Maryland v. Wilson: the Fading Fourth Amendment - Gregory Lineberry

• Citation: Vol. 49 No. 3
• Publication year: 1998

Maryland v. Wilson: The Fading Fourth Amendment

In Maryland v. Wilson,¹ the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may order a passenger of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle.² This "bright-line rule" allows these intrusions as a matter of course and does not require case-by-case determination.³

I. Factual Background

Maryland v. Wilson concerned an attempt to suppress evidence that arguably resulted from an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.⁴ A total of three persons, including petitioner, were riding in a car that was stopped in Maryland for exceeding the posted speed limit. The regular license tag had been replaced by a torn piece of paper that read "Enterprise Rent-A-Car." Maryland State Trooper David Hughes pulled the car over after attempting to do so for a mile and a half.⁵

During the pursuit, the behavior of the two passengers aroused Trooper Hughes's suspicions. The trooper noticed the passengers duck below sight level and turn to look at him several times. As Hughes approached the car after the stop was made, the driver left the car and met Hughes halfway. The driver produced a valid Connecticut driver's license and appeared very nervous. Upon Hughes's instruction, the driver retrieved the rental documents from the car. At this time Hughes noticed that the passenger in the front seat, Wilson, was sweating and noticeably nervous. Wilson exited the car at Hughes's demand and dropped a quantity of crack cocaine on the ground. Wilson was then arrested and charged with intent to distribute.⁶

At trial Wilson moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that Hughes's order to leave the car was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted Wilson's motion to suppress. On appeal the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the decisions of the courts below and held that "an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop."⁷

II. Legal Background

Despite general agreement that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has splintered when attempts have been made to translate this abstract principle into workable guidelines.⁸ This uncertainty has gradually eroded the need for individual police officers to make reasoned, discretionary decisions before intruding on an individual's personal liberties.⁹ The result of this change has been the promulgation of "bright-line rules," which refer to situations in which police officers are empowered to act without discretion.¹⁰ Maryland v. Wilson represents the most recent step in the retreat from the discretionary probable cause requirements.¹¹

In Terry v. Ohio,¹² the United States Supreme Court tested the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures in instances that fell short of arrest. At issue were situations in which a police officer might feel compelled to briefly detain a person without probable cause in order to ascertain whether that person was involved in illegal activity. The Court acknowledged that there was "some force" to petitioner's argument that there is no type of police activity, short of arrest, that does not require the voluntary consent of the citizen.¹³ Nevertheless, the Court held otherwise and declined to rely on the probable cause standard necessary for an arrest.¹⁴ Favoring the balancing test set forth in Camara v. Municipal Court,¹⁵ the Court stated that to be in compliance with the Fourth

Amendment, the officer's actions in this type of situation must be "reasonable," which is determined by "balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."¹⁶ To justify the particular invasion, the "officer must be able to point to specific articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant that intrusion."¹⁷ In this case the Court found that a protective search for weapons was valid even without probable cause because it would have been unreasonable to prevent a police officer from taking actions to protect himself when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous.¹⁸

The Court also stated that the Fourth Amendment was meaningless unless the officer's actions were subject to judicial review.¹⁹ A judge must find that the actions taken were appropriate and that an objectively reasonable police officer would have taken the same actions.²⁰ The Court stated that any lesser standard "would invite intrusion upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches," which the Court previously refused to sanction.²¹ Thus, an officer's good faith belief in the necessity of the action taken is not enough.²² According to the Court, under this standard the Fourth Amendment would cease to function, and people would be subject to the whim of the police.²³

The Court in Terry announced the proposition that a search of an individual by a police officer is justified when the officer reasonably believes that the individual is dangerous.²⁴ The Court stressed the need of police officers to protect themselves and reiterated the unreasonableness of forcing officers to take unnecessary risks while carrying out their duties.²⁵ However, the Court cautioned that the officer's assessment of a situation must be reasonable.²⁶ Action based on "unparticularized" suspicions and hunches was not warranted by the Court.²⁷ The Court in Terry ultimately held that when an officer is aware of unusual conduct that arouses reasonable suspicion of the existence of criminal activity or the possibility of danger, the officer may protect himself and others by intruding upon personal liberties to secure the safety of the person present.²⁸

The case most factually similar to Maryland v. Wilson is Pennsylvania v. Minims,²⁹ a 1977 case in which the Court enacted a "bright-line rule" allowing a police intrusion onto personal liberty absent the suspicion of danger.³⁰ The Court in Minims considered whether it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to order a driver to exit a lawfully stopped car. Two officers observed respondent Mimms driving with an expired license plate and stopped the car to issue a traffic ticket. One of the officers asked Mimms to leave the car, and when Mimms complied, the officer noticed a bulge in his jacket that turned out to be a gun. The State freely conceded that there was no unusual behavior to give the officer reason to be suspicious of criminal activity. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the order for Mimms to leave the car was an impermissible seizure under the Fourth Amendment.³¹

The United States Supreme Court employed a balancing test, weighing the policeman's interest in taking the action against the intrusion onto Mimms's personal liberty.³² The Court stated that it is "too plain for argument that . . . the safety of the officer . . . is both legitimate and weighty."³³ The Court reasoned that because Mimms was already lawfully stopped, the additional intrusion of forcing him to leave the car was "de minimis."³⁴ Thus, the Court held that mere inconvenience to a driver cannot prevent an action taken in pursuit of the legitimate concern for officer safety.³⁵

In his dissent, Justice Stevens discussed the retreat from probable cause that began with Terry and stated that "[t]oday, without argument, the Court adopts still another—and even lesser—standard of justification for a major category of police seizures."³⁶ Justice Stevens noted that the Court appeared to be abandoning a major protection of the Fourth Amendment—the requirement that there be independent justification on the specific facts of every police intrusion.³⁷ Justice Stevens further explained that the majority...