Weekly Case Digests April 15, 2019 April 19, 2019.

Byline: Rick Benedict

7th Circuit Digests

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Maurice Walker

Case No.: 18-2825

Officials: RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing Guidelines

A grand jury indicted Maurice Walker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). During his detention awaiting trial, the Government discovered that Mr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed multiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his upcoming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding indictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with conspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of the superseding indictment. The district court imposed sentences of 80 months' imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The district court recommended to the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") that Mr. Walker should not receive credit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the superseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct leading to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.

Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improperly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served before trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for all the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the superseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail in this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are controlled by settled law. Congress has committed the responsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confinement to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the authority to make such a determination. The court does have, however, the discretion to make a recommendation to the BOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district court therefore acted well within its discretion when it made such a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Paul Regains v. City of Chicago

Case No.: 15-2444

Officials: EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.

Focus: Time-barred

The Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the police. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was homeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers who directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they listed on his registration as his permanent address), and to return for re-registration in ninety days. When he appeared to report three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Regains on an "investigative alert," because other officers had not been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Regains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illinois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a change of address.

Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time-barred under Illinois' two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, or that it was barred by this court's decision in New- some v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Manual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) ("Manuel I"). The district court also found that the amended complaint lacked sufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that because Regains did not specifically identify a particular constitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).We reverse the district court's decision that Regains' claim was time-barred, and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Trustees of Indiana University, et al. v. Terry Curry, et al.

Case No.: 18-1146; 18-1247; 18-1308

Officials: EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation

In Indiana "[a] person who intentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony." Ind. Code 35-46-5-1.5(d). A federal district court held that several terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and that it must be treated as if it read: "A person who intentionally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony." 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 93435 (S.D. Ind. 2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is invalid. As enacted, 35-46-5-1.5(b) reads: "As used in this section, 'fetal tissue' includes tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted fetus." This must be treated as if it read: "As used in this section, 'fetal tissue' includes tissue or organs of an aborted fetus." The district court thus held that the words "acquires", "receives", and "transfers", and the phrase "any other part", are too uncertain to have legal force. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are invalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions.

We conclude that the district court should have entered judgment in defendants' favor. The injunction is reversed, and the case is remanded for that purpose.

Reversed and remanded

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: City of Chicago v. Shelly C. Moore, et al.

Case No.: 17-3630; 17-3663; 17-3664

Officials: EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Estate Bankruptcy

An application for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code transfers most of a debtor's assets to the newly formed bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. 541, 1306. Property stays in the estate until the bankruptcy court confirms a plan of payment. Then, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor." 11 U.S.C. 1327(b). This means that the debtor becomes personally...