‘Customers were not objects to suck blood from’: Social relations in UK retail banks under changing performance management systems

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12267
AuthorKnut Laaser
Date01 November 2019
Published date01 November 2019
Customers were not objects to suck blood
from: Social relations in UK retail banks
under changing performance management
systems
Knut Laaser
ABSTRACT
Utilising an analytical framework informed by a moral economy approach, this arti-
cle examines the social relationships between bank workers and customers in the
context of changing performance management. Informed by 46 in-depth interviews
with branch workers and branch managers from UK banks, this article focusses on
the interplay of the pressures arising from an intensied and all-encompassing perfor-
mance management system and bank workers lay morality. The article seeks to
analyse why one group of bank workers engages with customers in a primarily instru-
mental manner, while another group tends to mediate and engage in oppositional
practices which aim to avoid such an instrumentalisation. The article argues that
moral economy gives voice to the agency of workers and the critical concerns of the
social, economic and moral consequences of market-driven and purely prot-oriented
workplace regimes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Informed by 46 in-depth interviews with bank workers and branch managers (BMs)
from different UK retail bank branches and framed by the analytical framework of
moral economy (ME), this article sheds light on two key aspects: rst, the article
explores how the labour process in retail banks changed in the last two decades,
dominated by intensied performance management system (PMS) that features an
all-encompassing managerial control system that pushes bank workers to relate in-
strumentally to customers and prioritise selling over customer orientation. Second,
the article explores why a group of recently recruited bank workers are more prone
to instrumentalise customers, while a group of more experienced bank workers are
more likely to avoid such instrumentalisation by engaging in oppositional practices.
This article utilises an ME approach to work and employment that frames the explo-
ration of workers experiences of intensied PM in front-line-service work (FLSW),
analysing the materialist reality of the labour process as well as workers lay morality
which shapes if and how they engage in oppositional practices to compliance, respec-
tively. The framework of ME focusses on how economic practices are shaped by
Knut Laaser is at Brandenburger Technische Universität Cottbus (BTU), Cottbus, Germany and a
Lecturer in Work, Employment and Society, Stirling Management School, Stirling, UK. Correspondence
should be addressed to Dr Knut Laaser, Lecturer and Senior Researcher, Work, Employment and
Society, Stirling Management School, Stirling, UK. E-mail: knut.laaser@stir.ac.uk
Industrial Relations Journal
ISSN 0019-8692
© 2019 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribu-
tion and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
50:5
6, 532
547
moral norms and sentiments, and how, in turn, moral norms and sentiments are
formed by economic and institutional forces. Part and parcel of an ME approach
to work and employment is the concept of lay morality that theorises actors as eval-
uative and sentient beings, whose evaluation of their own and othersactions and
faring is informed by notions of justice and fairness, informing actions that range
from oppositional practices to compliance.
2 THE PREVALENCE OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
A common theme within the sociology of work and employment is the observation of
() the greater use of market forces in organising the employment relationship
(McGovern et al., 2007: 41). A testimonial of this is the development and centrality
of PMS in organisations (Cushen, 2013; Findlay and Thompson, 2017). Performance
management has evolved in the last two decades in many sectors of the economy
from annual performance appraisal practices towards a systematic and ongoing
managerial control system (Laaser, 2016; Taylor, 2013; Williams and Beck, 2018).
While PMS expresses continuity with, and indeed combine, traditional managerial
control techniques, critical employment and management scholarship point towards
the greater scope for managerial control that PMS enables featuring methodical
collection, storage, analysis and display of information of workerseffort via the
utilisation of sophisticated Information and Communications Technology (Carter et
al., 2014; Jeske and Santuzzi, 2015; Laaser, 2013; Laaser and Bolton, 2017; Newsome
et al., 2013).
Performance management system (PMS) has become particularly prevalent in
semi-routinised FLSW were front-line workers are in direct contact with customers
() and in a subordinate position in the employment relationship(Bélanger and Ed-
wards, 2013: 436). Critical employment research indicates that PMS in semi-
routinised FLSW feature individualised performance targets, systematic collection,
analysis and evaluation of work effort, performance-related pay and punitive mana-
gerial practices (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; Ellis and Taylor, 2006; Korczynski
and Ott, 2005). A prime example of an industry in which PMS became a dominating
feature is the banking sector in the UK. Historically, the banking industry was
characterised by paternalist management practices that fostered a unitary ideology
with the propagation of shared objectives and values that masked the power asymme-
try between BMs and workers (Heritage, 1977; Kerfoot and Knights, 1993). Further-
more, patriarchal values were deeply ingrained in the organisation of work, encoded
in high levels of sexual division of labour and overt and covert discrimination
against female bank worker (Crompton, 1989). In tandem with paternalism and
patriarchism, banks workplace regime rested on early forms of appraisal systems that
assessed behavioural and social dimensions of bank staff via highly subjective annual
inspections, aiming to bend staff to the unique banking culture (McKinlay, 2002).
The development of PMS in the banking industry is intermeshed with the wider
changes in the political economy. The nancial industry witnessed seismic shifts in
the 1980s under the Thatcher regime, being subject to deregulation and re-regulation
policies that aimed to increase the protability and market power of the industry
via heightened entrepreneurialism and competition between nancial organisations
(Kerfoot and Knights, 1993; Knights and McCabe, 1998; Watson, 2004). Banks
responded in the late 1980s to the changing political economy of the nancial industry
by implementing harsher forms of strategic management programmes that informed
Social relations under changing performance management 533
© 2019 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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