Lays vs. Wages: Contracting in the Klondike Gold Rush

Date06 April 2007
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-5895(06)22001-3
Pages1-15
Published date06 April 2007
AuthorDouglas W. Allen
LAYS VS. WAGES: CONTRACTING
IN THE KLONDIKE GOLD RUSH
Douglas W. Allen
ABSTRACT
Mine owners during the Klondike gold rush of 1898–1899 used two types
of contracts to coordinate workers and their capital: wage contracts and
lay (or share) contracts. The key interesting feature of this gold rush was
the severe climate and the constraints it placed on the miners. I show that
an ‘‘off the shelf’’ incentive model can explain the pattern of contracts,
once one understands how the extreme weather environment influenced
the behavior of miners.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines an unusual historical episode of contract choice: the
Klondike gold rush where wage and lay (share) contracts were used in the
mines.
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The theory of contract choice has been examined in many contexts,
including gold production; however, the geological features of the Klondike
make it an interesting case to consider.
Although the Klondike rush was short, the environment was so intense
that it placed severe binding constraints on miner’s abilities to mine and steal
gold during the mining process. These strong environmental constraints had
Research in Law and Economics, Volume 22, 1–15
Copyright r2007 by Elsevier Ltd.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0193-5895/doi:10.1016/S0193-5895(06)22001-3
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