§54.6 Analysis
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§54.6 ANALYSIS
This section examines the individual provisions of CR 54 and their implications.
(1)Definitions
As defined in CR 54(a), a judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action. It includes any decree or order from which an appeal lies. The rule requires a judgment to be in writing and signed by the judge. A judgment must be promptly entered pursuant to CR 58.
An oral opinion from the bench is not a judgment, because it does not meet the requirements of CR 54(a) that it be reduced to writing and be signed by the judge. The trial court may freely change its mind until a formal judgment is rendered. Fosbre v. State,70 Wn.2d 578, 424 P.2d 901 (1967). The common practice is to regard an oral announcement from the bench as a guide to preparation of written findings that, when prepared and signed, constitute the basis for the subsequently entered judgment. Pratt v. Pratt,99 Wn.2d 905, 910, 665 P.2d 400 (1983).
A letter from the trial court to counsel advising them of its disposition of a case is not a judgment under this rule. State v. Aleshire,89 Wn.2d 67, 568 P.2d 799 (1977). A memorandum opinion is not a judgment. Chandler v. Doran Co.,44 Wn.2d 396,267 P.2d 907 (1954). Additionally, a memorandum opinion that does not contain a caption entitling it an order or judgment and does not direct that any action take place does not constitute a final judgment, and does not satisfy the definition of the term "decision." State v. Knox,86 Wn.App. 831, 939P.2d710 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 62P.3d489 (2003).
When a party files an appeal and submits a revised proposed judgment that omits the judgment amount, the trial court lacks authority, sua sponte, to adjudge the settlement amount. CR 54 does not require the trial court to sign any inaccurate or incomplete judgment. Walter's Edge Homeowners Ass'n v. Water's EdgeAssocs.,152 Wn.App. 572, 216P.3d1110 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1019 (2010).
(2)Multiple claims or multiple parties
Entry of a final judgment under CR 54(b) requires all of the following if the case is not entirely resolved: "(1) more than one claim for relief or more than one party against whom relief is sought; (2) an express determination that there is no just reason for delay; (3) written findings supporting the determination that there is no just reason for delay; and (4) an express direction for entry of the judgment." Nelbro Packing Co. v. Baypack Fisheries, L.L.C., 101 Wn.App. 517, 523, 6 P.3d 22 (2000). Absent any of these prerequisites, a court's ruling is an "order" pursuant to CR 54(a)(2), i.e., it is not appealable and is subject to change.
Determining when more than one claim is involved, however, is not always easy. If only one claim is involved in a case, even though it is supported by multiple theories, an appeal should not be certified. Doerflinger aA^.ZLf/e/ns.Co.,88Wn.2d878,567P.2d230(1977)(action on insurance contract); Snyder v. State,19 Wn.App. 631, 577 P.2d 160 (1978) (action for tortious interference with family relationships).
The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Pepper v. J.J. Welcome Construction Co.,73 Wn.App. 523,871 P.2d601, review denied,124 Wn.2d 1029 (1994), holding that three separate legal theories (negligence, nuisance, and trespass) based upon one common set of facts constituted one "claim for relief under CR 54(b). The court ruled that a single claim for relief, based upon one set of facts, is not converted into multiple claims by the assertion of various legal theories, citing Doerflinger,88 Wn.2d 878.
AWashington appellate court has adopted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's test for determining whether there is more than one claim before the court: "The ultimate determination of multiplicity of claims must rest in every case on whether the underlying factual bases for recovery state a number of different claims which could have been separately enforced." Thus, when the facts give rise to more than one legal right or cause of action, or there is more than one possible form of recovery and they are not mutually exclusive, the claimant has presented multiple claims for relief. Nelbro Packing, 101 Wn.App. at 524 (citing 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2657, at 76-77 (3d ed. 1998).
When a determination of liability has been made, but the issue of damages has not yet been decided, the multiple claims test has not been met. There is only one claim, and until the entire case is resolved, including the determination of damages, final judgment cannot be entered and no appeal can be taken. Bowing v. Bd. of Trustees of Green River Cmty Coll.,85 Wn.2d 300, 534P.2d1365 (1975).
