“What We've Got Here Is Failure to Communicate”

AuthorDaniel S. Nagin
Date01 August 2016
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12227
Published date01 August 2016
POLICY ESSAY
DIRECTIONS IN DETERRENCE THEORY
AND POLICY
“What We’ve Got Here Is Failure
to Communicate”
Daniel S. Nagin
Carnegie Mellon University
After reading Pickett and Roche (2016: 727–751; hereafter “PR”) and rereading
Nagin, Solow, and Lum (2015; hereafter “NSL”), I recalled the iconic line from the
classic movie Cool Hand Luke—“What we’ve got here is failure to communicate.”
In retrospect, I should not have been surprised. Several criminologists for whom I have
the highest regard have told me that they did not understand the model laid out in NSL.
This is plainly the case with PR—PR’s criticisms of the NSL model reflect a literalism in
interpretation that demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of the purpose of mathematical
models. Such models are intended to be “used not believed” (Theil, 1971: vi).
PR’s (2016) most important error in interpretation of NSL (2015), and indeed in logic
more generally, stems from their conclusion that research showing systematic biases in risk
perceptions has demonstrated that risk perceptions have no grounding in reality. Just as
important, their key criticisms of the NSL model are contradicted by their own arguments
and data they report. They are, thus, without logical or empirical foundation.
Mathematical representations of social phenomenon, in the case of NSL (2015) target
choice by would-be offenders, are unusual in criminology, and most criminologists receive
no training in the use and specification of mathematics-based models of social phenomenon.
Thus, the main purpose of this commentary is to explain better the purpose and motivation
for the model in NSL, with the aim of clarifying for criminologists the added value of formal
models of crime for policy analysis and, even more importantly,for scientific inquir y. Along
the way, I hope to clarify the most important misunderstandings and errors in PR (2016).
Mathematical Models—TheirConstruction and Purpose
Criminologists normally think of a model as a statistical representation of a phenomenon
of interest. In this usage of the term, the central issues involve selection of the variables to
I thank Cynthia Lum, Charles Manski, and Robert Solow for helpful comments. Direct correspondence to
Daniel S. Nagin, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Hamburg Hall, Pittsburgh,
PA 15213 (e-mail: dn03@andrew.cmu.edu).
DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12227 C2016 American Society of Criminology 753
Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 15 rIssue 3

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