When expressions of fake emotions elicit negative reactions: The role of observers' dialectical thinking

• Author: Gerben A. Kleef,Ivona Hideg
• Published date: 01 October 2017
• Date: 01 October 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/job.2196

RESEARCH ARTICLE

When expressions of fake emotions elicit negative reactions:

The role of observers' dialectical thinking

Ivona Hideg

1

|Gerben A. van Kleef

2

1

Lazaridis School of Business and Economics,

Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON,

Canada

2

Department of Social Psychology, University

of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Correspondence

Ivona Hideg, Lazaridis School of Business and

Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University,

Waterloo, ON, Canada.

Email: ihideg@wlu.ca

Funding Information

Social Sciences and Humanities Research

Council of Canada, Grant/Award Number:

435‐2014‐1147; Ontario Ministry of Research

and Innovation

Summary

Fake displays of emotions are common in social and organizational settings. It is therefore

important to understand their consequences. To reconcile mixed previous findings, we develop

a model in which the consequences of expressing fake emotions depend on the observers' level

of dialectical thinking, a cognitive style characterized by acceptance of inconsistencies. We

propose that observers lower, but not higher, on dialectical thinking may infer that interaction

partners who fake emotions are untrustworthy and, in turn, react negatively. We found support

for our model in 2 studies. In a field fundraising experiment (Study 1), fundraisers who displayed

fake (vs. genuine) happiness received smaller monetary donations and elicited lower intentions to

volunteer from donors lower, but not higher, on dialectical thinking. In a laboratory negotiation

experiment (Study 2), negotiators who displayed fake anger (vs. genuine anger or no emotion)

were trusted less and received higher demands from counterparts lower, but not higher, on

dialectical thinking. Trust mediated the moderating effect of dialecticism on the relation between

fake anger (vs. genuine anger and no emotion) and demands. We discuss the theoretical and prac-

tical implications of the findings.

KEYWORDS

anger, dialectical thinking, fake emotions, fundraising, happiness, negotiation, trust

1|INTRODUCTION

Organization members often express emotions that differ from those

that they really feel. In today's service‐based economy, emotional dis-

plays are often considered part of job performance (Grandey, 2000;

Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). However, employees do not always feel the

emotions that their organizations require them to display. Thus,

employees often act to display emotions that they do not feel

(Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1983). Employees may also strategically

display emotions that they do not feel to achieve desired goals such

as better outcomes in negotiations (Barry, 1999; Kopelman, Rosette,

& Thompson, 2006) or more effort from employees (Fitness, 2000).

Given the prevalence of such fake displays of emotions in organiza-

tional settings, it is important to understand their consequences.

Past studies have yielded mixed results regarding the effects of

showing fake displays of emotions in the workplace. Some studies

have shown that expressing fake emotions has negative consequences

(e.g., Goodwin, Groth, & Frenkel, 2011; Grandey, Fisk, Mattila, Jansen,

& Sideman, 2005), but other studies did not find negative conse-

quences (e.g., Gosserand & Diefendorff, 2005; Groth, Hennig‐Thurau,

& Walsh, 2009). One of the reasons why these findings are mixed

may be that past research did not explicitly take into consideration

the characteristics of the individuals who observe and respond to the

displays. The mixed results could potentially be reconciled by taking

into account such characteristics.

Here we draw on the literatures on the social effects of emotions

(Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2016) and dialectical thinking, a

cognitive style associated with acceptance of inconsistencies in one's

environment (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer‐Rodgers, Williams, &

Peng, 2010) to develop and test a model of how observers' dialectical

thinking moderates the effects of showing fake emotions on observers'

reactions.

1

Given the inconsistency between external expressions and

internal feelings that is inherent to fake displays of emotions, we pro-

pose that the effects of showing fake emotions depend on observers'

dialecticism. More specifically, we propose that individuals respond

more negatively to others' fake emotional displays to the degree that

they themselves score lower (rather than higher) on dialectical

1

In this paper, we label the individual who observes emotional displays in others

as observer, and the individual who displays emotions as expresser.

Received: 17 September 2016 Revised: 21 February 2017 Accepted: 16 March 2017

DOI: 10.1002/job.2196

1196 Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J Organ Behav. 2017;38:1196–1212.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/job

thinking. We further suggest that undermined perceptions of trust

underlie the negative reactions of lower dialectical thinkers to fake

displays of emotions.

We test our propositions in two studies. In Study 1—a field exper-

iment—we examined whether lower dialectical thinkers react

negatively to fake (vs. genuine) displays of happiness in a fundraising

context, in which expressions of happiness are common. In Study 2

—a laboratory experiment—we expanded on Study 1 findings by

testing whether trust mediates the negative reactions of lower

dialectical thinkers to fake anger (vs. genuine anger and neutral

emotional display) in a negotiation context, in which expressions of

anger are more common.

