Managerial and supervisory custom and practice
| Date | 01 September 1979 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.1979.tb00285.x |
| Published date | 01 September 1979 |
*
Managerial
and
supervisory
custom
and
mactice
The term ‘custom and practice’ is more usually
associated with the behaviour
of
workers rather
than managers and supervisors. In addition, pre-
vious
studies have been
of
large plants with
strong workplace organisation. Peter Armstrong
and John Goodman discuss managerial and
supervisory custom and practice in the context
of
a study in a medium-sized factory in England.
HE
object
of
this paper is
to
examine some
T
examples
of
managerial and supervisory custom
and practice (C
&
P)
observed during a factory case
study’l].
As
C
&
P
is
generally associated with the
behaviour
of
workers rather than
of
supervisors and
managers, it
is
important
to
clarify the meaning
of
the
term when applied
to
the latter groups. The obvious
approach is
to
define
it
as referring
to
those aspects
of
managers’ and supervisors’ behaviour which
correspond
to
workers’
C
&
P.
However, existing
usage
of
the term C
&
P
varies slightly in the literature
and
it
is therefore necessary
to
re-examine this.
Clearly Brown’s work(2’ on the subject is very
important, and
is
discussed in the
first
part
of
the
paper.
Earlier writers(3) tended
to
define
C
&
P
as
unilaterally initiated and regulated by workers in a
context
of
management neglect. Brown’s work, by
contrast, demonstrates that much
of
the precedent
upon which
C
&
P
is
built
is
created by managers.
Foremen bying
to
buy peace or ill-informed interven-
tions by senior managers may re-intqret
or
transgress
existing rules and practices,
so
creating precedents
which are used by workers and their representatives
to build
up
new C
&
P.
Whilst this insight
was
not entirely new
-
Gouldner’s term indulgency
pattem’c4) refers
to
a somewhat similar process
-
it nevertheless stressed that both workers
and
managers were involved in the creation
of
C
&
P.
Indeed, besides initiating C
&
P,
managers
also
feature in the latter stages
of
its
establishment. In
Brown’s
usage, C
&
P
status requires more than that
working practices
be
established as customary
amongst the workers themselves: it requires
also
that
managers ‘recognise’ them. In conferring this ‘recog-
nition: they give a seal
of
legitimacy
to
C
&
P
rules,
thus ensuring their comparative stability.
U
P.
J.
Armstrong and
J.
F.
B.
Goodman
are,
respectively, Research Fellow and Frank Thomas
Professor
of
Industrial Relations,
University
of
Manchester institute
of
Science and Technology.
Whereas Flanders and
FOX(^'
saw C
&
P
as the
creation
of
workers and their stewards, Brown’s view
was that the part played by shop stewards
is
essentially
conservative‘? Rather than trying
to
extend C
&
P
at
every opportunity, they act primarily
so
as
to
order
and conserve the existing
C
&
P
created by manage-
ment action. The general picture, then,
is
one
of
piecemeal extension
of
C
&
P
in the direction
of
unilateral worker-control
(C
&
P
‘drift’) as a result
of
management error or omission. The rate
of
C
&
P
drift
depends partiy on management’s ‘control over itself
and partly on the
degree
of
organisation, bargaining
strength and ‘bargaining awareness’
of
the workforce.
Brown’s treatment
of
C
&
P
is
also distinctive in
that he insists on
a
‘transactional’ definition. Where
earlier writers used the term C
&
P
to
cover almost
any working customs‘7’ Brown specifically excludes
those
customs which
lie
outside the putative domain
of
management control
or
negotiated agreements@)
C
&
P
is thus conceived as
a
definite incursion into
managerial prerogatives
or
rights under negotiated
agreements, thereby excluding from the definition
practices which flourish in areas outside those covered
by management policy. In Brown’s use
of
the term,
“(C
&
P)
does not just augment formally negotiated
rules;
it
supplants
12
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