Corrigendum
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12304 |
Published date | 01 September 2020 |
Date | 01 September 2020 |
Corrigendum
In the below article, the following text were incorrect
1. In Introduction section “Within country differences are explained at the fir‐
level, by the capacity of shop stewards to engage with the strategic interests
of management (Locke, 1992)”should read as “Within country differences
are explained at the firm‐level, by the capacity of shop stewards to engage with
the strategic interests of management (Locke, 1992)”
2. “The social partners in the two Danish firms the social partners have negoti-
ated on these and also on a further two for which there is no formal provision.”
should read as “In the two Danish firms, the social partners have negotiated on
these and also on a further two for which there is no formal provision.”
3. “Our empirical contribution concerns two intertwined findings. In both Danish
companies, the social partners have gone beyond their formal competency
under demarcation to negotiate on issues on which the sector‐level framework
is silent. Their capacity to do so arises from the power (and legitimacy) that
local actors acquire from depth of bargaining at company level. It follows that
powerful bottom‐up dynamics may produce subsequent adjustments to articu-
lation arrangements, progressively adapting CB institutions to the needs and
the reality of actors on the ground (Marginson and Sisson, 2006; Thelen,
2014). The three‐dimensional operation of unions’organisational resources
(Lévesque and Murray, 2002) sheds light on the different flexibility and
security outcomes at firm level, over and above those that can be attributed
to institutions. While institutions and union power are shown to be comple-
mentary, institutions alone do not fully explain the agenda and outcomes of
company‐level negotiations. Despite pronounced cross country differences—
in both Danish firms, the level of interdependency between local actors is
higher than in the Italian firms, as well as their capacity to regulate issues of
flexibility and security via CB—noticeable variation emerges also within the
countries. This variation corresponds to differences in one or more union
organisational resources: internal democracy, external links and/or
proactivity”should be set as one paragraph.
REFERENCE
Paolucci, V. and P. Marginson (2020), ‘Collective bargaining towards mutual flexibility and se-
curity goals in large internationalised companies —why do institutions (still) matter?’
Industrial Relations Journal,51, 329–350.
Industrial Relations Journal 51:5, 474
ISSN 0019-8692
© 2020 Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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