A strike of ‘unorganised’ workers in a Chinese car factory: the Nanhai Honda events of 2010

Date01 March 2015
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12089
Published date01 March 2015
AuthorQuan Meng,Jun Lu,Xuebing Cao,Dave Lyddon
A strike of ‘unorganised’ workers in a
Chinese car factory: the Nanhai Honda
events of 2010
Dave Lyddon, Xuebing Cao, Quan Meng and Jun Lu
ABSTRACT
This strike in a Chinese factory of the Japanese multinational Honda in 2010 received
worldwide coverage. A young workforce sustained an on–off strike, with varying
numbers of workers involved, for 19 days. Academic interest has focused on prospects
for collective bargaining and union reform in China. This article, using interviews
with former strikers, and newspaper sources, analyses the strike process. The work-
place union, as a constituent of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and subject
to the Chinese Party–state, was hostile; so the workers were in effect ‘unorganised’.
Examples of non-union strikes in the interwar car industry of the USA and UK show
the similarity of situation with the Honda workers. Hiller’s classic text, The Strike,
provides a surprisingly suitable framework for understanding strikes of unorganised
workers. The strikers’ vocabulary ‘framed’ their demands initially as injustice, but
incorporated anti-Japanese sentiment and, then, dignity, in response to events.
1 INTRODUCTION
In going on strike at a transmission factory, workers here have Honda by the jugular [vein], although
it was not entirely clear at the employees’ dormitory . . . that they realized this. Transmission factories
are the most expensive auto plants of all to build. . . . The factory here supplies four Honda plants in
China, all of which have been shut down (New York Times, 28 May 2010).
The interdependent nature of factories in the car industry, exacerbated by local and
global just-in-time supply practices, can make companies peculiarly vulnerable to
stoppages in one factory. In May and June 2010 this was illustrated by the series of
strikes, for large pay increases, in the Chinese factories of the Japanese multinational
company Honda (particularly that in the Nanhai district of Foshan city, Guangdong
province, 100 miles north-west of Hong Kong); these were followed by strikes at
Toyota-affiliated factories in China. When the Nanhai Honda strike created short-
ages of gearboxes, leading to the shutdown of all Honda’s four Chinese assembly
factories, news of it even reached The Times (28 May 2010) and the Economist (3 June
Dave Lyddon is Honorary Fellow in Industrial Relations and Xuebing Cao is Lecturer in HRM, both
at Keele Management School, Keele University; Quan Meng is Lecturer in Capital University of Econom-
ics and Business, China, and Jun Lu is Associate Professor in Shandong University of Finance and
Economics, China. Correspondence should be addressed to Dave Lyddon, Keele University, Keele,
Staffordshire ST5 5BG; email: d.lyddon@keele.ac.uk
Industrial Relations Journal 46:2, 134–152
ISSN 0019-8692
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
2010) in Britain. For two days the Chinese authorities, playing on anti-Japanese
sentiment, unusually allowed domestic news coverage of the strike, thus ensuring its
notoriety within China itself. The method of ending the strike by a negotiated settle-
ment with the workforce, and the string of copycat actions that its success generated,
has triggered a steady stream of academic comment (e.g. Chan and Hui, 2012; 2014;
Chang, 2010; Chang and Brown, 2013; Friedman, 2012; 2013; Gray and Jang, 2014;
Hui, 2011; Lau, 2012).
Multinational companies are not allowed to assemble cars or manufacture compo-
nents in China, except through joint venture partnerships with domestic firms. In
1983, when the first joint venture opened, only 5,200 passenger cars were produced in
China. This had grown to 220,000 by 1993 and to 2.3 million in 2004 (Chin, 2010: 4).
With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, ‘pro-
duction skyrocketed’ (Anderson, 2012: 15) as protectionist measures were gradually
reduced and prices fell. Its annual car production overtook Japan’s in 2009 to become
the largest in the world, and the industry has carried on growing at a phenomenal rate.
In 2010 Chinese factories produced 13.9 million cars, which had risen to 18.1 million
three years later (OICA, 2014). All the big automobile multinationals now have a
presence in China, with Honda setting up joint venture assembly companies in 1998
and 2003 (Anderson, 2012: 268). The Nanhai Honda component factory (a joint
venture established in 2007) operated a three-shift system and employed a predomi-
nantly young migrant workforce of about 1,800 (90 per cent male in 2011), the
majority (different sources give different percentages) of whom were interns (average
age 18), third-year students from technical colleges, recruited every year, and paid a
lower wage than regular workers. The strike was an on–off affair, with varying
proportions of the workforce involved. A limited stoppage on 17 May 2010 was
followed by a partial strike on 20–21 May, no overtime (to make up for lost produc-
tion) worked on the weekend of 22–23 May, effectively a full strike between 24 May
and 1 June, then a resumption of work until final negotiations on 4 June were
accompanied by a small stoppage. After establishing a suitable framework with which
to analyse the strike, the rest of the article charts its course.
2 THEORY, CONTEXT AND METHOD
While the number of strikes is historically extremely low in Europe and North
America, strikes in the new ‘workshop of the world’—China—are becoming more
common (Chan, 2009; China Labour Bulletin, Research Report, 2014; Elfstrom and
Kuruvilla, 2014; van der Velden et al., 2007). Even before the increased marketisation
of the Chinese economy, strikes were not unknown. Since the early 1980s there has
been a spate of ‘mass incidents’ recorded, though the term ‘strike’ often encompassed
actions by workers after they had lost their jobs. Such incidents included blocking
highways and besieging local government buildings, particularly when workers were
laid off from state-owned enterprises (Chan, 2010: 24–42; Lee, 2000: 43, 48–53;
Pringle, 2011: 77–81). Labour shortages and greater experience of the factory system
led to a ‘normalization’ of strikes in the 2000s, and ‘strikes and picket lines have
gradually replaced sit-ins and marches’ (Pringle, 2011: 103).
Pringle (2011: 103–104) has used Hobsbawm’s term ‘collective bargaining by riot’
(1964: 7) to describe the ‘short strikes and protests [that] have become an extremely
prompt and effective way of redressing . . . grievances’ in China, where workers have
‘developed a very good idea of what they can get away with and how far they can go’.
135The Nanhai Honda strike of ‘unorganised’ workers in 2010
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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