WI Supreme Court rules sec. 893.16 does not apply when disabled person dies.

Byline: David Ziemer

When a disabled person dies, sec. 893.16 provides the statute of limitations for commencing action of her behalf, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held on June 2.

From Mar. 29, 1994, to Dec. 3, 1996, Lucille Genevieve Yox was a resident of St. Francis Home. During that time, and until her death on Aug. 15, 2000, Yox suffered from Alzheimer's disease, a "mental illness" within the meaning of sec. 893.16.

On Aug. 12, 2002, Julie Ann Walberg was appointed special administrator for Yox's estate. That same day, Walberg commenced an action for negligence and breach of contract against St. Francis Home, Inc. and Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., relating to Yox's care at St. Francis Home.

St. Francis asserted that the action was time-barred pursuant to sec. 893.22. Douglas County Circuit Court Judge George L. Glonek agreed and dismissed the action, concluding that the relevant statute of limitations was not two years from Yox's death under sec. 893.16, but rather one year under sec. 893.22.

Walberg appealed, and the court of appeals reversed in a published decision, Walberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc., 2004 WI App 120, 274 Wis.2d 414, 683 N.W.2d 518.

The Supreme Court accepted review, and affirmed the court of appeals in a unanimous decision by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley.

The Statutes

Section 893.22 provides: "Limitation in case of death. If a person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of the action and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced by the person's representatives after the expiration of that time and within one year from the person's death."

Section 893.16 provides, "Person under disability. (1) If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues . . . mentally ill, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, except that where the disability is due to mental illness, the period prescribed in this chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years.

(2) Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of limitation otherwise prescribed."

St. Francis argued that sec. 893.22 governs all actions brought by an estate after the injured party's death, and limits the period for any existing claims to one year, causing Walberg's claims to be time-barred. Walberg argued that sec. 893.22 extends, rather than restricts, the time period for commencing an action of a deceased claimant.

The court agreed with...