Widening the ‘representation gap'? The implications of the ‘lobbying act’ for worker representation in the UK

• Published date: 01 November 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12076
• Date: 01 November 2014
• Author: Steve Williams,Brian Abbott

Widening the ‘representation gap’? The

implications of the ‘lobbying act’ for

worker representation in the UK

Brian Abbott and Steve Williams

ABSTRACT

The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Admin-

istration Act 2014 (the ‘Lobbying Act’) imposes tight restrictions on the campaigning

and lobbying activities of civil society organisations in the UK, diminishing their

capacity to represent the interests of working people and thus likely compounding the

‘representation gap’ within British workplaces. Along with austerity measures and

employment law reforms, the legislation exemplifies the UK government’s attempts to

shift the balance of power further towards employers.

1 INTRODUCTION

In countries like the UK, the United States and Australia trade unions have tradi-

tionally been considered the primary source of employee representation (Dobbins

and Dundon, 2014). This representative model, however, has been in decline;

increasingly workplaces are non-union, resulting in either an absence of representa-

tive structures, the creation of non-union mechanisms or a hybrid form of repre-

sentation where union and non-union forms coexist (Gomez et al., 2011). Studies of

worker representation, union and non-union, and employment relations more gen-

erally, often have a workplace focus. However, employment relations actors also

operate from outside of the traditional boundary of employing organisations. Trade

unions, in particular, have long attempted to influence public policy in areas that

affect their members through the ‘method of legal enactment’ (Webb and Webb,

1920).

In the UK, for example, the Lobbying Act, which became law in January 2014, was

the subject of intense lobbying from the Trade Union Congress (TUC), trade unions,

charities and pressure groups. The Act contains three substantive components. Part

One introduces a statutory register of ‘consultant lobbyists’ and a Registrar to enforce

the requirements (House of Lords, 2013a). The third part, the focus of the concerns of

❒Brian Abbott is Senior Lecturer, Department of Management, Kingston Business School, Kingston

University and Steve Williams is Reader, Department of Organisation Studies and Human Resource

Management, Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth. Correspondence should be

addressed to Brian Abbott, Department of Management, Kingston Business School, Kingston University,

Kingston Hill, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT2 7LB; email: B.Abbott@kingston.ac.uk

Industrial Relations Journal 45:6, 507–523

ISSN 0019-8692

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

many trade unions (e.g. UNISON and UNITE), reinforces the existing legal require-

ments obliging trade unions to keep accurate membership lists. Part Two of the Act,

the focus of this article, regulates and restricts campaigning by non-political party

bodies such as charities, trade unions and pressure groups during a ‘regulated period’

in the run up to parliamentary elections (House of Lords Library Note, 2013). This

part of the Act has provoked widespread controversy, especially among civil society

organisations (CSOs) and the TUC concerned that it will undermine their lobbying

and campaigning activities on issues affecting their constituents (House of Commons

Library, 2014; House of Lords, 2013b).

The provisions contained within Part Two of the Lobbying Act also have poten-

tially important implications for work and employment relations, principally by

compounding the ‘representation gap’ (Heery, 2009; Towers, 1997) in UK

workplaces. Given the decline in traditional sources of worker voice there is growing

interest in the role new employment relations actors, such as CSOs—including single-

issue campaign bodies, pressure groups, charities and community organisations—

play in representing the interests of workers (Abbott, 2006; Bellemare, 2000; Williams

et al., 2011), often by attempting to influence government policies at the level of the

state (Heery et al., 2012). By imposing tight restrictions on the campaigning and

lobbying activities of CSOs, the Lobbying Act potentially diminishes their capacity to

represent the interests of their constituents as working people. Along with profound

austerity measures (e.g. Taylor-Gooby, 2012) and the reform of employment law

(Hepple, 2013), it constitutes a third, and hitherto neglected, dimension of the UK

coalition government’s efforts to shift the balance of power in work and employment

relationships further towards employers.

The purpose of this article is to explore the likely effects of the Lobbying Act on the

lobbying and campaigning activities of CSOs, with regard to a number of key

questions. How will the Lobbying Act affect the ability of CSOs to provide their

constituents with representation and voice at the level of the state? How could the Act

affect joint working between CSOs on issues of concern to their supporters? Given the

tighter controls, contained within the legislation, on the activities of CSOs during a

‘regulated period’, will this weaken their role as employment actors? Finally, in what

potential ways could the legislation compound the ‘representation gap’?

2 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND WORKER REPRESENTATION

The dominant source of employee representation has traditionally been through

trade unions (Gomez et al., 2011). Declining union membership and workplaces with

a union presence have undermined this representative model (Van Wanrooy et al.,

2013). The marginalisation of trade unions has led to growing interest in the emer-

gence of a multiform system of worker representation and non-union forms of

worker representation (Dobbins and Dundon, 2014; Heery, 2009; 2011). Although

non-union forms of worker representation have remained stable in recent years there

remains an absence of any representative arrangements in a large minority of work-

places, 37 per cent (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013: 66). In the 1990s, the decline of

traditional workplace representative mechanisms led commentators (e.g. Towers,

1997) to highlight the emergence of a representation gap, an observation that

remains relevant today.

Towers (1997) identified established workplace representative structures and

cooperative union–management relations as important approaches to bridging the

508 Brian Abbott and Steve Williams

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd