Women's voices as evidence: personal testimony is pro-choice films.

• Author: Pickering, Barbara A.

Analysis of public policy issues has long been the core of argumentation research. Argument critics examine how arguments are constructed and what forms of proof are valid to substantiate a claim. Traditional argument theorists typically refer to facts, examples, expert testimony and statistics as proof, and personal testimony is seen as merely a supplement to, rather than as grounds for arguments. Feminist scholars and feminist argumentation scholars, however, approach the use of personal testimony differently. Stories of personal experience have found their place in a feminine style of rhetoric developed by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1989). In addition, other feminist scholars, such as Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray (1993), Lorraine Code (1988), Jean Elshtain (1982), Karen A. Foss and Sonja K. Foss (1994), Sonja K. Foss and Cindy Griffin (1995), bell hooks (1989), Catharine A. MacKinnon (1982), and feminist argumentation theorists Catherine Helen Palczewski (1993, 1995, 2001) and Carrie Crenshaw (1993a, 1993b, 1994) have examined personal testimony as a means of producing knowledge and understanding. Theories relating to personal testimony have emerged representing a continuum of beliefs about its value and use. At one end of the spectrum is research which suggests that all personal testimony should be accepted and valued equally, while other research rejects its use entirely. The middle ground between the two advocates careful, considered use of personal testimony and it is this position that guides the philosophical approach of this piece.

This paper seeks to demonstrate how a feminist style of argument can better explain the function of women's voices in public policy discussions on abortion. Extending on the scholarship of Celeste Condit (1990) in her ground-breaking work on the arguments about abortion, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric, I describe how public rhetoric came to reflect the private lives of women. Just as Condit, I note the importance of recognizing "the full range and complexity of individuals' lived experiences" (p. 177). I will argue that personal testimony is a valid form of evidence which serves three functions for argumentation and feminist theory. First, it expands our understanding of the interrelationship between the public and private spheres of argument. Second, it implicates a relational standard of morality, in addition to the rigid, rule-based standard of morality. Finally, personal testimony can contribute to an evolving, liberatory, feminist epistemology. Ultimately, including personal testimony will result in more contemporary, comprehensive, and inclusive argumentation theory. To explore these argumentative functions, I review existing theory on personal testimony and feminist styles of arguing. Then, I provide a brief explanation of the historical context surrounding production of two pro-life films, followed by a synopsis of two pro-choice films, Personal Decisions and Abortion Denied: Shattering Young Women's Lives. The three functions of personal testimony described above will serve as a framework for analyzing the films. I conclude with recommendations for a feminist theory of argument which accepts personal testimony as a valued form of proof.

EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND ARGUMENT

Tensions exist between traditional argumentation theory and emerging feminist theories regarding personal testimony. Traditional argument theory views logic, reasoning and rationality as objective forms which limit the use of subjective experience. "Feminine" rhetoric, however, embraces inductive reasoning, which begins with a pool of individual examples and ultimately draws generalizations from those individual cases. Through this process, it follows that women's individual experiences may be combined to establish universal claims. To understand the range of perspectives represented in the literature it is necessary to examine traditional argumentation theory, feminist scholarship, and work which demonstrates the links between argumentation and feminist theory.

Recognition of experience as a valid form of evidence challenges traditional definitions of evidence. Evidence which incorporated personal testimony was marginalized early on in the rhetorical tradition by Aristotle, who suggested that only "the opinion of detached persons is highly trustworthy" (Aristotle, trans. 1984, p. 86). This traditional definition also appears in more recent work on argument theory. Michael Pfau, David Thomas and Walter Ulrich defined testimony as "evidence which consists of a person's statements or assertions as to what he or she thinks is true" (1987, p. 114). They concluded that, "Opinionated testimony is of little value in controversies over factual issues," and ultimately argued that, "Opinion testimony, unlike factual testimony is inherently personal and subjective" (Pfau, Thomas & Ulrich, 1987, p. 114). This privileging of "objective" evidence over "subjective" proof creates problems for contemporary argumentation theory, however. Feminist scholarship which has examined personal testimony does not present such a monolithic perspective, choosing instead to recognize the continuum of opinions regarding personal testimony which range from the blanket acceptance of personal testimony to a more skeptical, limited use of personal testimony.

