Too big to fail

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2011.00774.x
• Published date: 01 November 2011
• Author: Andrew V. Papachristos
• Date: 01 November 2011

POLICY ESSAY

COMMUNITY-DRIVEN VIOLENCE

REDUCTION PROGRAMS

Too big to fail

The science and politics of violence prevention

Andrew V.Papachristos

Harvard University

The University of Massachusetts—Amherst

Criminologists and politicians walk to the beat of different drummers. The

4-year rhythm of political terms and the 24-hour buzz of the postmodern news

cycle disrupt the slow and steady cadence of academic research. Criminologists

strive for analytic rigor, sound research design, and objectivity, especially when trying to

understand causal effects such as those demanded in most evaluation research. Politicians,

however, pledge their allegiance not to the scientific method but to their constituents.

Problems need fixing, lives need saving, and most nonacademics need solutions at a pace

quicker than the processes of peer review. As a result, whereas the criminologist waits to

make claims about causality and program efficacy until field experiments and mathematical

models are complete, politicians and other denizens of the “real world” often rely on back-

of-the-envelope calculations or simple cross-tabulations made on spreadsheets to discern

whether a violence prevention program “works.” Linking specific programs to decreases in

crime becomes more of an art than a science.

Such divergent worldviews between science and politics have profound implications on

violence prevention efforts. “Successful” violence prevention programs typically can secure

better funding and resources, not to mention the attention of community leaders, politicians,

and the press. Yet who determines whether a violence prevention effort is a success? The

academic with his or her regression tables and field experiments? Programadministrators and

front-line workers with their on-the-ground knowledge and experience? Or the politicians

addressing the problems of constituents? And what impact does a programmatic “failure”

have on subsequent prevention efforts?

I would like to thank Christopher Wildeman and Anthony Braga for comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

Direct correspondence to Andrew V. Papachristos, Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts,

Amherst. (e-mail: andrewp@soc.umass.edu).

DOI:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2011.00774.x C2011 American Society of Criminology 1053

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 10 rIssue 4