The Relationship Between Union Membership and Net Fiscal Impact
Published date | 01 January 2019 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12224 |
Author | José Pacas,Aaron Sojourner |
Date | 01 January 2019 |
The Relationship Between Union Membership
and Net Fiscal Impact
*
AARON SOJOURNER and JOS
E PACAS
This paper develops the first evidence on how individuals’union membership sta-
tus affects their net fiscal impact, the difference between taxes they pay and cost
of public benefits they receive, enriching our understanding of how labor relations
interacts with public economics. Current Population Survey data between 1994
and 2015 in pooled cross-sections and individual first-difference models yield evi-
dence that union membership has a positive net fiscal impact through the worker-
level channels studied.
Introduction
This paper offers the first evidence on whether union membership causes
workers to use less public benefits and to pay more taxes. Prior work has
neither tested nor measured effects on these outcomes, although findings of
union wage and benefit premiums gives reason to expect this. The litera-
ture’s evidence about effects of unionization on wages and benefits is insuf-
ficient to understand the effect of unionization on taxes paid or benefits
received. First, higher hourly compensation might reduce hours and not
increase earnings. Second, tax and public-benefit effects depend on interac-
tions of workers’earnings with household characteristics and with tax and
benefit policy. A union-induced 10 percent wage increase will have differ-
ent tax and benefit implications for a worker earning near the poverty line
versus one earning at the median, for a childless worker versus with one
with three children, and for a worker in California versus Mississippi. For
example, additional earnings will increase the amount of Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) a worker collects if her base level of income and family
structure are such that the EITC is phasing in but will decrease the EITC
amount if the EITC is phasing out.
*The authors’affiliations are, respectively, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. E-mail:
asojourn@umn.edu; and University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. E-mail: pacas002@umn.edu.
The authors thank John Budd, Brigham Frandsen, Greg Leiserson, Joseph Ritter, Elizabeth Davis, session
participants at the LERA and SOLE annual meetings, and attendees of the Urban Institute seminar series for
helpful feedback. They also thank the Minnesota Population Center for assistance with editing, as funded
under grant #P2C HD041023.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, DOI: 10.1111/irel.12224. Vol. 58, No. 1 (January 2019). ©2018 The Regents of
the Univers ity of Califo rnia Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden,
MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK.
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Through union membership, many workers raise their labor compensation in
earnings and employer-provided fringe benefits. The positive effect of union
membership on labor earnings is especially pronounced for workers who
would otherwise have very low earnings. Frandsen (2012) followed workers
after close union elections and found that unionization strongly raises post-
election earnings for workers who were below the twenty-fifth percentile of
the pre-election earnings distribution but had no effect for workers who were
at higher percentiles. Frandsen’s focus on earnings, rather than wages,
accounts for any reduction in hours induced by higher hourly compensation.
He also followed workers even if they left the establishment and counted earn-
ings as zero if they did not earn from any employer, so this also accounts for
any reductions in employment driven by unionization.
Union membership also raises workers’likelihood of having private,
employer-provided health insurance and other benefits (Buchmueller, DiNardo,
and Valletta 2002; Freeman 1981; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Knepper 2018).
Employer expenditures on fringe benefits are 2.5 times higher per hour worked
for unionized jobs than for nonunion jobs and, as with earnings, the effects of
unions on benefits appear larger in lower-paying establishments (Budd 2005).
Freeman et al. (2015) provided evidence that the union wage premium shifts
some workers up into middle-class incomes and that the decline of unionism
contributes to the shrinking middle class. This latter paper focuses on the
effect of union density in a community rather than of individual worker union
membership, i.e., union gains rather than union gaps in the language of Lewis
(1986). We focus on union gaps, the effect of individual union membership
rather than of aggregate union density.
Political leaders, activists, and media have speculated that unionization
may have a positive net fiscal impact on public balance sheets by both (1)
reducing public-benefit use and (2) increasing tax payments by workers.
Low-wage workers have been pushing for improvements in working condi-
tions and for unionization through the OUR Walmart, Fast Food Forward,
and the Fight for 15 campaigns, often criticizing nonunion employers’low
pay and meager benefits for making working families reliant on public insur-
ance programs. U.S. Representative-elect Alan Grayson spoke with Walmart
workers in his community about their right to join a union, arguing that they
are paid so little, “they often seek government programs for help”(Sanders
2012). McDonald’s central human-resources department points out to their
employees that they may qualify for food stamps and Medicaid (Eidelson
2013). This issue is not isolated to retail. For instance, Jacobs et al. (2016)
found that a third of frontline manufacturing production workers are enrolled
in at least one public safety net program and that this is primarily a result of
low wages.
Union Membership and Net Fiscal Impact /87
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