ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The

Publisher:: Sage Publications, Inc.
Publication date:: 2021-08-12

ISBN:: 0002-7162

Issue Number

Latest documents

Changing Americans’ Attitudes about Immigration: Using Moral Framing to Bolster Factual Arguments
Our tendency to interpret facts in ways that are consistent with our prior beliefs impedes evidence-based attempts to persuade partisans to change their views on pressing societal issues such as immigration. Accordingly, most prior work finds that favorable information about the impact of immigration has little or no influence on policy preferences. Here, we propose that appealing to individuals’ moral values can bolster the persuasive power of informational interventions. Across three experiments (total N = 4,616), we find that an argument based on the value of in-group loyalty, which emphasized that immigrants are critical to America’s economic strength, combined with information about the economic impact of legal immigration, significantly increased Americans’ support for legal immigration. We also find a significant effect of the moral component of this message alone, even without factual information. These results show that moral arguments can strengthen the persuasiveness of informational appeals.
Moral Convictions and Threats to Science
When science is marshaled to support one side or another in policy debates, people can react to that information differently depending on whether it supports their own position. They tend to find fault in unfavorable information and accept favorable information less critically. This may especially be the case when individuals’ positions are held with moral conviction—that is, when their position is not only their preferred position, but when it is the position that they feel to be morally correct. I examine three areas in which allowing moral convictions to influence reactions to scientific information may actually threaten the social benefits of science: promoting science misperceptions, eroding the credibility of scientists as sources of information, and eroding evaluations of science as a process. I argue that dealing with the influence of moral conviction over scientific interpretation will require acknowledgement that the social benefits of science are not self-evident and that they depend on public buy-in.
Changing Americans’ Attitudes about Immigration: Using Moral Framing to Bolster Factual Arguments
Our tendency to interpret facts in ways that are consistent with our prior beliefs impedes evidence-based attempts to persuade partisans to change their views on pressing societal issues such as immigration. Accordingly, most prior work finds that favorable information about the impact of immigration has little or no influence on policy preferences. Here, we propose that appealing to individuals’ moral values can bolster the persuasive power of informational interventions. Across three experiments (total N = 4,616), we find that an argument based on the value of in-group loyalty, which emphasized that immigrants are critical to America’s economic strength, combined with information about the economic impact of legal immigration, significantly increased Americans’ support for legal immigration. We also find a significant effect of the moral component of this message alone, even without factual information. These results show that moral arguments can strengthen the persuasiveness of informational appeals.
Moral Convictions and Threats to Science
When science is marshaled to support one side or another in policy debates, people can react to that information differently depending on whether it supports their own position. They tend to find fault in unfavorable information and accept favorable information less critically. This may especially be the case when individuals’ positions are held with moral conviction—that is, when their position is not only their preferred position, but when it is the position that they feel to be morally correct. I examine three areas in which allowing moral convictions to influence reactions to scientific information may actually threaten the social benefits of science: promoting science misperceptions, eroding the credibility of scientists as sources of information, and eroding evaluations of science as a process. I argue that dealing with the influence of moral conviction over scientific interpretation will require acknowledgement that the social benefits of science are not self-evident and that they depend on public buy-in.
Nudging Social Media toward Accuracy
A meaningful portion of online misinformation sharing is likely attributable to Internet users failing to consider accuracy when deciding what to share. As a result, simply redirecting attention to the concept of accuracy can increase sharing discernment. Here we discuss the importance of accuracy and describe a limited-attention utility model that is based on a theory about inattention to accuracy on social media. We review research that shows how a simple nudge or prompt that shifts attention to accuracy increases the quality of news that people share (typically by decreasing the sharing of false content), and then discuss outstanding questions relating to accuracy nudges, including the need for more work relating to persistence and habituation as well as the dearth of cross-cultural research on these topics. We also make several recommendations for policy-makers and social media companies for how to implement accuracy nudges.
Nudging Social Media toward Accuracy
A meaningful portion of online misinformation sharing is likely attributable to Internet users failing to consider accuracy when deciding what to share. As a result, simply redirecting attention to the concept of accuracy can increase sharing discernment. Here we discuss the importance of accuracy and describe a limited-attention utility model that is based on a theory about inattention to accuracy on social media. We review research that shows how a simple nudge or prompt that shifts attention to accuracy increases the quality of news that people share (typically by decreasing the sharing of false content), and then discuss outstanding questions relating to accuracy nudges, including the need for more work relating to persistence and habituation as well as the dearth of cross-cultural research on these topics. We also make several recommendations for policy-makers and social media companies for how to implement accuracy nudges.
Americans’ Attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act: What Role Do Beliefs Play?
How do people form their attitudes toward complex policy issues? Although there has long been an assumption that people consider the various components of those issues and come to an overall assessment, a growing body of recent work has instead suggested that people may reach summary judgments as a function of heuristic cues and goal-oriented rationalizations. This study examines how well a component-based model fits Americans’ evaluations of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, an important and highly contentious piece of legislation that contained several constituent parts. Despite strong partisan disagreement about the law, we find that Democrats and Republicans both appear to evaluate the law as a function of their beliefs and what the law would do as well as their confidence in those beliefs. This finding implies that correcting misperceptions and increasing awareness of the components of legislation have the potential to change attitudes.
Inequality and Misperceptions of Group Concerns Threaten the Integrity and Societal Impact of Science
Racial and ethnic minority and lower-income groups are disproportionately affected by environmental hazards and suffer worse health outcomes than other groups in the United States. Relative to whites and higher-income groups, racial-ethnic minority and lower-income Americans also frequently express greater concern about high-profile global environmental threats like climate change, but they are widely misperceived as being less concerned about these issues than white and higher-income Americans. We use new survey research to explore public perceptions of COVID-19—another global threat marked by substantial racial, ethnic, and class disparities—finding a distinct pattern of misperceptions regarding groups’ concerns. We then discuss how these misperceptions represent a unique form of social misinformation that may pose a threat to science and undermine the cooperation and trust needed to address collective problems.
Americans’ Attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act: What Role Do Beliefs Play?
How do people form their attitudes toward complex policy issues? Although there has long been an assumption that people consider the various components of those issues and come to an overall assessment, a growing body of recent work has instead suggested that people may reach summary judgments as a function of heuristic cues and goal-oriented rationalizations. This study examines how well a component-based model fits Americans’ evaluations of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, an important and highly contentious piece of legislation that contained several constituent parts. Despite strong partisan disagreement about the law, we find that Democrats and Republicans both appear to evaluate the law as a function of their beliefs and what the law would do as well as their confidence in those beliefs. This finding implies that correcting misperceptions and increasing awareness of the components of legislation have the potential to change attitudes.
Inequality and Misperceptions of Group Concerns Threaten the Integrity and Societal Impact of Science
Racial and ethnic minority and lower-income groups are disproportionately affected by environmental hazards and suffer worse health outcomes than other groups in the United States. Relative to whites and higher-income groups, racial-ethnic minority and lower-income Americans also frequently express greater concern about high-profile global environmental threats like climate change, but they are widely misperceived as being less concerned about these issues than white and higher-income Americans. We use new survey research to explore public perceptions of COVID-19—another global threat marked by substantial racial, ethnic, and class disparities—finding a distinct pattern of misperceptions regarding groups’ concerns. We then discuss how these misperceptions represent a unique form of social misinformation that may pose a threat to science and undermine the cooperation and trust needed to address collective problems.