Value Pluralism

• Author: Robert B. Talisse
• Date: 01 November 2015
• Published date: 01 November 2015
• DOI: 10.1177/0095399715593315
• Subject Matter: Disputatio Sine Fine

593315AASXXX10.1177/0095399715593315Administration & SocietyTalisse
research-article2015
Disputatio Sine Fine
Administration & Society
2015, Vol. 47(9) 1064 –1076
Value Pluralism:
© The Author(s) 2015
DOI: 10.1177/0095399715593315
A Philosophical
aas.sagepub.com
Clarification
Robert B. Talisse1
Abstract
Patrick Overeem and Jelle Verhoef pose a serious challenge to Hendrik
Wagenaar and Michael Spicer, both of whom attempt to derive prescriptive
conclusions for public administration from value pluralism (VP). Wagenaar
and Spicer have responded with puzzlement, adding the counter-charge that
Overeem and Verhoef have misinterpreted their views. Indeed, there is
misinterpretation afoot, but the culprits are Wagenaar and Spicer. Although
they both claim to have adopted VP, neither demonstrates an adequate
grasp of that position. Consequently, they miss the force of Overeem and
Verhoef’s arguments, and their responses introduce new confusions.
Keywords
value pluralism, Isaiah Berlin, moral philosophy
Patrick Overeem and Jelle Verhoef (2014) pose a serious challenge to Hendrik
Wagenaar (1999, 2011) and Michael Spicer (2001, 2010), both of whom
attempt to derive prescriptive conclusions for public administration from
value pluralism (VP). Wagenaar (2014) and Spicer (2014) have responded
with puzzlement, adding the counter-charge that Overeem and Verhoef have
misinterpreted their views. Indeed, there is misinterpretation afoot, but the
1Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA
Corresponding Author:
Robert B. Talisse, Vanderbilt University, 111 Furman Hall, Nashville, TN 37240, USA.
Email: robert.talisse@vanderbilt.edu

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Talisse
1065
culprits are Wagenaar and Spicer. Although they both claim to have adopted
VP, neither demonstrates an adequate grasp of that position. Consequently,
they miss the force of Overeem and Verhoef’s arguments and their responses
introduce new confusions.
In this commentary, I aim to clarify matters regarding VP. I suspect that
once the concepts are properly formulated, the present dispute will be
resolved in the direction indicated by Overeem and Verhoef. VP as proposed
by Berlin and his contemporary followers indeed has no prescriptive implica-
tions. Consequently, Wagenaar and Spicer are wrong.
I begin by identifying what VP is. To this end, I develop a contrast between
VP and its primary philosophical rival, value monism (VM). Then I present
three diversity theses; I argue that VP is equivalent to none of these, but rather
is a distinct thesis about the nature of value that offers an explanation of vari-
ous forms of diversity. With this conceptual work in place, I will develop an
argument similar to the one offered by Overeem and Verhoef for the view that
VP is prescriptively barren. I close with some general remarks regarding
Wagenaar’s and Spicer’s response essays.
What VP Is
As the present debate concerns the views associated with Berlin and contem-
porary Berlinians such as John Kekes, by “value pluralism,” I will henceforth
mean the Berlinian version, and in explicating it, I will rely primarily on
Berlin’s writings, although my depiction of VP will apply equally well to the
contemporary Berlinians.1 Now, one way to achieve the requisite clarity is to
contrast VP with its rival, VM. Before turning to the contrast, however, three
remarks are in order.
First, in calling VP and VM rivals, I do not mean that the value monist
must deny everything that the value pluralist asserts. There is considerable
overlap among them regarding, say, the badness of lying and the importance
of liberty. VP and VM are rivals in the following strict sense: VP asserts a
distinctive claim about the nature of value that the value monist must deny.
VP and VM are opposed views about the nature of value; they need not dis-
agree over what is of value.
Second, VP and VM nonetheless share key underlying commitments.
Most importantly, they are both objectivist views about value; they both
assert that the facts about value are objective and universal, independent of
what any person, group, or epoch may hold them to be. VP and VM are allied
in opposing non-objectivist views about value, including relativism, nihilism,
and skepticism. Although they are rivals, VP and VM are close neighbors in
the conceptual space of moral theory.

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Administration & Society 47(9)
Third, VP is a minority position. Contemporary ethicists who are objectiv-
ists tend toward VM, and even among those who resist VM, very few opt for
the Berlinian alternative; indeed, many those who are attracted to pluralism
about value distance themselves from Berlin’s doctrines. In other words,
dyed-in-the-wool Berlinians are scarce among ethicists. Now, the unpopular-
ity of VP is not conclusive evidence that it is false. In calling attention to the
fact that VP is a minority view, I mean only to suggest that the more strident
claims that Berlin makes about the dangers of VM are only so much hot air.
To be more specific, Berlin’s (2002) claims that VM leads to authoritarian
politics (p. 212), that only value pluralists can fully respect the value of nega-
tive liberty (p. 214), or that monism is symptomatic of “moral and political
immaturity” (p. 217) simply are overblown. The most stalwart defenders of
liberty, individuality, and diversity in the tradition—Immanuel Kant, John
Stuart Mill, and Ronald Dworkin, to name a few—are value monists. Now, it
may be the case that the tyrants of the world have also tended to be value
monists, but that fact obviously does not entail that VM explains, much less
causes, their tyrannical behavior. Tyranny is explained by the tyrants’ values,
not their conception of the nature of value.
With these preliminaries in place, we can lay down the general claim that
whatever VP is, it must be something that value monists must deny. Now we
proceed with the contrast.
It appears intuitive to think that monism in any domain is the claim that
there is only one thing in that domain. Alas, philosophical matters are not that
simple. Few philosophers have flatly denied that there are many things. Even
those metaphysicians who, such as Parmenides and Spinoza, hold that “all is
one” nonetheless countenance the many appearances or modes of the one, or
else distinguish the real one from the illusory many. However, if there is a
distinction to be drawn between the one and its manifestations—or the real
and the illusory—there must be in some sense more than one thing. In meta-
physics, simple-minded monism is a non-starter, a view decisively refuted by
the plain fact that it takes three words to formulate the thesis that all is one.
Yet some metaphysicians endorse monism, so we should infer that their view
is not simplistic. Sophisticated metaphysical monists carefully delineate what
is to count as a “thing”; monism, they say, holds that although there is one
thing, it has many properties, aspects, and attributes. As the present debate
concerns values rather than general metaphysics, we need not survey these
details.
Still, the general lesson applies. Like his counterpart metaphysician, the
value monist does not espouse the simplistic thesis that there is but one good
thing to which all must conform. The claim is...