To Serve and Protect: Thornton v. United States and the Newly Anemic Fourth Amendment - Jason Lewis

• Citation: Vol. 56 No. 4
• Publication year: 2005

CASENOTE

To Serve and Protect: Thornton v. United States and the Newly Anemic Fourth Amendment

In Thornton v. United States,¹ the United States Supreme Court further weakened the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment² by holding that an officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest even when the suspect is first approached after exiting the vehicle.³ Under the guise of providing protection to police officers, this decision greatly expands the power of an arresting officer to search the private property of the arrestee and creates uncertainty on what constitutional limits apply to searches incident to arrest outside the home.

I. Factual Background

Deion Nichols, a police officer in Norfolk, Virginia, was driving an unmarked police car while in uniform. