Flexible institutional arrangements and labour productivity: the case of transit industry in the United States

Published date01 January 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12169
Date01 January 2017
AuthorOlga V. Smirnova
Flexible institutional arrangements and
labour productivity: the case of transit
industry in the United States
Olga V. Smirnova
ABSTRACT
Using the US National Transit Database 19942006, the manuscript empirically tests
the inuence of several institutional arrangements on labour productivity. The main
nding of the paper is that not all exible institutional arrangements may translate
into labour productivity gains in the mass transit. While partial contracting may in-
crease labour productivity in the US transit sector during the study period, the special
governance actually decreases labour productivity. The potential implications for im-
provements in labour productivity are discussed.
1 INTRODUCTION
Local governments, both within the United States (UCLG, 2009) and internationally
(CEMR, 2009), have experienced the negative effects of the Great Recession. Fiscal
pressures result from reduced payments and fees as well as reduced state support
(UCLG, 2009). In the face of limited funding and scal distress, increased attention
is paid to local governmentsperformance including whether they are exible in gen-
erating solutions to the current challenges. With this regard, it becomes important to
evaluate how this exibility allowed agencies to perform in the past.
We use the institutional analysis approach to investigate how managerial exibility
may affect labour productivity in the transit industry over a period of time that in-
cludes a previous recession (March 2001 to November 2001
1
).
Flexible institutional arrangements are dened as rules that enhance the ability of
an organisation to adapt to changing economic times (Zafra-Gómeza et al., 2009)
and to respond to divergent circumstances in different locations(Tang, 1991; 48).
Local government managers might strive for exibility (e.g. regulations fostering ex-
ibility) to boost performance, especially during times of adversity. Folke et al. (2005)
apply exible institutional arrangements to the social-ecological systems and tie these
institutions to enabling legislation that promote conditions for adaptations.
The article examines three major institutions that inuence managerial exibility
with regard to labour: collective bargaining, contracting out and forming special au-
thorities. The question guiding this study is: How the presence of institutional choices
that inuence managerial exibility affects labour productivity?
Olga V. Smirnova, Department of Political Science, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC USA.
Correspondence should be addressed to Olga V. Smirnova, PhD, Associate Professor, MPA, Department
of Political Science, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA; email: smirnovao@ecu.edu
1
US Business Cycles Expansions and Contractions, NBER, available online at http://www.nber.org/cy-
cles.html
Industrial Relations Journal 48:1, 7293
ISSN 0019-8692
© 2017 Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Compared with previous studies on contracting (Brown and Potoski, 2005) and un-
ionisation (Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2012), this article offers a unique breadth of re-
sults applicable to the whole country instead of a single state or subsample of
places. Ideology arguments are omitted in this article; that is, the political preferences
for certain institutional provisions are not included in the analysis. Previous research
has found that local governments are often concerned with practical issues of services
quality and efciency over ideology
2
(Warner and Hebdon, 2001).
One of our major contributions is the nding that exible institutional arrangements
may not translate into labour productivity gains. The local government management
might strive for exibility during scal crises, but over the long term, those rules do
not guarantee higher productivity. Only partial contracting may lead to higher labour
productivity, while full contracting is found to have no effect (a nding common for
the contracting literature (Brown and Potoski, 2005; Warner and Hebdon, 2001)).
The unionisation rates and interaction of unionisation and contracting out had no
effect on labour productivity over the study period, which is a surprising nding given
unions effects on job satisfaction and working hours (Bryson and White, 2016). The
special governance (to a certain extent a unique American local government forma-
tion) has a negative effect on labour productivity. It may be that the rules that stress
job security and accountability lead to higher labour productivity. Further research
on specic job security rules and performance over time is needed in this area. The ar-
ticle covers the earlier time period mostly because of the lack of data both in the United
States and internationally (Bryson and White, 2016; Cappelli and Keller, 2013;
Pedulla, 2013). However, together with the earlier researchers, we believe that these
data and our study help to establish an important baseline for the future research. Be-
cause this study focuses on the single country, and a specic sector (transit), the trans-
lational effects and international competition are being controlled for by study design.
The following section provides US Mass Transit background, followed by the
denitions of exible institutional arrangements and literature review. The research
design section outlines methods, measures and data used. Then, we discuss the results
and estimated models. The conclusions provide major implications and further paths
for research.
2 US MASS TRANSIT BACKGROUND
According to Troger (2016), public transportation has been expanding globally over
the past two years. This trend of increasing interest in the public transportation affects
the US mass transit sector as well. The American Public Transit Association also no-
tices the revival of the public transit ridership growth (APTA, 2008, 2014); in 2013
APTA (2014), there has been documented a record growth of ridership with 10.7 bil-
lion passenger trips. The public transportation ridership has outpaced the population
growth.
However, this revival is different from the public transit growth in the European
cities. American cities have adopted automobiles earlier and at a larger scale than
their European counterparts (Buehler, 2014). Prior to World War II, most of public
transit services in the United States have been provided by private and semi-private
2
At the same time, the ideology may play a very important role in setting up constitutional and collective
choice rules for exible institutional arrangements (especially unions) (Schmitt and Mitukiewicz, 2012).
However, the discussion of the initial institutional set up is outside of the scope of this analysis.
73Flexible institutional arrangements and labour productivity
© 2017 Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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