Sidney and Beatrice Webb's Institutional Theory of Labor Markets and Wage Determination

Published date01 July 2013
AuthorBruce E. Kaufman
Date01 July 2013
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12032
Sidney and Beatrice Webbs Institutional Theory
of Labor Markets and Wage Determination
BRUCE E. KAUFMAN*
Sydney and Beatrice Webb were among the most inuential institutional labor
economists of the pre-World War II period yet this portion of their work has
fallen out of sight for more than a half-century. This paper reconstructs the
Webbstheory of labor markets and wage determination and explains how it dif-
fers from the rival neoclassical labor theory of Alfred Marshall. Key institutional
components of their theory are developed, such as rent theory, institutional pyra-
mid, chain of bargains, inequality of bargaining power, unemployed residuum,
and common rule. The Webbstheory is then used to explain the operation of
labor markets and why in the absence of regulation they generate numerous social
problems, including widespread poverty wages, excessive work hours and inju-
ries, substantial unemployment, and human capital exploitation. Also described is
the set of labor policies the Webbs advocate to solve these problems. Implications
for modern labor theory and policy are developed.
The labor view [was] rst and most effectively developed by the Webbs,
where they set out, in a literary way, the whole notion of inequality of
bargaining power, and there wasnt a man in the United Statesor in
the worldwho taught this stuff, or any writers of textbooks in succeed-
ing generations, who didnt say this. (Wolman 1961: 55)
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SCHOOLS WERE THE DOMINANT
GROUPS IN LABOR ECONOMICS into the 1960s (Boyer and Smith 2001; Kaufman
2006), and among early writers, the British husbandwife team of Sidney and
Beatrice Webb played a particularly important roleper the Wolman epigraph
(also see Douglas 1948). Among the dozens of books and articles they wrote
over a six-decade career, the 900+page volume Industrial Democracy (1897)
* The authorsafliations are Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Email: bkaufman@gsu.edu; Department of Human Resources and Employment Relations, and Centre for
Work, Organization, and Wellbeing, Grifth University, Brisbane, Qld, Australia and Work and Employment
Research Unit, Business School, University of Hertsfordshire, Hateld, UK.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July 2013). ©2013 Regents of the University of California
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington
Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK.
765
stands out as their magnum opus. The book is an exemplar of the early institu-
tional approach in political economy (Rutherford 2011)exhaustive on-the-
ground investigation, an inductive/empiricist approach to theory development, a
corpus of theory integrating in a literary way ideas and insights from diverse
writers and disciplines (Smith, Marx, Marshall; economics, sociology, history),
and a progressive policy program emphasizing social control and reengineering
of institutions to produce more efcient and equitable outcomes.
The Webbs are the subject of a modest literature of biography and political
thought (Cole 1971; Eriguchi 2009; Harrison 2000; Nolan 1988) centered on
their role in founding and developing the Fabian Society and its creed of evo-
lutionary state socialism. Next is a smaller body of work that examines the
Webbss place in the late nineteenth-century dissident movement associated
with the British version of the Methodenstreit (war over method) and corollary
efforts to develop a historicalsocialinstitutional type of economics (Koot
1987; Rutherford 2007). Part of this story is the Webbsdecision to found the
London School of Economics (LSE) in 1895 as a way to circumvent the
orthodox hold on British economics exercised by Marshall et al. at Cambridge
and Oxford (Kadish 1993; Perlman and McCann 1998).
Next in the list are the Webbshistorical and empirical studies on labor prob-
lems, institutions, and policy. They were late nineteenth-century pioneers of the
social science research program on the conditions of labor (Harrison 2000; Kauf-
man 2012a; McNulty 1980); were widely regarded as co-founders of the eld of
industrial relations for their seminal trade union studies (Frege 2008; Hyman
1989); and provided often-cited analyses and rationales for collective bargaining,
minimum wages, and the modern social welfare state (Bevir 2002; Farnham
2008; Kaufman 2005, 2009). Of these subjects, the Webbswritings on trade
unions today still get occasional if somewhat ritualistic citation.
Least known is the Webbsattempted reformulation of labor market theory.
Critics claim the Webbs and other labor institutionalists were antitheory and con-
tributed little beyond a mass of facts and description (Boyer and Smith 2001;
Stigler 1959). However, one notes in the preface to Industrial Democracy (1897)
the Webbs tell readers, we have ventured into the domain of theory [and]
have laid before the student a new analysis of the working of competition in the
industrial eld(p. viii, emphasis added). Although lost today, this new analy-
siswas widely known and quite inuential in the preWorld War II years (e.g.,
Millis and Montgomery 1945) and provided part of the economic and social
rationale for the New Deal labor program in the United States (Kaufman 2012b).
This article describes and recasts into modern terms the labor market theory
of the Webbs. It is organized into ten linked topic areas. A history of thought
purpose is served; more important, however, is utilizing the Webbsideas to
further develop and strengthen the institutional economic theory base for labor
766 / BRUCE E. KAUFMAN

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