On the Optimal Negligence Standard in Tort Law When One Party is a Long-run and the Other a Short-run Player

• Published date: 06 April 2007
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-5895(06)22006-2
• Pages: 207-216
• Date: 06 April 2007
• Author: Henrik Lando

ON THE OPTIMAL NEGLIGENCE

STANDARD IN TORT LAW WHEN

ONE PARTY IS A LONG-RUN AND

THE OTHER A SHORT-RUN

PLAYER

Henrik Lando

ABSTRACT

It is well established that courts should and in fact do require a higherlevel

of care by people working within their profession than by amateurs. Ad-

equate care is simply more within reach for the professional than for the

amateur (less ‘costly’). This article analyzes whether a further distinction

between the professional and the amateur should influence the way courts

set negligence standards: the professional is more likely to invest in ac-

quiring information concerning negligence standards, and the professional

is hence more likely than the amateur to be influenced by the standards.

This issue is analyzed for the case where the professional is the injurer and

the amateur is the victim. The amateur is assumed not to acquire any

information concerning standards, and the behavior of the amateur is

taken as exogenously fixed. Under this assumption, the negligence stand-

ard applied to the professional may be either higher or lower than first

best, depending on whether care levels by the injurer and the victim are

Research in Law and Economics, Volume 22, 207–216

Copyright r2007 by Elsevier Ltd.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 0193-5895/doi:10.1016/S0193-5895(06)22006-2

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