Politics of Active Representation: The Trade-off Between Organizational Role and Active Representation

• Date: 01 March 2020
• Author: Changgeun Yun
• Published date: 01 March 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/0734371X18792977
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0734371X18792977

Review of Public Personnel Administration

2020, Vol. 40(1) 132 –154

© The Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0734371X18792977

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Article

Politics of Active

Representation: The Trade-off

Between Organizational Role

and Active Representation

Changgeun Yun1,2

Abstract

The translation of passive into active representation assumes that bureaucrats are

willing to serve the interest of their social group when developing and implementing

policies. However, the assumption does not account for organizational socialization—

the process of being taught what is important in an organization. In addition, there is

a comparative paucity of theoretical and conceptual frameworks to explain why and

how bureaucrats decide to become active representatives. In this study, I develop

a framework for analyzing the decision to engage in active representation. The

framework recognizes that active representation conflicts with organizational role and

is based on the assumption of public choice theory that humans are utility maximizers.

Bureaucrats are not totally devoted to active representation, but instead find an

optimal point at which their self-interest is maximized in interrole conflict.

Keywords

active representation, organizational socialization, inter-role conflict, self-interest

maximization

Introduction

Since Mosher (1968) divided the concept of representation into passive and active

forms, the link between them has been a central concern in public administration.

Members of the same social group having similar demographic backgrounds

undergo a similar socialization process and share core attitudes, values, and beliefs

1Ajou University, Suwon, South Korea

2Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea

Corresponding Author:

Changgeun Yun, Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Ajou University, 206

Worldcup-ro, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16499, South Korea.

Email: cyun@ajou.ac.kr

792977ROPXXX10.1177/0734371X18792977Review of Public Personnel AdministrationYun

research-article2018

Yun 133

(Krislov, 1974), which generate social norms and cognitive reference points.

Thus, when bureaucrats develop and implement policies in accordance with their

own values and beliefs, they also serve the interest of their social group (Lim,

2006).

However, socialization has multiple sources: not just demographic backgrounds

but also peer, community, and organization. Particularly, the previous literature has

not fully taken into account organizational socialization, which is the process of

being indoctrinated and taught what is important in an organization (Ellis, Bauer, &

Erdogan, 2015; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Organizational socialization may

conflict with the socialization one receives in a social group before entering the

organization. Although some studies have recognized and explained organizational

socialization as a barrier to the translation of passive into active representation

(e.g., Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Wilkins & Williams, 2008), it is nevertheless an

ongoing process after a member joins an organization (Oberfield, 2014; Wanous,

1992) and may conflict with active representation. Thus, the issue should be incor-

porated into representative bureaucracy theory rather than being presented as a

potential reason for why passive representation does not translate into active

representation.

In addition, most bureaucrats intend to represent their social group regardless of

whether they are minority or majority. Thus, given that an organization has limited

resources, minority and majority bureaucrats compete for use of these limited resources

to represent their social groups’ interests. Finally, minority bureaucrats may not per-

ceive their role as representatives of minority interests. It is a choice to take on active

representation role.

In an effort to better understand a bureaucrat’s decision to serve as an active repre-

sentative, I test an understudied theoretical framework that rests on the assumption of

public choice theory that humans are egoistic and rational utility maximizers (Buchanan

& Tullock, 1962). Bureaucrats pursue private interests at least to the same extent as

other persons are allowed, so it can be expected that bureaucrats might promote self-

interests while pursuing their own social groups’ interests. Furthermore, active repre-

sentation is not a free lunch, but comes at the expense of private interests. Decision

making about active representation can be understood under the assumption of utility

maximization.

The subsequent discussion proceeds as follows. I first discuss the theoretical back-

ground of representative bureaucracy, especially in terms of political support and pol-

icy discretion. The politics of active representation through conflict between informal

and formal roles is examined, the establishment of a framework for understanding

individual decision making about active representation. An exposition of testable

hypotheses and a description of the data follow. In the final sections, I report the results

of tests of the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the results for better under-

standing the politics of active representation. I conclude by describing the contribu-

tions and theoretical implications of the study as well as the limitations and issues that

should be investigated in future research.