Methamphetamine, Money, and a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel: United States v. Jimenez-antunez All Boils Down to the Appropriate Standard-

• Publication year: 2017

Methamphetamine, Money, and a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel: United States v. Jimenez-Antunez All Boils Down to the Appropriate Standard-

Jessica Haygood

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Methamphetamine, Money, and a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel: United States v. Jimenez-Antunez All Boils Down to the Appropriate Standard^*

I. Introduction

In United States v, Jimenez-Antunez,¹ the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant is not required to show good cause to dismiss his retained counsel, even if the defendant then intends to request appointed counsel.² The issue was one of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit,³ and one that has caused some disagreement between the other circuits.⁴ There are distinct differences between the right to appointed counsel and the right to retained counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.⁵ This case continues to uphold those distinctions by keeping the standards to substitute counsel separate.

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II. Factual Background: Methamphetamine, Money, and Motion to Withdraw

Gabriel Jimenez-Antunez was a drug distributor for a Mexican drug supplier named Chato. Chato's couriers transported drugs into the United States and delivered them to Jimenez-Antunez. Chato instructed Jimenez-Autunez to deposit the profits from the drug sales in several different bank accounts. On May 12, 2013, Jimenez-Antunez was arrested by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).⁶

On June 4, 2013, Jimenez-Antunez was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams of methamphetamine, possession of 500 grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and illegal reentry after deportation. After Jimenez-Antunez was indicted, Attorney Ash Joshi entered notice of appearance as Jimenez-Antunez's retained counsel. Joshi negotiated a plea agreement with the government and Jimenez-Antunez pleaded guilty to the two conspiracy charges.⁷

On October 24, 2014, Jimenez-Antunez sent a letter to Joshi requesting that he withdraw as counsel so the judge would appoint an attorney to represent him. On November 3, 2014, Joshi moved to withdraw as counsel and stated that he expected Jimenez-Antunez to request appointed counsel immediately after Joshi's withdrawal.⁸

At Jimenez-Antunez's sentencing hearing on December 16, 2014, the district court reviewed Joshi's motion to withdraw.⁹ "Joshi stated that he and Jimenez-Antunez had disagreements and that Jimenez-Antunez felt that Joshi had coerced him into pleading guilty."¹⁰ The district court determined there was no evidence that Joshi had coerced Jimenez-Antunez into pleading guilty, the judge had explained the nature of the proceedings during the plea hearing, and Joshi had visited Jimenez-Antunez in the last six months.¹¹ The court denied Joshi's motion to withdraw on the basis that Jimenez-Antunez had been provided effective counsel.¹² The

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court then proceeded with the sentencing hearing, in which Jimenez-Antunez was sentenced to 300 months and 240 months of imprisonment, to be served concurrently.¹³

Jimenez-Antunez appealed the district court's decision.¹⁴ The Eleventh Circuit determined that "[t]he district court applied the wrong standard when it denied Joshi's motion to withdraw" on the basis that Jimenez-Antunez was given effective counsel.¹⁵ Furthermore, the district court did not give any reasons for concluding that granting Johsi's motion would have affected the fair, orderly, and effective administration of the courts.¹⁶ In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit held that a criminal defendant does not have to show good cause to dismiss retained counsel, even if the defendant then intends to request appointed counsel.¹⁷

III. Legal Background: Right to Counsel

A. The History of the Right to Retained and Appointed Counsel

A defendant's right to counsel arose out of early English common law, the constitutions of the original colonies, and the Sixth Amendment.¹⁸ Originally, in England, a person was only entitled to full assistance of counsel in criminal cases where a person was accused of a misdemeanor.¹⁹ It was not until 1836 that an act by Parliament granted the full right to counsel in respect to felonies.²⁰

The American colonies rejected England's original limitation on the full assistance of counsel, which was only afforded in misdemeanor trials.²¹ When the Constitution was adopted, twelve of the thirteen colonies had constitutional provisions that rejected the English rule and recog-

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nized that a defendant had a right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions.²² The Sixth Amendment rejected the English rule as well and "provide[d] that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right 'to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.'"²³

While Powell v. Alabama²⁴ was not a Sixth Amendment case, it still had an important role in the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.²⁵ The case involved a group of young African-American males who were convicted of raping two Caucasian females and were sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of the United States considered the case after the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment, which included denying the defendants the right to counsel.²⁶ The U.S. Supreme Court first held that an accused person should be given reasonable time and a fair opportunity to retain counsel of his own choice.²⁷ The Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution²⁸ and stated that depriving a defendant of the right to retain counsel was a denial of due process.²⁹ Second, the Court held that it is a requirement for counsel to be appointed in capital cases where the accused is unable to employ counsel.³⁰ The Court reasoned that the denial of appointed counsel was a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it would deny the defendant a fair trial.³¹ This case stands for the proposition that there are two separate rights to counsel afforded by the Constitution, which include both the right to retained counsel and the right to appointed counsel.³²

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In 1938, the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Zerbst³³ that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to both retained and appointed counsel.³⁴ The case involved two defendants who were charged and convicted with possessing and uttering counterfeit money. Neither of the defendants could employ counsel of their choice because they lacked financial ability. A request was made for appointed counsel to the District Attorney, who responded that the court would not appoint counsel because the defendants had not been charged with a capital offense.³⁵ The Supreme Court stated that the right to counsel is one of the protections the Sixth Amendment "deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty."³⁶ The Court also determined that it is consistent with the Sixth Amendment that a defendant be appointed counsel by the state if he cannot afford counsel on his own.³⁷ Consequently, the Court concluded that federal courts cannot deprive a defendant of life or liberty in any criminal proceeding, unless the accused "has or waives the assistance of counsel."³⁸

In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,³⁹ which extended the Sixth Amendment to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.⁴⁰ Gideon was charged and convicted in a Florida state court of breaking and entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Gideon requested appointed counsel, but the court denied his request on the basis that Florida state laws only require an appointment of counsel where a defendant is charged

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with a capital offense.⁴¹ After granting writ of certiorari, the Court explained that any provision of the Bill of Rights⁴² that is deemed fundamental and essential to a fair trial is extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.⁴³ It concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is fundamental and essential to a fair trial.⁴⁴

In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court further extended the reach of the right to counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin.⁴⁵ The defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, which is a crime punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a fine of $1,000, or both. The defendant was not represented by counsel at his trial and was sentenced to ninety days in jail.⁴⁶ The defendant "brought [a] habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme Court," which ruled that the right to appointed counsel was only required in trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment."⁴⁷ After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court held that no person may be imprisoned for any crime, whether petty, a misdemeanor, or a felony, without being represented by counsel at trial.⁴⁸ The Court explained there was no historical support for limiting the right to counsel to serious criminal cases.⁴⁹ The Court also reasoned that the possibility of imprisonment will rarely "be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter . . . ."⁵⁰

B. Standards for Retained Counsel

The Supreme Court stated in Powell that a defendant should be given a fair opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice.⁵¹ The right of a person who does not require appointed counsel to choose the counsel that he prefers is protected by the Sixth Amendment.⁵²

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In Wheat v. United States,⁵³ the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to retained counsel of choice could be restricted in some important instances.⁵⁴ In Wheat, the defendant and several codefendants were charged with participating in a drug distribution conspiracy. The defendant contacted his codefendants' counsel and asked the attorney to represent him as well. The Government argued that the substitution of counsel would create a substantial conflict of interest. The defendant argued he had a right to...