Trial Practice and Procedure
| Publication year | 2018 |
Trial Practice and Procedure
John O'Shea Sullivan
Tala Amirfazli
Adelyn B. Boleman
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The 2017 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating to federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first impression. This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of civil procedure, statutory interpretation, and federal subject-matter jurisdiction.1
A. Whether a Complaint Asserting Claims that Could Have Been Asserted in a Prior Action Must be Dismissed Under the Prohibition Against Claim-Splitting.
In Vanover v. NCO Financial Services, Inc.,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a complaint
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should be dismissed for asserting claims that could and should have been presented in an earlier-filed complaint, an issue of first impression.3 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit joined the majority of circuits in dismissing the later-filed claims as violating the rule against claim-splitting.4
The lawsuit (Vanover II) was filed in Florida state court where the plaintiff, Karen Vanover (Vanover), filed a complaint against defendant NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (NCO) alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),5 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),6 and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA)7 arising out of NCO's attempts to collect consumer medical debts.8 The Vanover II lawsuit was filed almost one year after Vanover filed a prior complaint (Vanover I) against NCO asserting similar claims.9
NCO removed the Vanover II case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for improper claim-splitting.10 The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ultimately dismissed the amended complaint, finding that because Vanover I and Vanover II involved the same parties and a common nucleus of operative facts, Vanover II violated the prohibition against claim-splitting.11
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue of first impression regarding whether Vanover II should be dismissed for claim-splitting.12
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Recognizing that claim-splitting has been analyzed as an aspect of res judicata or claim preclusion, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately adopted the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's test for claim-splitting, which is whether "the first suit, assuming it were final, would preclude the second suit."13
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court properly applied a two-factor test for claim-splitting, where the court analyzes "(1) whether the case involves the same parties and their privies, and (2) whether the separate cases arise from the same transaction or series of transactions."14 The appellate court rejected Vanover's attempts to distinguish the claims she asserted in Vanover I and Vanover II.15 The court explained that because the parties were identical in both cases, and because "the factual bases for both lawsuits [were] related in time, origin, and motivation, and they form[ed] a convenient trial unit,"16 Vanover was precluded from splitting her claims among the lawsuits.17
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B. Whether Federal Common Law Borrows the Doctrine of State Law Collateral Estoppel to Determine the Preclusive Effect of an Earlier Judgment of a Federal Court that Exercised Diversity Jurisdiction.
In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc.,18 the Eleventh Circuit resolved a "discord" in the circuit, holding that federal common law adopts the state rule of collateral estoppel when determining the preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction.19 This case arose out of a prior action (the Prior Action) filed by an employee of General Mills, Inc. (General Mills) who was injured by a railcar and sued CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) for his injuries, invoking diversity jurisdiction in federal court.20 CSX was found solely at fault but thereafter sought indemnification from General Mills, which General Mills denied.21
CSX then sued General Mills for indemnification, arguing that the parties' Sidetrack Agreement (the Agreement) required General Mills to indemnify CSX.22 The district court dismissed the action, finding that because the jury found CSX solely at fault in the Prior Action, the Agreement barred indemnity and the federal collateral estoppel rule23 prohibited the re-litigation of the fault of General Mills.24
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the question of "[w]hether federal common law borrows the state rule of collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a
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court that exercised diversity jurisdiction [was] unclear under [the Circuit's] caselaw"25 after the Supreme Court's decision in Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.26 in 2001.27 After distinguishing between the holding and dicta of the Supreme Court's opinion in Semtek, and considering the first precedent after Semtek to mention this issue,28 the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that federal common law does in fact borrow the state rule of collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a federal judgment in which the court exercised diversity jurisdiction.29
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A. Whether a Voicemail Constitutes a "Communication" and What Information is Necessary to Constitute a "Meaningful Disclosure" Under the FDCPA.
In Hart v. Credit Control, LLC,30 the Eleventh Circuit addressed two issues of first impression regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the FDCPA: (1) whether a voicemail left by a debt collector constitutes a "communication" and (2) whether a debt collection company provides a "meaningful disclosure" when individual callers fail to disclose their names but disclose the debt collection company's name and the nature of the company's business.31 The court concluded that (1) a voicemail will be considered a communication within the meaning of the FDCPA if it reveals that the call was from a debt collector and provides the recipient instructions and information for returning the call, and (2) "meaningful disclosure" does not require the individual caller's name under the FDCPA, as long as the caller reveals the nature of the debt collection company's business and the name of the debt collection company.32
The lawsuit began after plaintiff Stacey Hart (Hart) received a voicemail (the Voicemail) from defendant Credit Control, LLC (Credit Control) as its first communication to Hart without the "mini Miranda warning"33 relating to the purpose of the call.34 The Voicemail identified Credit Control as the caller and asked Hart to return the call.35 Hart alleged that Credit Control violated the FDCPA by failing to provide the necessary disclosures for an initial communication to a consumer and by failing to provide a "meaningful disclosure."36 The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the Voicemail was not an "initial communication" under the FDCPA (and thus did not require the "mini Miranda warning"). The court found that the Voicemail provided a
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"meaningful disclosure" to Hart because it contained enough information not to mislead the consumer regarding the purpose of the call.37
On appeal, there were two issues of first impression arising out of the interpretation of certain sections of the FDCPA.38 First, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a voicemail may serve as an initial communication between a debt collector and consumer so long as there is a "convey[ance] of information 'regarding a debt'"39 to the consumer.40 The court explained that under the statutory language of the FDCPA, the Voicemail fell squarely within the FDCPA's broad definition of "communication."41 Because the Voicemail was Credit Control's initial communication with Hart, Credit Control violated the FDCPA by failing to provide Hart with the required "mini Miranda warning."42
Second, the court held that because the Voicemail provided the name of the debt collection company and the nature of the company's business, Credit Control did provide "meaningful disclosure" under the FDCPA, despite the caller's failure to identify herself by name.43 The Eleventh
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Circuit explained that "meaningful disclosure" is provided in this regard so long as the consumer is made aware of the identity of the debt collector, namely the company collecting the debt.44 But because the Voicemail violated the FDCPA's requirements for the initial communication, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Hart's complaint and remanded to the district court.45
B. Whether the Local Controversy Provision of CAFA Prohibits District Courts from Exercising Federal-Question Jurisdiction.
In Blevins v. Aksut,46 the Eleventh Circuit held that while the Class Action Fairness Act's (CAFA)47 local controversy exception48 precludes district courts from exercising jurisdiction under CAFA,49 it does not preclude district courts from exercising federal-question jurisdiction50 even if the class action is a "local controversy."51 The named plaintiff and putative class representative (Blevins) brought a putative class action against defendant Dr. Aksut (Aksut) and a facility operated by various other defendants,52 arising out of allegations that Aksut recommended and performed unnecessary medical procedures for which he billed his patients.53 Blevins filed suit in Alabama state court and the defendants removed the case to federal court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331
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based on federal-question jurisdiction.54 Blevins moved to remand the case, arguing that the local controversy provision in CAFA55 required the district court to...
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