BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board chair orientations

• Date: 01 January 2018
• Published date: 01 January 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2698

RESEARCH ARTICLE

BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board

chair orientations

Abbie G. Oliver

1

| Ryan Krause

2

| John R. Busenbark

3

| Matias Kalm

4

1

Department of Management, Terry College of

Business, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia

2

Management, Entrepreneurship, and Leadership

Department, Neeley School of Business, Texas

Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas

3

Department of Management, Terry College of

Business, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia

4

Department of Management and

Entrepreneurship, W.P. Carey School of Business,

Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona

Correspondence

Ryan Krause, Management, Entrepreneurship, and

Leadership, Neeley School of Business, Texas

Christian University, TCU Box 298530, Fort

Worth, TX 76129.

Email: r.krause@tcu.edu

Research Summary: Though research has focused on the

ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post-

promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain

unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post-

promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relation-

ship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency

theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms

appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a col-

laboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt

a control orientation. We further predict this effect is

attenuated by female board representation. Using a sam-

ple of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our pre-

dictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not

the control orientation. This research provides some evi-

dence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with

female directors acting as a countervailing influence.

Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females

encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is

well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter

after promotion are less understood. The relationship

between the board chair and the CEO is one important

post-promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on

monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We

suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close col-

laboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We

attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that

board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female

CEOs because they view females as more conducive to,

and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest

this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are

more females on the board.

KEYWORDS

agency theory, board chair orientation, CEO gender,

corporate governance, stewardship theory

Received: 27 February 2017 Revised: 22 July 2017 Accepted: 24 July 2017 Published on: 20 October 2017

DOI: 10.1002/smj.2698

Strat Mgmt J. 2018;39:113–130. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/smj Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 113

1|INTRODUCTION

When General Motors Co. appointed Mary Barra as chief executive officer (CEO)—becoming the

first major U.S. automaker with a female CEO—the Wall Street Journal published an article about

the firm’s incoming independent board chair, Tim Solso, and his orientation toward the job. Accord-

ing to the article, “Mr. Solso insists his job is to ensure Ms. Barra succeeds as the com-

pany’s CEO”:

Mr. Solso makes clear he intends to be a hands-on player as well as a coach, advocate

and resource for Mary Barra, the company’s new chief executive…“I can take some of

the load off management’s back,”he said. (Bennett & Lublin, 2014, p. B1)

The article notes that Solso’s statement seems to conflict with his reputation as a strict board

monitor who “can be a tough boss and knows how to get his way,”having previously engineered

the ouster of a CEO while on the board of another firm (Bennett & Lublin, 2014, p. B1). Indeed,

the board chair role described above is a clear example of what Krause (2017) identified as the “col-

laboration”board chair orientation, which consists of advising and guiding the CEO and reducing

the CEO’s job demands. Based on his history, though, the GM board chair also seems amenable to

the “control”board chair orientation, which consists of monitoring and overseeing the CEO. What

was it about General Motors’circumstances, then, that led Solso to adopt the former orientation?

Boards—and board chairs, in particular—approach their corporate governance responsibilities

differently depending on the model of man

1

they deem most salient; that is, depending on how they

think the CEO is likely to behave. Drawing on gender role theory and the concept of benevolent

sexism—the often stereotypically favorable (but potentially patronizing) attitudes people have

toward women (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001)—we argue that board chairs consider the gender of the

CEO when determining board chair orientation. Specifically, we suggest board chairs are more

likely to exhibit a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to exhibit a control board

chair orientation when the CEO is female than when the CEO is male. The reason for this is that the

female gender stereotype is more consistent with the model of man assumed by stewardship

theory—cooperative, collectivistic, and trustworthy (Donaldson, 1990; Sundaramurthy & Lewis,

2003). Conversely, the male gender stereotype is more consistent with the model of man assumed

by agency theory—self-interested, opportunistic, and untrustworthy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jen-

sen, 1983). We further predict that female representation on the board will weaken the effect of

CEO gender on board chair orientation. Using data from new CEO appointments at S&P 1500 firms

between 2010 and 2015, we find partial support for our theory as well as some interesting and unex-

pected deviations.

Our research aims to make a number of contributions. First, by isolating the role of gender

stereotyping in the boardroom, we advance knowledge regarding the conditions female leaders face

once they ascend to the highest rung of the corporate ladder. While much is known about the bar-

riers preventing female executives from becoming CEO and the negative market reactions to their

appointments, less is known about the circumstances female CEOs face once they land the coveted

CEO position (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Joshi, Neely, Emrich, Griffiths, & George,

2015). In addition, much of the scholarly focus on female leaders centers on the ramifications of

hostile sexism or “antipathy toward women who are viewed as usurping men’s power,”while

1

“Model of man”is a widely used gender-neutral term in the stewardship literature that means “a view about the nature of human

beings”(see Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).

114 OLIVER ET AL.