Zara S. Steiner. Britain and the Origins of the First World War: The Making of the 20th Century. Pp. vi, 305. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $16.95

• Date: 01 January 1979
• Published date: 01 January 1979
• Author: Calvin W. Hines
• DOI: 10.1177/000271627944100118
• Subject Matter: Articles

200

Order

may

prove

a

wiser

focus

than

conflict,

since

it

can

address

other

prob-

lems

besides

conflict,

and

order

qua

political

laws

can

complement

social-

scientific

laws

to

explain

behavior-

conflictual

and

otherwise.

International

order

is

especially

apt

as

it

differs

from

domestic

and

world

order,

not

in

quality

as

the

author

argues,

but

in

complexity:

While

order

elsewhere

may

entail

the

presence

of

overarching

consensus/

coercion,

order

among

nations

entails

its

absence

(between

blocs)

but

also

its

presence

(within

blocs)

and

resurgence

(over

time).

Hence,

the

best

theory

of

international

order

may

be

a

general

theory

of

order.

An

&dquo;interaction&dquo;

approach

illumines

the

evolutionary

process

toward

order

by

replacing

single

(synoptic)

with

se-

quential

(iterative)

interactions,

thus

permitting

a

dynamic

theory

about

the

rules

of the

game.

Alas,

the

very

birth

of

those

rules

eludes

explanation

since

criteria

governing

even

the

choice

of

historical

precedents-for

example,

Munich

1938-to

guide

rule

formation

are

obscure.

Nor

does

the

approach

anticipate

a

need

for

rule

formation

without

historical

precedents,

as

when

newly

independent

states

lacking

a

his-

tory

enter

a

disordered

system-a

&dquo;lord

of

the

flies&dquo;

scenario.

This

calls

for

a

revised

approach

to

explain

rule

creation.

The

US/USSR

ordering

process

is

a

strategic

case-recent

enough

to

remain

manipulable

via

new

interaction

pat-

terns

guided

perhaps

by

this

very

theory,

yet

pervasive

enough

to

facilitate

ma-

nipulation

elsewhere.

But

other

case-

studies

might

better

depict

the

overall

process

from

even

lower

levels

of

order

(the

Mideast)

to

still

higher

thresholds

(the

EEC)

than

observed

here.

They

might

then

gauge

the

theory’s

limits-

indeed,

gauge

whether

greater

interac-

tion

and

attendant

background

knowl-

edge

than

observed

here

threaten

over-

order

or

rigidity,

including

intolerance

toward

new

actors

on

the

world

stage.

CRAIG

MCCAUGHRIN

University

of

Pennsylvania

Philadelphia

ZARA

S.

STEINER.

Britain

and

the

Origins

of

the

First

World

War:

The

Making

of

the

20th

Century.

Pp.

vi,

305.

New

York:

St.

Martin’s

Press,

1977.

$16.95.

This

is

an

intriguing,

thought-provok-

ing

volume,

in

an

excellent

series,

which

probes

both

within

and

beyond

the

tra-

ditional

reservoirs

of

diplomatic

research

and

balances

the

evidence

gained

therein

with

that

drawn

from

selective

monographs,

memoirs,

contemporary

articles

and

accounts.

It

is

well-written,

heavily

documented

and,

in

some

re-

spects,

most

engrossing.

The

author

approaches

the

subject

of

British

policy

vis-h-vis

Europe

from

the

premise

that

the

time-honored

and

realistic

diplomacy

of

detachment,

a

&dquo;splendid

isolation&dquo;

of

sorts,

was

aban-

doned

somewhat

hastily

despite

the

assumption

that

involvement

would

en-

tail

sacrifice

and

tragedy

on

a

scale

beyond

comprehension.

The

culprits

in

this

departure

from

practicality,

it

seems,

were

for

the

most

part

dead

at

the

time

of

the

catastrophe

of

August,

1914.

But

the

legacy

of

decisions

made

in

the

interests

of

national

security,

party

politics,

and

even

personal

ego

hovered

above

and

haunted

English

statesmen

of

that

fate-

ful

summer

as

effectively

as

if the

bodies

themselves

were

present.

And

not

all

of

those

in

the

decisionmaking

councils

in

Britain

at

that

time

realized

the

degree

to

which

they

were

shackled

to

the

past.

The

approach

to

and

the

decision

for

war,

as

the

writer

demonstrates,

seemed

to

betray

an

unnatural,

almost

artificial

manufacturing

of

crisis.

A

United

King-

dom

that

stood

supreme,

with

a

mixture

of

world

envy

and

pride

as

its

chief

name-identification,

having

no

immedi-

ate

association

with

either

the

assassins

of

Sarajevo

or

the

Serbian

irritation

to

Austria,

reacted

with

a

blend

of

deepen-

ing

concern,

or

alarm,

or

studied

hos-

tility,

patriotic

fervor,

righteous

indigna-

tion,

and

resignation

in

such

a

fashion

as

to

transform

a

hereditary

defensive

posture

to

one

of

continental

commit-

ment

and

intervention.

The

vehicle

selected

by

the

writer

in

presenting

the

evidence

and

the

conclu-