Industrial relations and the management of whistleblowing after the Francis report: what can be learned from the evidence?

• Date: 01 July 2015
• Published date: 01 July 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12106
• Author: Alessio D'Angelo,Lisa Clarke,David Lewis

Industrial relations and the management of

whistleblowing after the Francis report:

what can be learned from the evidence?

David Lewis, Alessio D’Angelo and Lisa Clarke

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the results obtained from the quantitative surveys conducted

for the independent review into creating an open and honest report culture in the

NHS. It examines the management of whistleblowing and discusses the research

findings in the light of the recommendations made by Sir Robert Francis QC in his

‘Freedom to Speak Up’ report published in February 2015. The authors believe that

the principles and actions set out in this report and the detailed Annexe describing

various aspects of good practice are generally applicable in both the public and

private sectors. In so far as it provides evidence that those who follow their employer’s

procedure when raising a concern have better outcomes than others, the authors

conclude that the quantitative research for Francis is consistent with other findings

that power resources and institutional arrangements can be critical to the

whistleblowing process.

1 INTRODUCTION

There is no universally recognised definition of whistleblowing, but researchers have

frequently relied on the following: ‘The disclosure by organisation members (former

or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their

employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action’ (Near and

Miceli, 1985). It can be observed that this covers anonymous reporting and the use of

both internal and external channels of communication. However, this formulation

does not match statutory definitions in the UK or elsewhere. For example, voluntary

workers might be regarded as organisation members, but such people are not

‘workers’ for the purposes of Part IVA of the UK Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA

1996).1

❒David Lewis is Professor of Employment Law, Middlesex University, Alessio D’Angelo is a Senior

Lecturer in the Law School, Middlesex University and Lisa Clarke is a Post-doctoral Researcher in the Law

School, Middlesex University. Correspondence should be addressed to David Lewis Law school, Middle-

sex University, The Burroughs, Hendon NW4 4BT; email: d.b.lewis@mdx.ac.uk

1Part IVA was inserted by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. ‘Worker’ is defined in Section 230 ERA

1996.

Industrial Relations Journal 46:4, 312–327

ISSN 0019-8692

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Disclosures of information about alleged wrongdoing may provoke conflicting

values if they challenge the interests of others. However, it is generally recognised that

the nature of such conflicts will depend on cultural contexts, whether these are

societal, industrial, organisational or professional (Vandekerckhove et al., 2014).

Equally, the issue of loyalty often features in debates about whistleblowing (Lewis,

2010), although researchers tend to assume that there are higher public interests and

that whistleblowing is a pro-social activity2(Brown et al., 2014). Thus, the

whistleblowing process can be analysed from a wide range of perspectives, for

example, the human right to free speech (Wragg, 2015); organisational citizenship

(Organ, 1988); principled organisational dissent (Miceli et al., 2008) and the risk

society (Beck, 1992). From the point of view of industrial relations, whistleblowing

could constitute an element of a mutual gains approach or a form of individual

employee ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970). It has also been suggested that, like the use of

social media, whistleblowing arrangements can be used to create an ‘inverted

panopticon’ through which workers can shed light on employer behaviour (Upchurch

and Grassman, 2015). Less controversially, voluntary whistleblowing procedures can

be viewed as a self-regulatory aspect of corporate governance. However, we think that

a recent examination of the practical impact of power resources and institutional

arrangements in Norway (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2015) is particularly relevant to the

research findings we discuss below.

In order to have an influence, power resources must be valued by other people in the

organisation. Such resources affect a person’s decision-making possibilities and the

impact of the choices they make at the workplace. Empirical research has suggested

that whistleblowing might be associated with seniority (Miceli et al., 2008) and

education (Miethe, 1999). Gender may also be regarded as a power indicator, but the

research is contradictory in relation to both this variable (Miceli et al., 2012) and

position in the management hierarchy (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). It

must also be noted that the power resources of the alleged wrongdoer may affect the

decision whether or not to blow the whistle (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2010). Turning to

institutional arrangements, Skivenes and Trygstad suggest that labour market models

with different approaches to worker representation and human resource management

create different frameworks for whistleblowing. In the light of their studies, they argue

that institutional arrangements, for example collective bargaining and consultation

with trade union representatives, can provide counterbalancing mechanisms that

reduce the effect of individual power resources and promote democratic participation

in workplace activities (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2015).

2 THE RESEARCH CONTEXT

Using the Miceli and Near definition quoted above, academics in the United States

and elsewhere have been conducting empirical studies of whistleblowing and

whistleblowers for over three decades (Brown et al., 2014). For example, in the UK,

surveys have been conducted in schools, further and higher education, local govern-

ment, and the National Health Service (see Lewis, 2006) as well as the FTSE Top 250

firms (Lewis and Kender, 2010). In Australia, a major study in 2006 surveyed 7763

2According to Brief & Motowidlo 1986, pro-social organisational behaviour is: ‘(a) performed by a

member of an organisation; (b) directed towards an individual, group, or organisation with whom he or she

interacts while carrying out his or her organisational role; and (c) performed with the intention of promot-

ing the welfare of the individual, group or organization toward which it is directed’ (p. 711).

313Industrial relations and the management of whistleblowing

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd