchases and to bridge smaller
expenditure/income gaps. In addition, finance underlies the operation of
the monetary/payments system of any modern economy.
Second, finance unavoidably involves a time dimension: a loan or
investment is made at an initial point in time;2 repayment is expected to
occur at some future point in time.3 This time dimension means that
lenders always face some uncertainty as to whether the borrower will
actually repay the loan. T his uncertainty reflects the lender‘s
informational disadvantage (―asymmetric information‖) vis-à-vis the
2. For ease of exposition, the following discussion will be in terms of
―loans‖ that involve a ―lender‖ and a ―borrower;‖ but the same principles
apply to issues of equity investment rather than lending.
3. There is a similar time element to insurance: a commitment (to insure
against an event) is made at an initial point in time (with the insured party
making a ―premium‖ payment); and then subsequently, if the
insured-against event occurs, the insurance payment is made.

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