Embracing the argumentative power of personal testimony illustrates a fundamental element of the feminist movement-the personal is political. Catharine A. MacKinnon, feminist jurisprudence scholar, explained the meaning of the phrase: "It means that women's distinctive experience as women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal--private, emotional, interiorized, particularized, individuated, intimate--so that what it is to know the politics (emphasis in original) of woman's situation is to know women's personal lives" (1982, p. 535). This principle of the women's movement--making the personal political-is accomplished by means of a feminist method which embodies a unique relationship between method and truth and the public/private spheres of influence known as consciousness raising. Campbell suggested consciousness-raising recognizes "affirmation of the affective, of the validity of personal experience, of the necessity for self-exposure and self-criticism, of the value of dialogue, and of the goal of autonomous, individual decision making" (1973, p. 79).

The work of feminist theorists illuminates a way to understand personal experience as useful evidence in public argument. Campbell described the elements of a feminine style of rhetoric found in the early feminist movement: the use of personal tone, emphasis on personal experience of both the speaker and audience, and inductive reasoning. These elements create a sense of empowerment for women.

Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin contended that personal testimony is central to feminist scholarship, concluding that all personal experience is admissible in a "rhetoric of inherent value" characterized by "first-hand, concrete, lived experience" (1992, p. 344). Other feminist scholars warned of a victim mentality, suggesting that it limits the usefulness of women's experiences. Jean Bethke Elshtain argued that creating an image of victims who speak from a standpoint of moral purity risks the valuable edge of self-criticism so necessary to feminisms' goals (1986, p. 612). Linda Kauffman warned that, "there is something fatally alluring about personal testimony" (1993, p. 261). Her underlying argument is that a danger arises when personal testimony privileges individual experience without acknowledging the impact of history, society and politics.

The gap between these two perspectives on personal testimony is bridged by other scholars who maintain that the middle ground between absolute acceptance and rejection can, and in fact, must be considered. Feminist scholar bell hooks argued for the "power of voice as gesture of rebellion and resistance," which is unique and different from ordinary talk (1989, p. 14). The content of this speech enables us to develop a critical consciousness, avoiding "a shallow feminist politic which privileges acts of speaking over the content of speech" (hooks, 1989, p. 14).

Hooks also examined the relationship between the oppressor and oppressed in which, "those who dominate are seen as subjects and those who are dominated objects" (1989, p. 42). Power is found in subjects who "have the right to define their own reality, establish their own identities, name their history," while for objects, "reality is defined by others, one's identity created by others, one's history named only in ways that define one's relationship to those who are subject" (hooks, 1989, p. 42-3).

Another way of conceptualizing the subject/object relationship emerged in Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray's analysis of sexual abuse survivor discourse. Alcoff and Gray explored the struggle between theory and personal life seeking "to reposition the problem from the individual psyche to the social sphere where it rightfully belongs" (1993, p. 261). Here too, there are dangers in creating a victim mentality, where survivor speech is dependent on an expert's interpretation of one's actions to lend legitimacy to the statements. The victim mentality, which weakens the value of personal testimony, can be avoided if survivor discourse shifts from a confessional mode, which emphasizes the binary nature of knowledge versus experience, to a witnessing or testifying mode where speaking out can empower women.

The criticism of the dichotomy between experience and knowledge found in Alcoff and Gray's work is central to other feminist theory. Philosopher Lorraine Code described a Toronto hospital inquiry in which doctors (primarily males) were asked to answer questions based on their "knowledge" while nurses (primarily females) were asked to describe their "experiences" (1988, p. 64). This created a hierarchy in which knowledge...