When the liability of different defendants is based on independent acts of negligence, judgment may be entered as to one defendant, and if the required determination that there is no just reason for delay is made (and written findings are entered as required by the 1989 amendment to CR 54(b)), the judgment is appealable under CR 54(b). Bergren v. Adams County,8 Wn.App. 853, 509 P.2d 661, review denied, 82 Wn.2d 1009 (1973).
The appellate court has authority to review the trial court's determination for abuse of discretion to determine whether the action actually involved multiple claims. Schiffman v. Hanson Excavating Co.,82 Wn.2d 681, 513 P.2d 29 (1973).
(3)Express findings, determination, and direction for entry of judgment
CR 54(b) requires the trial court to make an express determination in the judgment, supported by written findings, that there is no just reason for delay as well as an express direction for the entry of judgment. Strict compliance with these provisions is required. Schiffman,82 Wn.2d 681. The Washington Supreme Court has held that to justify entry of final judgment under this rule, there must be some danger of hardship or injustice through delay that would be alleviated by an immediate appeal. Doerflinger,88 Wn.2d 878. In Snyder v. State,19 Wn.App. 631, 577 P.2d 160 (1978), the court held that the power conferred on the trial court to determine that there is no reason for delay should be used only infrequently—for example, when necessary to improve the administration of justice.
The Washington Supreme Court has enunciated several factors to be considered in determining whether there is no just reason for delay:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated claims, (2) whether questions which would be reviewed on appeal are still before the trial court for determination in the unadjudicated portion of the case, (3) whether it is likely that the need for review may be mooted by future developments in the trial court, (4) whether an immediate appeal will delay the trial of the unadjudicated matters without gaining any offsetting advantage in terms of the simplification and facilitation of that trial, and (5) the practical effects of allowing an immediate appeal.
Schiffman, 82 Wn.2d at 687; see also Lindsay Credit Corp. v. Skarperud,33 Wn.App. 766, 657 P.2d 804 (1983). When immediate appeal will resolve novel issues with a "far reaching effect" on others, the "practical effects" of immediate appeal weigh in favor of certification. KershawSunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass'n, 121 Wn.App. 714, 725,91 P.3d 104 (2004;, aff'd inpart, rev'd in part,156 Wn.2d 253, 126 P.3d 16 (2006); Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass'n,156 Wn.2d 253, 261 n.4, 126 P.3d 16 (2006) ("While there is some doubt as to whether CR 54(b) and RAP 2.2(d) were properly invoked in this case, these issues are not jurisdictional and do not prevent us from addressing the merits.").
The court's written findings must contain an analysis of the relevant factors and the reasons for the express direction for entry of judgment. Findings and an express direction for entry of final judgment are mandatory; an appeal must be dismissed when these requirements are not met. Surrey Downs Cmty Club v. City ofBellevue,14 Wn.App. 801, 802, 545P.2d24 (1976). The appellate court will review the record to determine whether the required hardship or injustice is affirmatively demonstrated and may reverse the trial court's determination for abuse of discretion. Fox v. Sunmaster Prods., Inc.,115 Wn.2d 498, 798P.2d808 (1990).
There are two aspects to the appellate court's review in CR 54(b) cases. First, the court must be satisfied that a final decision was reached as to any of the claims or parties. Some deference is given to the trial judge's opinion that the requirements have been met; however, mere certification by the trial judge that the requirements of CR 54(b) have been met is not conclusive. Nelbro Packing, 101 Wn.App. at 523. Second, the appellate court will consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that there was no just reason for delay. Id. at 525. "A court abuses its discretion if the decision was manifestly unreasonable, or the discretion was exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Substantial deference is given to the trial court's judgment." Id.
The appellate court will not hesitate to reverse a trial court's CR 54(b) determination for abuse of discretion if the appropriate requirements are not met. In Nelbro Packing, the court reversed the trial court's CR 54(b) certifications and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. 101 Wn.App. 517. The court found that although the trial court considered the practical effects of an immediate appeal, it did not address the relevant factors as set out in Schiffman, 82 Wn.2d at 687. Specifically, the trial court failed to address the relevant factors that appeared to weigh against a conclusion that there was no just reason for delay. "Without an explanation of why the other factors were disregarded, the court's stated reasons for the decision were...
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