United States v. Dickerson: the Beginning of the End for Miranda? - James R. O'neill

• Publication year: 2000

United States v. Dickerson: The Beginning of the End for Miranda?

In United States v. Dickerson,¹ the Fourth Circuit held that the admissibility of a confession in federal courts is determined by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501,² not the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.³ Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded, pursuant to the statute, that admissibility of a confession depends upon whether or not it is voluntary⁴

I. Factual Background

On January 27, 1997, several FBI agents traveled to defendant Charles Dickerson's apartment to investigate a bank robbery. After a brief conversation, Dickerson agreed to accompany the agents to the FBI office in Washington, D.C. Initially, Dickerson denied any involvement but admitted to being in the vicinity of the bank at the time of the robbery.⁵ Based upon this and other information,⁶ the agents obtained a warrant to search Dickerson's apartment.⁷

Upon returning to the interview room, one of the interviewing agents informed Dickerson that his apartment would soon be searched. Dickerson subsequently indicated that he wished to make a statement. He admitted to driving the getaway car in several bank robberies, identifying Jimmy Rochester as the actual robber. Moreover, Dickerson indicated that on the date in question, he stopped the car near the bank whereupon Rochester exited the vehicle.⁸ After describing suspicious actions on the part of Rochester,⁹ Dickerson was placed under arrest.¹⁰

Dickerson's confession resulted in the arrest of Rochester. Rochester stated that Dickerson was his driver in seven bank robberies in both Maryland and Virginia.¹¹ The search of Dickerson's apartment and automobile yielded a large amount of incriminating evidence.¹² This accumulation of evidence resulted in Dickerson's indictment by a federal grand jury on several charges related to the bank robberies.¹³

On May 19, 1997, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during the FBI interview.¹⁴ A hearing was held in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on May 30, 1997.¹⁵ The parties disputed whether defendant had been read his Miranda rights and whether he waived them prior to his confession. On July 1, 1997, the district court suppressed Dickerson's statement, which implicated himself and Rochester in the bank robbery The district court concluded that the statement was made while Dickerson was in police custody, in response to police interrogation, and without the necessary Miranda warnings.¹⁶

However, the district court found that Dickerson's statement was voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.¹⁷ On July 15, 1997, the Government filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's order suppressing Dickerson's statements made at the FBI interview.¹⁸ The Government contended that because Dickerson's statements were voluntary, they were admissible pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501.¹⁹

The Government's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 4, 1997.²⁰ Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,²¹ the district court denied the Government's motion for reconsideration because the Government failed to establish that the evidence was not available when the hearing was ongoing.²² The Government filed an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.²³

Although the Government contended in its motion for reconsideration that Dickerson's statement was admissible pursuant to Section 3501, it did not raise the applicability of the statute on appeal.²⁴ In fact the Justice Department would not permit the United States Attorney's Office to brief the issue.²⁵ Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit decided to use its own discretion to determine whether Section 3501 governs the admissibility of confessions in federal courts.²⁶

II. Legal History

At common law, confessions that were voluntarily made were admissible against an individual at trial.²⁷ In 1884 the Supreme Court essentially adopted this rule, concluding that a confession which was made voluntarily was admissible, basing its decision on the reliability of such a confession.²⁸ The Court subsequently declined to announce a per se rule that any confession made while in custody was involuntary.²⁹ Moreover, in 1896 the Court concluded that neglecting to warn an individual of his right to remain silent and of his right to an attorney were alone insufficient for a finding of an involuntary confession.³⁰

In Bram v. United States,³¹ the Court announced a constitutional basis for its rule that a confession must be made voluntarily, stating that the issue of voluntariness "is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'"³² The Court indicated that this part of the Fifth Amendment essentially codified the common law rule requiring that confessions be voluntary to be admissible.³³ Years later, the Court would question whether this rule derived from the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination or from concerns about whether forced confessions are untrustworthy.³⁴ In Brown v. Mississippi,³⁵ the rule was extended to the states when the Court concluded that to be admissible, a confession had to be voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.³⁶

Prior to 1966 the rule determining the admissibility of confessions in federal courts was consistent for many years, even if its origin was somewhat unclear. Specifically, the traditional rule was that a voluntary confession was admissible at trial.³⁷ In 1941 the Court specifically indicated that "voluntariness" was the test for assessing the admissibility of confessions in federal courts.³⁸ Whatever the rule's traditional basis, the Court would articulate a different approach for determining the admissibility of confessions.

In Miranda v. Arizona,³⁹ the Court rejected the individualized inquiry of whether a confession was voluntary, holding that any statement resulting from the custodial interrogation of an individual would be presumed involuntary and inadmissible unless the suspect was first provided with four warnings by the police.⁴⁰ Despite its decision in Bram, in which the Court held that the Fifth Amendment required voluntariness,⁴¹ the Court in Miranda conceded that the Constitution did not require any specific remedy to combat the inherent compulsions which plagued the interrogation process.⁴² The Court left the door open for the states and Congress to "develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as [the four warnings] in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it."⁴³ However, until such a time, the Court stated that the safeguards must be adhered to.⁴⁴

Two years after the Court's decision in Miranda, Congress enacted Section 3501.⁴⁵ The statute provides in pertinent part:

(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct

the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.

(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including

(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment,

(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession,

(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him,

(4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and

(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.

The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession ....

(e) As used in this section, the term "confession" means any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.⁴⁶

The Fourth Circuit emphasized that Congress's intention to return to an individualized inquiry of whether a confession is voluntary was manifested not only in the plain language of the statute but also in its legislative history.⁴⁷

Despite the express intent of Congress in enacting Section 3501, the United States Department of Justice has never vigorously enforced this provision.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, Paul Cassell, a law professor and former

Associate Deputy Attorney General who has submitted amicus briefs in support of Section 3501, contends that the Clinton Administration is the only Executive Department in the thirty year history of the statute that has ever indicated that the statute is unconstitutional or prevented its use.⁴⁹ Cassell asserts that even though the constitutionality of Section 3501 was rarely addressed by the courts, the Justice Department, from the Nixon Administration through the Bush Administration, had no policy against its use.⁵⁰

The Supreme Court has referred to Section 3501 as "the statute governing the admissibility...