You Shall Not Pass! Georgia Court of Appeals Narrows the Admissibility of Prior Acts Character Evidence Under Georgia Evidence Rule 404(b)
| Publication year | 2023 |
You Shall Not Pass! Georgia Court of Appeals Narrows the Admissibility of Prior Acts Character Evidence Under Georgia Evidence Rule 404(b)
Hannah Farthing
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The common law rules of evidence prohibited the use of a defendant's "bad character or prior, unrelated misconduct" to show in a criminal trial that the defendant was more likely to have committed the charged crime.1 Today, however, the accused's prior crime or prior acts are admissible in trial so long as the evidence is relevant to some issue other than proving the accused acted in accordance with his character.2 Although the rule manages to keep out entirely unrelated evidence of the accused's criminal character, many broad exceptions to the rule still lie in place allowing the prosecution to sneak evidence into the trial.3 This creates a danger that once the jury learns that a defendant has a criminal history, the likelihood of a conviction escalates tremendously.4
Mirroring the Federal Rules of Evidence, Georgia maintains the general prohibition making character evidence of "bad acts" inadmissible
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to show a defendant acted in conformity with these negative characteristics on a certain occasion.5 Georgia adopted its own rendition to the general prohibition of character evidence through the enactment of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 24-4-404(b).6 Under the Georgia code, character evidence will surpass the general prohibition if the prosecution can show that the evidence is relevant to the accused's "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."7
The Georgia Court of Appeals tightened the reins on prosecutors' ability to admit character evidence into criminal trials through the ruling in Wright v. State.8 The court held evidence of Wright's prior drug conviction, while relevant to the charged offense, was improperly admitted into evidence because of the danger of unfair prejudice the evidence presented. Hiding behind a veil of relevance and minimal prosecutorial need will no longer suffice when the admission of the evidence poses a danger that the jury will misuse the evidence for an improper purpose.9
In November 2015, Jamie Courtney Wright arrived at a home in Richmond County.10 Approximately one hour later, narcotics investigators and law enforcement officers arrived at the residence in search of an unnamed fugitive. Officers were given consent to enter the residence by the homeowner. Wright emerged from a bedroom and was asked by a law enforcement officer to wait on the porch with another officer while the residence was searched.11 An investigator found a black bookbag containing around forty seven grams of a "leafy substance" in the room where Wright emerged from.12 After finding the substance, believed to be marijuana, the investigator asked the occupants waiting on the porch who the bookbag belonged to. Without a description of the bag, Wright told the investigators the bookbag belonged to him. After Wright claimed to own the bag, the investigator retrieved the black
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bookbag containing the believed narcotics.13 Wright claimed possession of a bookbag stating, "[y]eah, that's my bag."14 With consent from Wright to search the bag, investigators found a handgun, a small scale, a dollar bill with oxycodone residue, and various smaller bags of drugs. A search incident to arrest later revealed a large quantity of small denominations of bills. No personal drug use paraphernalia was found on Wright's person or in the black bookbag, indicating the items recovered were for distribution and not personal use.15
Wright later testified that when he arrived at the residence that morning, he only possessed a small red and black bag containing various items for his child; furthermore, he knew nothing about the black bookbag or its contents.16 Wright also testified that he was simply found in the room containing the bookbag at issue because he entered the room to look out the window when officers arrived. Contradicting the testimony of the investigators, Wright testified that he only claimed possession of the red and black bag he arrived with, never claiming ownership of the black bookbag at issue. At the conclusion of the first phase of a bifurcated trial, Wright was charged and found guilty of possession with intent to distribute of a Schedule One and Schedule Two controlled substance and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. During the second phase of the bifurcated trial, the State admitted evidence from Wright's 2011 conviction for a possession with intent to distribute.17
Wright challenged his conviction on two grounds.18 First, Wright argued that the statements made pertaining to the ownership of the bookbag at issue are inadmissible as "products of custodial interrogation" because the statements were made before an investigator advised him of his Miranda rights.19 After assessing the facts, the court of appeals found
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no error in the denial of Wright's motion to suppress.20 Compared to a reasonable person not guilty of a crime in a similar situation, Wright was found not to be within the confines of a custodial interrogation under Miranda.21
Wright's second justification for appeal rested on wrongfully admitted evidence of his 2011 conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.22 The superior court admitted the evidence from Wright's prior conviction for the sole purpose of establishing Wright's knowledge, intent, and lack of mistake of the commission of the current charged crime.23 Although the jury was given a limiting instruction on how to view the evidence, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was improperly admitted.24
A. The Georgia Rules of Evidence
Under Official Code of Georgia Annotated § 24-4-401 (Rule 401)25 , for evidence to be considered admissible in trial the evidence must be relevant.26 Relevant evidence tends to make the existence of a particular fact of consequence more or less probable than the fact would be without the admission of the evidence.27 Specifically, in order for evidence to be found relevant under O.C.G.A § 24-4-404(b) (Rule 404(b)), the evidence must be relevant for the non-propensity purpose for which the evidence is being offered.28 For instance, evidence of a prior driving under the
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influence of alcohol charge would be relevant evidence in a current trial for the same charge.29 Allowing this evidence in at trial would make the existence of the fact that the driver was voluntarily driving under the influence more probable than the fact would be without the admission of that evidence.30
After concluding that evidence is relevant under Rule 401, the trial court must come to an independent conclusion as to whether the probative value of the evidence offered is "substantially outweighed" by any of the enumerated factors in Official Code of Georgia Annotated § 24-4-403 (Rule 403).31 Even if evidence is considered relevant to the case at hand, evidence is inadmissible if the evidence presents a danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, would confuse the jury on the issues at bar, or would cause undue delay in the proceedings.32
Generally, evidence of a defendant's character trait is not allowed during trial to show that the defendant acted in conformity with that specific character trait on the date in question.33 In contrast, evidence of a defendant's character is permissible during trial if the evidence is being offered to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.34 The Rule 403 analysis of evidence of prior acts requires a case by case common sense assessment of the surrounding circumstances of both the prior act and the charged crime.35
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B. The Jones Test
When reviewing the admission of evidence, courts view the decision and circumstances around the admission of the evidence for abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.36 The error of improperly admitting evidence into the trial court requires reversal of the appellant's conviction unless the error is concluded to be harmless.37 In determining if the evidence was offered for a "proper purpose" the Georgia Court of Appeals applies the evidence to the test outlined in State v. Jones.38
State v. Jones is a similar case that deals with the admissibility of prior convictions under the Georgia Evidence Code.39 The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the evidence of Jones' prior conviction for driving under the influence was admissible for subsequent prosecution of driving under the influence to show his intent and knowledge.40 While the court held that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404 (b), the court reserved the Rule 403 analysis of the evidence on remand for the court of appeals.41 A thin line lies between the permissible purposes of proving intent and knowledge and the impermissible purpose of proving the character of the defendant.42 The Jones opinion concluded with caution that admission of prior acts evidence leaves significant room for prejudice to the defendant.43
Jones lays out a three-prong test to determine the admissibility of evidence: (1) the proposed evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character; (2) the probative value of the prior acts must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the defendant; and (3) there must be sufficient proof that the defendant committed the current act in question.44
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1. Prong One: Relevance to Some Issue Other Than Defendant's Character
For evidence to be admissible in trial, the proposed evidence must be relevant to a fact of...
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