WI Court of Appeals rules that trial courts must tell defendants about Truth in Sentencing mandates.

Byline: David Ziemer

Trial courts are required to inform defendants during the plea colloquy that Wisconsin's Truth in Sentencing legislation mandates that they serve each day of confinement imposed, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held on Jan. 29.

On Jan. 28, 2002, Douglas K. Uhde pleaded no contest to (1) burglary while using a dangerous weapon, (2) carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), (3) possession of a short-barreled shotgun, and (4) felon in possession of a firearm (FIPOF).

Adams County Circuit Court Judge James Miller sentenced him as follows: 10 years in prison and seven years extended supervision for burglary; lesser, concurrent sentences for the two remaining felonies; and 225 days, consecutive, in the local jail for CCW. The sentence was later amended for reasons not relevant to the appeal.

Uhde moved to withdraw his no contest pleas, asserting the following grounds: (1) the plea questionnaire listed the maximum penalty for a FIPOF as two years when the actual maximum penalty was five years; (2) the questionnaire failed to set forth the maximum penalty for CCW as nine months; (3) the court failed to set forth all the elements of burglary; (4) the court failed to set forth the proper elements of the dangerous weapon penalty enhancer; and (5) the trial court was required to inform him that Wisconsin's Truth in Sentencing legislation mandates that he serve each day of confinement imposed by the court.

In support of the last argument, Uhde claimed he first learned about Truth in Sentencing while incarcerated, and that, when he entered his pleas, he assumed that Wisconsin used probation and good-time credits, because he had served time in Michigan and Texas, where such practices were in place.

The trial court denied the motion, and Uhde appealed. The court of appeals reversed in a decision by Judge Charles P. Dykman.

Direct Consequence

The court held that due process requires that defendants be informed, prior to entering their pleas, that they must serve every day imposed, because it is a direct, rather than collateral, consequence of the plea, relying on State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, 237 Wis.2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477. Only direct consequences of pleas must be known to the defendant for the plea to comport with due process requirements.

In Byrge, the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined a "direct consequence of a plea" as "one that has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of a defendant's punishment. If a defendant is...