This research contributes to the literatures on the social effects of

emotions and dialectical thinking. For example, our studies show that

observers have negative reactions to fake displays of emotions, but

only if they are lower on dialectical thinking. As such, our findings

indicate that emotional inauthenticity does not universally lead to

negative reactions from observers. Our work also shows that

dialectical thinking has important implications for inferences about

others, thus complementing the typical focus in research on dialectical

thinking on inferences about the self.

2|PAST RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF

EXPRESSING FAKE EMOTIONS

Some past research, and particularly research in the area of emotional

labor, has examined how individuals interpret and respond to fake

displays of emotions by organization members. This literature suggests

that employees use two broad strategies for emotion regulation to

display organizationally required emotions: deep acting and surface

acting (Côté, 2005; Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1983). Deep acting

changes both the internal experience and the public display of emotion

and hence produces a genuine display of emotion. By contrast, surface

acting changes the public display but not the internal experience of

emotion and hence produces a fake display of emotion (Côté, 2005;

Grandey, 2000). Research shows that people can reliably identify

inauthentic emotional expressions (e.g., Côté, Hideg, & Van Kleef,

2013; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Grandey et al., 2005), with even

19‐month‐old infants being able to detect inauthentic emotions in

others (Walle & Campos, 2014).

Several past studies found that fake displays of emotions pro-

duced via surface acting elicit negative reactions from observers. For

example, past research found that surface‐acted (i.e., fake) emotions

were related to low ratings of affective delivery in a sample of univer-

sity administrative assistants (Grandey, 2003) and a sample of call

center employees (Goodwin et al., 2011). In an experiment utilizing

videotapes depicting a hotel check‐in and a field study of real

customer–server interactions in restaurants, fake displays of happiness

produced via surface acting were related to low perceived friendliness

and satisfaction with customer service (Grandey et al., 2005). Similarly,

another experiment found that surface‐acted happiness was related to

lower customer–employee rapport, relative to deep‐acted happiness

(Hennig‐Thurau, Groth, Paul, & Gremler, 2006). This research in

organizational contexts is consistent with findings from laboratory

studies showing that displays of fake happiness are related to less lik-

ing (Frank et al., 1993), lower perceptions of job suitability (Krumhuber,

Manstead, Cosker, Marshall, & Rosin, 2009), and reduced trustworthi-

ness and cooperation (Krumhuber et al., 2007). Similarly, a negotiation

experiment found that surface‐acted (vs. deep‐acted) anger

undermined trust and increased demands (Côté et al., 2013). These

findings suggest that fake displays of emotions can lead to negative

reactions by observers.

Other studies, however, have not found negative effects of

showing fake emotions. One study of real customer–service employee

interactions found that surface‐acted happiness did not influence

customers' ratings of service quality (Groth et al., 2009). A related

study found that surface‐acted happiness of customer service

employees did not influence supervisors' ratings of affective

performance (Gosserand & Diefendorff, 2005). Further, in an experi-

ence‐sampling study, Beal, Trougakos, Weiss, and Green (2006) found

that surface‐acted happiness of cheerleaders was positively related to

supervisors' ratings of affective delivery when cheerleaders' negative

emotions were high. These findings indicate that fake displays of

emotions sometimes do not lead to negative reactions by observers.

We suggest that fake displays of emotions sometimes, but not

always, elicit negative reactions from observers, depending on charac-

teristics of the observers. Past research has not considered observer

characteristics in understanding the effects of displaying fake

emotions. Given that observers play an active role in interpreting and

responding to others' emotional expressions (Côté, 2005; Van Kleef,

2009), it is crucial to understand how observers' characteristics

influence their reactions to fake emotional displays. We suggest that

an important characteristic of observers that influences how they react

to fake emotional displays is their tolerance for inconsistencies in the

environment, namely, dialectical thinking.

3|DIALECTICAL THINKING

Dialectical thinking (or naïve dialecticism) is a system of thoughts and

beliefs characterized by the expectation of contradictions and change

in the environment (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Peng & Nisbett, 1999;

Spencer‐Rodgers, Williams, et al., 2010). Past theorizing indicates that

dialectical thinking can be seen as a facet of the broader construct of

holism, which suggests that all things in the universe are in a constant

state of flux (Choi et al., 2007; Spencer‐Rodgers, Williams, et al., 2010).

In particular, higher dialectical thinkers expect phenomena to change

over time, they tolerate and embrace contradictions, and they accept

the simultaneous existence of seemingly incompatible ideas. For

example, they are likely to endorse seemingly contradictory notions

such as that people are both inherently good and bad (Spencer‐

Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2012). Thus, higher dialectical thinkers

regard and acknowledge contradictions as natural. By contrast, lower

dialectical thinkers expect phenomena to remain constant and are

generally uncomfortable with contradictions. Most importantly, past

theorizing suggests that dialecticism may influence what kind of infor-

mation is considered diagnostic of others' characters (Spencer‐Rodgers,

Williams, et al., 2010). That is, if higher dialectical thinkers may see both

good and bad in people and tolerate that both can coexist, then they

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