Winning and Losing in Federal Sector Dispute Resolution

• DOI: 10.1177/009102609402300210
• Author: Charles G. Smith
• Date: 01 June 1994
• Published date: 01 June 1994
• Subject Matter: Article

Winning

and

Losing

in

Federal Sector Dispute

Resolution

This

paper

examines

the

binding

decisions

of the

Federal

Service

Impasses

Panel.

(Panel)

The

Panel

has

the

authority

to

mediate

and

ultimately

decide

the

terms

of

a

labor

agreement

should

the

federal

agencies

and

labor

unions be

unable

to do so

bilaterally.

This

paper

presents

descriptive

data

on who wins and who loses with the

Federal

Service

Impasses

Panel.

Background

information

on

the

history

of

dispute

resolution

machinery

in

the

federal

govern-

ment

is

outlined.

The

data

was

collected

from

a

content

analysis

of

307

of

311

binding

cases

decided

by the

Panel

from

1/79

through

7/87.

The

paper

chronicles

the

types

of

procedures

used

by the

Panel,

the

nature

of issues at

impasse

and

who wins.

Also,

the

number

and

types

of

arguments

used by the

parties

in

support

of

their

respective

positions with the

Panel

are

examined.

A

number

of

conclusions

are

drawn

from

the

analysis.

(1)

The

Panel

uses a

number

of

different

types

of

dispute

machinery

including

conventional

and

final

offer

procedures.

(2)

Management

won

almost

sixty

percent

of all issues

brought

before

the

Panel

(3)

Labor

and

management

tend

to

use

a

variety

of

different

arguments

to

support

their

positions.

(4)

Neither

labor

nor

management

appeared

very

interested

in

the

impact

of

their

proposals

on

the

general

public.

Future

research

may

wish to

investigate

the

specific

reasons

for

management

success.

B

The Federal Service Impasses Panel (Panel) is responsible for resolv-

Charles G. Smith mg negotiation impasses between federal agencies and unions representing

federal workers. This paper presents descriptive data on who wins and who

loses

with the Panel. It is divided into six parts. First, background informa-

tion on dispute resolution machinery in the federal government is dis-

cussed. Next, the data and the method of data collection are identified.

Third, the procedures used by the Panel to resolve disputes are outlined.

Fourth, the issues in dispute and who wins or loses are examined. Fifth, the

arguments used by labor and management to

support

their respective

positions with the Panel are presented. Finally, the paper concludes with

several observations concerning the significance of the findings.

From

1980 to 1982

Charles

G.

Smith

served as a national vice-

president

representing region

nine of

the

National

Federation

of

Federal

Employees.

In

1983

he

re-

ceived

the

Master

of

Arts

in

Indus-

trial

Relations

from

the

University

of

Cincinnati

and in

1989

a Ph.D.

in

Labor

and Human Resources

from

the Ohio

State

University.

He

is

currently

assistant

professor

of

human

resources

at

Niagara

University

and

adjunct

professor

of

labor

studies for Cornell Uni-

versity.

Current

research

topics

include,

dispute

resolution,

union

certification

election,

labor-man-

agement

cooperation and the

transformation

of business sys-

tems

from

planned to non

planned

economies.

Background

Until the late

1970s

U.S. Civil Service Commission exercised broad

authority over the federal workforce. The Commission was charged with

the management of the nation's federal bureaucracy, including the estab-

lishment of many terms and conditions of employment and the exercise of

broad judicial power over issues of discipline and discharge. The moderat-

ing influence of union representation and collective bargaining on this

comprehensive management control and authority was late coming to the

federal service. It began slowly with the issuing of Executive Order

10988

I

wish

to

thank

Steve

Hills,

Steve

Mangum

and

Marc

Sandverfor

their

guidance

and

comments.

Also

I

wish

to

thank

several

anonymous

reviewers.

Public

Personnel

Management

Vol.

23

No.2

(Summer

1994)

301

by

President Kennedy in

1962.

Collective

bargaining rights were afforded

federal sector unions, however, the negotiation process was severely re-

stricted

by a very narrow scope of bargaining, (wages and fringe benefits

were,

and remain today, excluded from bargaining) provisions which

required all agreements be approved by agency heads and by provisions

which guaranteed many management prerogatives.1

A

major weakness of this order was the absence of any provision for

resolving disputes arising between labor and management

during

the

course

of contract negotiations. Procedures could be used but they had to

be

mutually agreed to by the parties. The

belief

governing the Kennedy

Order was that because of the

lack

of experience in labor relations on the

part

of both management and labor, binding procedures, normally identi-

fied

with public sector impasse resolution, would result in the "chilling

effect"

associated with third party intervention. In addition, it was believed

that because the federal bureaucracy was so large and diverse a number

of

different

non binding procedures should be explored and tested. These

procedures included mediation, fact-finding and referral to higher agency

authority for decision. However, by the mid

1960s

most observers realized

that if the labor management relations program in the federal sector was to

operate properly a more formal method for impasse resolution was neces-

sary.2

Impasse resolution procedures took a dramatic

turn

in

1969

with the

issuing of

Executive

Order

11491

by President Richard Nixon. In addition

to an overall strengthening

of

the federal

sector

labor

management relations

program,

Section

5 of the Order established the Federal

Service

Impasses

Panel

as the federal sector's alternative to the strike.3 One major improve-

ment over the Kennedy Order was that now either party could initiate

impasse resolution procedures unilaterally without the consent of the

other. However, binding procedures for contract

dispute

resolution were

not yet in place.

The

framers of

E.0.11491

envisioned that the Panel would be more

concerned

with the use of non binding procedures such as mediation and

fact-finding.

And in

fact,

from 1970 to

1973

the Panel had an impressive

record

of

success

via the use of non-binding procedures. During this period

96

disputes were submitted and the Panel resolved all of them without

benefit

of a binding procedure. However, in addition to the use of non-

binding procedures

Executive

Order

11491

also stated that the Panel could

"take whatever action it deemed necessary to bring the

dispute

to settle-

ment."

Based

on this language the Panel in 1974 issued its first binding

"Decision

and Order" to resolve an impasse. This established the principle

of

final and binding arbitration as the ultimate

dispute

resolutions proce-

dure

in the federal service. After 1974 the Panel was prepared to issue

contract

language should the panties be unable to do so bilaterally.4

302 Public Personnel Management

Vol.

23

No.2 (Summer

1994)