Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Board: the Sovereign Immunity of State Agencies Under the Georgia Constitution and the Georgia Tort Claims Act - Jamie P. Woodard

• Publication year: 2002

Younghlood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton

Community Service Board: The Sovereign

Immunity of State Agencies Under the

Georgia Constitution and the

Georgia Tort Claims Act*

In Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Board,¹ the Georgia Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statutory section that extended sovereign immunity "as provided for counties"² to community service boards, which are statutorily created, multicounty, public bodies that receive public funds to contract with third-party mental health providers on behalf of mentally disabled citizens.³ The court held the statute impermissibly expanded the sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies under the state constitution and the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA).⁴

I. Factual Background

Margie Youngblood's daughter, Patricia, is mentally disabled and is not capable of caring for herself. In 1995, Margie placed Patricia in a residential home funded by the Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Board (GRNCSB).⁵ Community service boards are statutorily formulated "public agencfies] created to govern publicly funded programs for the purpose of providing disability services not provided by other public or private providers."⁶ The boards coordinate public monies on a multicounty level to "provide mental health, mental retardation, substance abuse, and other disability services."⁷ The purpose of these boards is to centralize the referral of mental health patients to local, regional, and state health care providers in order to foster a greater "continuity of care."⁸

Marie Youngblood placed Patricia in a residential home operated by Barbara and Charles Vaughn, who were under contract with GRNCSB.⁹ GRNCSB employees in Patricia's workplace reported she had been injured in March 1996. After an investigation, the GRNCSB employees discovered the Vaughns were beating Patricia, and she was removed from the Vaughns' care.¹⁰ Acting as the guardian of Patricia's property, Margie Youngblood filed suit against GRNCSB and the Vaughns alleging negligence and breach of contract. GRNCSB moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment holding GRNCSB was protected by sovereign immunity under Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 37-2-11.1(c)(1) for any negligence claim. The trial court also held Youngblood's breach of contract action was barred because no written contract existed between her and GRNCSB.¹¹ The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari¹² to consider the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 37-2-11.l(c)(l)'s grant of sovereign immunity to community service boards.¹³ The statute provides that "community service boards shall be public bodies, but shall not be considered agencies of the state or any specific county or municipality. Such community service boards are public agencies in their own right and shall have the same immunity as provided for counties."¹⁴

The court held the legislature's grant of the same immunity as counties to community service boards was unconstitutional because community service boards like GRNCSB are agencies or departments of the state whose sovereign immunity may only be waived in a tort claims act "or an act . . . which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and the extent of such waiver."¹⁵

II. Legal Background

The Georgia Supreme Court has considered the proper scope of the sovereign immunity of the state and its agencies and departments on many occasions and in many contexts. In doing so, the court has been guided not only by constitutional and statutory language but also by the long common-law heritage of sovereign immunity and its development as a constitutional doctrine in Georgia. Before examining more recent developments, this historical context is worthy of review.

The common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity originates from the medieval English theory that "the King can do no wrong."¹⁶ Georgia adopted sovereign immunity in 1784 when it passed a reception statute for all of the common law of England in force prior to May 14, 1776.¹⁷ The doctrine was first given constitutional status in 1975 when the supreme court, based on a 1974 constitutional amendment reserving the sovereign immunity of the state, held it lacked authority to abrogate or modify the state's immunity because that power rested solely with the General Assembly.¹⁸ Even though the reservation of immunity in the 1974 amendment only referred to "the state," the supreme court held that this included state agencies and counties.¹⁹ Courts gave a similar construction to the word "state" in the very first constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity—a waiver to the extent of any liability insurance coverage—which was enacted in 1983.²⁰

In 1991 Georgia amended the state constitution to repeal the insurance waiver and reserve the sovereign immunity of "the state and all of its departments and agencies."²¹ Under this framework, the state's sovereign immunity is automatically waived for any action ex contractu and may be waived specifically by the General Assembly for tort claims.²² In 1992 the General Assembly exercised its constitutional authority to do so and passed the GTCA,²³ which, with certain exceptions and limitations, waives the state's sovereign immunity for the "torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment."²⁴

Within this context, the supreme court has frequently been called on to determine the scope of the phrase "the state and its departments or agencies" in the 1991 amendment. The court's jurisprudence in this area demonstrates no unified method for resolving the issue. Taken together, the cases demonstrate three basic approaches: (1) a narrow construction that distinguishes the state and its political subdivisions from mere instrumentalities; (2) a broad construction founded on plain meaning and legislative history; and (3) deference to the General Assembly's authority to create political subdivisions and extend immunity to them as the Assembly sees fit.²⁵

In the 1994 case of Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County,²⁶ the court applied a narrow construction of the term "state" in the 1991 amendment when it held that hospital authorities qualified neither as the state nor as departments or agencies of the state and were not entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity.²⁷ The court distinguished the state and its political subdivisions from "instrumentalities created by the state to carry out various functions."²⁸ Because it was a distinct corporate entity and lacked the inherent powers of a political subdivision, the hospital authority was not a part of the state or the county even though it had been created by Clarke County pursuant to state law.²⁹ The court held that the nature of the hospital authority's function was irrelevant because it was a mere instrumentality of the county, but the hospital authority was not an instrumentality in the way that a department or agency would be because it was a separate corporate entity.³⁰

Justifying its conclusion on policy grounds, the court analyzed the functions of the hospital authority and concluded that they were not the type of functions that warranted the protection of sovereign immunity.³¹ The court identified the historical purpose of sovereign immunity as allowing the business of government to occur without being hindered by lawsuits and noted that the doctrine was properly limited in its application to governmental functions only.³² The hospital authority's functions were not governmental, according to the court, because they were functions ordinarily performed by private hospitals in the business sector.³³ The court also observed that if an instrumentality of government enters the marketplace, it should have the same liabilities of doing business as a private corporation, and those who transact business with the instrumentality should have the same legal protections they would have in dealing with a private entity.³⁴

Finally, the court, in deciding whether the hospital authority qualified for sovereign immunity, balanced the interests of injured parties against the interests of taxpayers.³⁵ The court found no impact on taxpayers as a result of imposing liability on the hospital authority because "[a] hospital authority is a business corporation authorized and able ... to provide itself with insurance and of satisfying judgments against it without affecting the stability of the state treasury."³⁶ As a result, the court held that the interest in compensating injured parties clearly outweighed any potential impact on the taxpayers.³⁷

Just two years later, however, in Miller v. Georgia Ports Authority,³⁸ the court significantly departed from this analysis and applied a broader construction when it looked to the plain language and legislative history of the 1991 constitutional amendment and determined that the Georgia Ports Authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as a state agency.³⁹ The court framed its analysis by reciting that "the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the legislative intent, 'keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy.'"⁴⁰ Looking first to the plain meaning of the phrase "state or its departments and agencies," the court canvassed multiple dictionaries and concluded that "agency" meant a department or administrative unit of government.⁴¹ The court then examined the act that created the Georgia Ports Authority,⁴² which specifically referred to the authority as the state ports authority and gave it the responsibility to "develop, improve, and maintain the harbors and seaports of the state."⁴³ Because the Georgia Ports Authority was the administrative unit in charge of the state's docks, the court held it was a state agency within the plain meaning of that term.⁴⁴

After deciding the case on plain meaning alone, the court justified the interpretation as consistent with the legislative intent...