W. D. PULESTON. The Influence of Force in Foreign Relations. Pp. xii, 254. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955. $4.50
| Author | Martin B. Travis |
| Date | 01 July 1955 |
| DOI | 10.1177/000271625530000120 |
| Published date | 01 July 1955 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
132
international
politics
is
in
the
present
situa-
tion
of
the
world
it
&dquo;is
of
little
value
for
long
range
prediction
and
control&dquo;
(p.
145).
One
of
Wright’s
hopes
is
expressed
thus:
&dquo;The
relativism,
pragmatism,
adaptability,
and
moderation
observable
in
the
healthy
organism,
in
the
well-adjusted
personality,
and
in
the
stable
culture,
is
needed
in
the
world
community....
It
should
be
the
function
of
a
discipline
of
international
re-
lations
to
analyze
the
entities,
processes,
forces
and
relations
in
the
international
field,
and
to
seek
means
for
so
regulating
and
balancing
them
that
the
opportunity
for
individuals
and
groups
to
achieve
their
values
may
be
maximized&dquo;
(p.
59).
There
is
much
intellectual
history
in
this
book.
RICHARD
H.
HEINDEL
University
of
Buffalo
W.
D.
PULESTON.
The
Influence
of
Force
in
Foreign
Relations.
Pp.
xii,
254.
New
York:
D.
Van
Nostrand
Company,
1955.
$4.50.
Contemporary
United
States
foreign
policy
has
emphasized
military,
economic,
and
moral
considerations
in
its
formula-
tion.
The
thinking
of
the
moralists
has
been
adequately
developed
by
international
lawyers
and
exposed
by
Hans
J.
Morgen-
thau.
Various
economic
approaches
may
be
as
sophisticated
as
Keynes
and
Viner
or
as
naive
as
Humphrey
and
Wilson.
But
the
military
mind
has
been
neglected
until
recently.
Little
yet
has
been
forthcoming
from
the
large
scale
research
financed
by
Carnegie,
Rockefeller,
and
the
Twentieth
Century
Fund.
Captain
Puleston’s
latest
book,
therefore,
is
all
the
more
welcome
as
an
excellent
illustration
of
a
military
analy-
sis
of
foreign
policy.
The
author,
a
retired
naval
captain
(An-
napolis,
1902),
cannot
be
accused
of
fore-
saking
his
church-the
United
States
Navy,
nor
his
god-Admiral
Mahan. As
a
tech-
nician
he
tends
to
emphasize
the
role
of
the
specialist
over
that
of
the
generalist;
his
scope
therefore
can
be
characterized
as
nar-
row
rather
than
broad.
Perhaps
typical
of
the
military
mind,
Puleston
stresses
the
short
run
(expedient
and
efficient)
as
against
the
long
run
(political
and
psycho-
logical).
Likewise
he
emphasizes
the
ma-
terial
aspects
of
power,
and
tends
to
neglect
the
importance
of
the
psychological
aspects
(both
morale
and
allies).
Like
navy
writers
in
general
(including
an
unmasked
Hanson
Baldwin)
he
appreciates
potential
power
and
depreciates
an
overstated
air-
force
evaluation
of
the
immediate
destruc-
tiveness
of
H-bombs.
Withal,
Captain
Puleston
would
disagree
that
the
atom
bomb
created
a
technological
revolution
in
warfare;
he
uses
the
history
of
preatomic
wars
for
predictive
purposes.
The
book’s
eight
chapters
include
an
In-
troduction
which
sketches
the
contributions
of
Clausewitz
and
Mahan;
a
chapter
on
the
relative
role
of
the
land,
air,
and
sea
forces
(emphasizing
the
latter);
a
consideration
of
the
joint
responsibility
of
civil
and
military
leadership,
taking
particular
ex-
ception
to
the
thought
that
wars
are
too
important
to
be
fought
by
generals;
a
case
study
of
the
diplomatic
rivalry
between
the
United
States
and
Japan
in
which
he
stresses
power
more
than
pride
(United
States
immigration
policy)
as a
motivating
factor
for
the
Japanese
policy;
the
impact
of
the
H-bomb
in
which
defensive
mecha-
nisms
are
emphasized
on
the
one
hand,
and
a
modified
preventive
war
policy
on
the
other
(&dquo;we
should
strike
only
if
the
enemy
did
not
cease
preparing
to
attack
us
by
a
certain
time!&dquo;);
an
unflattering
analysis
of
the
leadership
in
Britain
and
the
United
States
as
compared
to
Russia
in
World
War
II;
and
an
assessment
of
all
the
fu-
tile
efforts
to
eliminate
force
from
the
first
Hague
Conference
in
1899
through
the
United
Nations.
While
this
reader
disagrees
with
the
author’s
approach,
as
well
as
his
conclu-
sions,
it
must
be
admitted
that
Puleston
gives
a
pungent
criticism
of
idealistic
think-
ing.
It
may
be
that
the
flaw
in
this
militaristic
realism
are
all
too
apparent
and
for
that
reason
the
author does
not
quite
earn
the
title
of
&dquo;Devil’s
advocate.&dquo;
Nevertheless,
the
book
deserves
to
be
required
reading
for
all
students
of
foreign
policy-particularly
in
connection
with
Sapin
and
Snyder’s
The
Role
of
the
Mili-
tary
in
American
Foreign
Policy.
MARTIN
B.
TRAVIS,
JR.
Stanford
University
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