Does the open shop harm union collective action?

• Author: Roland Zullo
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12322
• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Date: 01 March 2021

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Does the open shop harm union collective

action?

Roland Zullo

School of Social Work, University of

Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA

Correspondence

Roland Zullo, School of Social Work,

University of Michigan, 1080 South

University Ave., Ann Arbor, MI

48109-1106, USA.

Email: rzullo@umich.edu

Abstract

In the United States, right-to-work (RTW) laws impose

the open shop on labour unions. I test whether RTW

affects the frequency and outcomes of union represen-

tation petitions. Quasi-experimental tests reveal no

association between RTW law and the volume of certi-

fication petitions filed and that fewer certification peti-

tions are withdrawn under RTW. Thus, unions do not

appear to retreat from new member organizing under

RTW law. Moreover, RTW correlates with a decline in

decertification and unit clarification petitions, implying

that under the open shop, RTW law reduces internal

union dissension. Although fewer decertification cases

go to an election under RTW law, unions are more

likely to lose cases that proceed to a referendum. These

changes benefit smaller more than larger bargaining

units. I infer that the law nudges the system away from

an industrial union model in favour of smaller, craft or

occupation-based units.

1|INTRODUCTION

One topic surrounding right-to-work (RTW) legislation in the United States is the extent that

the law affects new union formation or existing union dissolution. This research examines the

association between RTW law and the frequency and outcomes of National Labor Relations

Board (NLRB) petitions and supervised elections. The NLRB certification process is the major

pathway for new union formation. The NLRB also provides a legal mechanism for unionized

workers to terminate their representation and a process for employers to challenge the majority

Received: 17 February 2020Revised: 4 February 2021Accepted: 8 February 2021

DOI: 10.1111/irj.12322

© 2021 Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Industrial Relations. 2021;52:183–197.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/irj 183