U.S. Supreme Court nixes unique circumstances.

AuthorZiemer, David

Byline: David Ziemer

The "unique circumstances" doctrine, long subject to criticism in the Seventh Circuit, has been overruled by a U.S. Supreme Court decision issued June 14. Under the doctrine, a party's failure to make a jurisdictional deadline was not fatal, if the failure was made in reliance on a district court's order. But where the deadline is "jurisdictional," such as that for filing a timely notice of appeal, not even reliance on a court order can excuse the late filing. In 1999, a state court jury in Ohio convicted Keith Bowles of murder. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction and sentence on direct appeal in state court, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. On Sept. 9, 2003, the district court denied Bowles habeas relief, giving Bowles 30 days to file a notice of appeal. Bowles failed to do so, but on Dec. 12, he moved to reopen the period during which he could file his notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows district courts to extend the filing period for 14 days from the day the district court grants the order to reopen, provided certain conditions are met. On Feb. 10, 2004, the District Court granted Bowles' motion. But rather than extending the time period by 14 days, the court gave Bowles 17 days to file his notice of appeal. Bowles filed his notice on Feb. 26 -- within the 17 days allowed by the court, but after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. 2107(c). The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review, but affirmed in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice David H. Souter dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. The majority began by citing cases dating back to the 19th century, holding that taking an appeal within the prescribed time is "mandatory and jurisdictional." The court also noted the difference between rules promulgated by courts, which are not jurisdictional, and those imposed by statute, which are jurisdictional. Because the deadline is established not only by court rule, but by sec. 2107(c), the court concluded that the deadline was jurisdictional, and could not be extended. Third, the court noted the different treatment in its own rules for parties seeking certiorari between civil and criminal cases. The 90-day period is the same for both, but in civil cases, it derives from...

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