Union Business Leave Practices in Large U.S. Municipalities: An Exploratory Study
| Published date | 01 December 2017 |
| Date | 01 December 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0091026017726774 |
| Author | Akheil Singla,Thom Reilly |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2017
Article
Public Personnel Management
2017, Vol. 46(4) 342 –367
Union Business Leave
© The Author(s) 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1177/0091026017726774
DOI: 10.1177/0091026017726774
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Municipalities: An
Exploratory Study
Thom Reilly1 and Akheil Singla1
Abstract
This article examines union business leave (UBL) or official time practices among the
77 largest municipalities in the United States. Specifically, it evaluates UBL practices
as articulated in 231 collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) of police, firefighter,
and nonsafety public employee unions. Results indicate that UBL is prevalent as 72%
of unions receive some kind of UBL, most frequently paid leave financed by the city
or through cost-sharing arrangements. Empirical findings suggest these practices are
driven by political factors, and that resource constraints or the state or regional-level
environment are nonsignificant. The article discusses these results and offers a series
of policy recommendations.
Keywords
union business leave, official time, union release time, transparency, UBL
Introduction
In early 2016, an auditor for Howard County, Maryland, found that the county sheriff
had received nearly 200 hours of “county-subsidized campaign labor” (Waseem,
2016). The auditor suggested this labor came about via the misuse of official time for
union business. Some of the time came from employees ineligible for union business
leave (UBL), and some came about via improper use of the time by otherwise eligible
employees (Waseem, 2016). As both are problematic, the report has the county
1Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA
Corresponding Author:
Thom Reilly, Arizona State University, 411 North Central Avenue, Suite 900, Phoenix, AZ 85004-2135,
USA.
Email: thom.reilly@asu.edu
Reilly and Singla
343
scrambling to recoup costs and defend its labor practices. Though this is a particularly
egregious case, scrutiny of UBL at all levels of government is nothing new. In 2012,
the State of New Jersey conducted an investigation into the practice of allowing offi-
cial time for UBL. It concluded,
Although it is not uncommon, nor is it necessarily improper, for government employers
to grant some form of time-off for union work, the Commission found significant and
questionable variations in how such leave is authorized, who qualifies for it, who keeps
track of it, how it is constituted and who ultimately pays the bill. (State of New Jersey,
2012, p. 9)
Despite the potential for abuse, it is essential to note that UBL can serve an essential
role in smoothing labor–management relations, which in turn creates tangible value
for the public (Government Accounting Office [GAO], 2014). In spite of this tension,
there is almost no systematic information about UBL at the local level. This article
serves as a first attempt to provide insight into these practices.
The existence of UBL at the state and local level is an outcome of allowing collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector. At the federal level, the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 (CSRA) authorized official time, or UBL, for federal employees representing
unions (§ 7131). In all three cases, official time for UBL can be either paid or nonpaid
and allows public sector employees to perform functions on behalf of a labor group in
lieu their normal day job. If union leave is paid, the employee performs certain duties
while receiving a paycheck. This leave can include working in a public office or off-
site at a union office. In some cases, the employee works for the union full-time.
Activities can include time off for negotiations, grievances, attendance at impasse pro-
ceedings, participation in labor–management workgroups, facilitation of new work-
place initiatives, and participation in local, state, and national union activities (GAO,
2014; Woska, 1988). Partisan political activity is prohibited while on union release
time; however, lobbying conducted by federal union officials is allowed as long as it
is nonpartisan (Bullock, 2006; Hatch Act of 1939, §1502).
The purpose of this exploratory study is to gain a better understanding of official
time or UBL practices within local municipalities. We endeavor to answer three
research questions:
Question 1: How common are UBL provisions in CBAs between public employee
unions and large municipal employers?
Question 2: What specific UBL practices are most common?
Question 3: What drives the variation in the presence of UBL and various UBL
practices?
To answer the first and second questions, we engage in a robust descriptive analysis of
the UBL practices of the largest 77 municipalities in the United States. We find that
UBL is common among local governments, with 72% of employee groups receiving
some form of coverage. To answer the second question, we draw on policy innovation
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Public Personnel Management 46(4)
and diffusion studies to explore the effects of political motivation, resources, and the
external environment on UBL practices in these 77 cities. We find that variation in
UBL appears to be driven by political factors and not budgetary resources or the exter-
nal environment.
Background
Whereas UBL at the local level has received almost no attention, there has been a
considerable amount written about the practice at the federal and state level. In this
section, we describe UBL at both levels before examining the costs and benefits of
UBL in those contexts.
The Federal Picture
The CSRA provides a legal basis for management and labor relations at the federal
level; guarantees that federal sector unions represent all employees in a bargaining
unit, regardless of whether the employees are dues-paying members of the union; and
establishes two sources of official time (1978, § 7102; GAO, 2014). Official time pro-
vides UBL for paid union business agents to represent the union in matters like collec-
tive bargaining or grievances as a statutory right. Official time for other purposes must
be negotiated between the union and agency. However, activities that relate to internal
union business, such as the solicitation of members or the election of union officials,
must be performed when in a nonduty status; that is, not on official time (GAO, 2014).
While paid and unpaid union leave have been accepted practices for federal public
sector unions, renewed attention has been placed on how often employees are conduct-
ing union activities while receiving a tax-payer-funded salary. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study of official time in 2014, and found
federal employees used 2.5 million hr of UBL in fiscal year 2013. The GAO found that
the costs estimates by the agency responsible for collecting this data, the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), were not reliable (GAO, 2014). The OPM relied upon
agencies to report UBL; however, it does not cross-check the accuracy of those reports.
As there is no agreed upon method for reporting and managing UBL, the OPM had no
way of knowing what the reported time means. The GAO recommended three actions
to improve the collection, tracking, and reporting on the use of official time: (a) have
OPM consider other approaches to estimate costs, (b) have OPM work with agencies
to identity opportunities to increase the efficiency of data collection, and (c) share
agencies’ practices on monitoring the use of official time (GAO, 2014).
Politically, Republicans in Congress have targeted UBL for years and lawmakers in
both Chambers have introduced legislation aimed at both increasing data collection
requirements for UBL as well as eliminating UBL for federal employees altogether. In
addition, in early 2016, the chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee launched an investigation to collect official time data from every agency,
down to the square footage in rooms where employees conduct union activity (Katz,
2016b). H.R. 4392 would increase data collection and make reporting a requirement
Reilly and Singla
345
for the OPM (To Amend Title 5. . . . 2016). H.R. 1658, the Federal Employee
Accountability Act (FEAA) of 2015, would ban all UBL by striking the sections of the
CSRA that authorize the practice. The FEAA was originally introduced in 2009. It
should be noted that these congressional actions may reflect a partisan ideological
agenda.
Federal unions have criticized these legislative efforts. According to Katz (2016b),
the agreement on official time came
. . . as a tradeoff for the requirement that the groups represent all employees in their
collective bargaining units, whether or not they are union members . . . . Unlike in other
sectors, federal unions cannot require workers they represent to pay dues. (para. 12)
Federal unions have pointed to their inability to charge fair-share or agency fees to
justify the use of official time because they are required to represent nonunion “free
riders” who don’t pay dues in negotiations.
The State Context
On the state and local level, the picture is more complex. Twenty-six states have Right-
to-Work laws. State and local unions in these states face a similar situation as their
federal counterparts in needing to represent members who do not pay dues and “free-
ride” (National Right To Work [NRTW], 2016). However, 24 states require union
membership...
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