The impact of (more) enlargement on the European Employment Strategy

• Author: Hasan Bıçak,Hilary Ingham,Mehmet Altinay,Mike Ingham
• Published date: 01 November 2005
• Date: 01 November 2005
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.2005.00377.x

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148,

USA.

Industrial Relations Journal

36:6, 456– 477

ISSN 0019-8692

Blackwell Science, LtdOxford, UKIRJIndustrial Relations Journal0019-8692Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 20052005366456477Original Article

Impact of enlargementMike Ingham et al

.

❒

Mike Ingham is Senior Consultant Ansdell Consulting and Research Fellow, Lancaster University;

Hilary Ingham is Senior Lecturer, Lancaster University; Hasan Bıçak is Professor and Dean of the Business

and Economics Faculty, Eastern Mediterranean University; and Mehmet Altinay is Professor and Director

of the School of Tourism and Hospitality Management, Eastern Mediterranean University. Correspon-

dence should be addressed to Dr Hilary Ingham, Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lan-

caster LA1 4YX, UK; email: h.ingham@lancaster.ac.uk

The impact of (more) enlargement on the

European Employment Strategy

Mike Ingham, Hilary Ingham, Hasan Bıçak and

Mehmet Altinay

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) aspires to be the most competitive, full employment

economy in the world and has set a number of ambitious targets to be met by 2010

in order that it can achieve this goal. At the same time, it is pursuing an enlargement

policy that will witness the accession of an increasing number of less developed

nations. This article explores some of the tensions that exist between these two goals

as these are manifest in labour market indicators and finds the likelihood of meeting

the deadline set for success remote.

INTRODUCTION

Following a mid-term review (European Commission, 2005), the Lisbon Strategy has

been relaunched, streamlined and, it is claimed, simplified (Brussels Council, 22–23

March 2005).

1

As part of this process, the guidelines of the European Employment

Strategy (EES) and of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) are now pre-

sented jointly in a single annual set of Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs

(European Commission, 2005a). Most importantly, however, the original goals estab-

lished in 2000 have been retained, notwithstanding the failure to achieve the inter-

mediate targets for 2005 set at Stockholm in 2001. During the course of the

deliberations that contributed to these decisions, the European Union (EU) accepted

10 new, relatively low income states into membership, eight of which have yet to

complete fully their post-communist transitions.

While acknowledging ‘insufficient progress in reaching the Lisbon Strategy’s objec-

tives’, the Commission (2005: 12), drawing on the work of Kok (2004), foresaw Europe

as being able to ‘draw further strength from its recent enlargement’ (Kok, 2004: 12).

It is the contention of this article that this assertion is incredible, at least within the

time frame set for the achievement of the Lisbon ambitions. The Stockholm targets

1

All European Councils referenced in this article can be consulted at: http://ue.eu.int.show Page.

ASP?lang

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en

Impact of enlargement 457

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.

have been missed by the old EU-15 and the chances of those states meeting the goals

set for 2010 are remote, at best (Kok, 2003). Bringing into membership 10 new states

that are even further away from the objectives set in 2000 hardly improved the pros-

pects. Indeed, the European Council noted in October 2004 that ‘most New Member

States, together with the social partners need to further develop their efforts to

modernise their employment policies’ (European Council, 2004). What is more, the

EU is set to embrace further, even less developed states before the 2010 deadline is

reached.

This said, it is not the intention to call into question the rectitude, taken in isolation,

of either the Lisbon ambitions or the process of enlargement in whatever form. Rather,

it is simply to argue that, in their current configuration, they are highly likely to be

incompatible, particularly in view of the constraints placed on the new member states

(NMS) by the Stability and Growth Pact to which they are obliged to adhere. On the

face of it, this might not matter. However, there has emerged increasing pressure for

countries that are adjudged to be failing in their efforts to comply with the Lisbon

strictures to be admonished publicly (Kok, 2003; 2004). In the case of weaker entrants,

this is unlikely to be conducive to European solidarity. At the same time, Lisbon is at

the core of the EU’s drive for sustainable improvements in the welfare and living

conditions of its citizens. As such, stubborn adherence to verifiable targets that are

most unlikely to be met is surely not in the interest of the European institutions.

While the EU-25, EU-15, the 10 NMS and individual countries will, as appropriate,

form comparators in what follows, attention will primarily be on the impact of

impending enlargements on the aspirations of the EES, in particular, and the Lisbon

Strategy, in general. Of necessity, the coverage will be both brief and selective. It will

focus upon the four countries that, at the time of writing, were officially recognised

as being in the accession queue—Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey—as well as

North Cyprus (N. Cyprus), which, in principle, could enter into membership at any

time. As a prelude to the consideration of this issue, however, the next section will

focus upon the chaotic evolution of the EU’s employment aspirations. This is followed

by an overview of certain of the basic socio-demographic characteristics of the present

applicants, why they have so far failed to secure membership and when they might

ultimately be admitted. A comparative examination of the performance of these

countries against fundamental Lisbon criteria is then undertaken. This highlights

more fully the strains between adherence to current targets and further enlargement.

A concluding discussion closes the article.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE EES

The EES was introduced at the extraordinary European Council held at Luxembourg

in 1997 first and foremost as an additional weapon with which to tackle Europe’s

sclerotic unemployment problems, working in tandem with broader macroeconomic

and Single Market policies. Its success was from the outset seen to depend on its

ownership by a wide range of actors and their participation in its execution. Effective

from 1998, the Strategy was originally based around four main lines of action (improv-

ing employability; developing entrepreneurship; encouraging adaptability in busi-

nesses and their employees; strengthening the policies for equal opportunities), which

were to become ‘pillars’ in 1999 (European Council, 1999), under which were sub-

tended a number of guidelines. The mainstreaming of employment policies inherent

in the Strategy had been foreshadowed in Article 127 of the Treaty establishing the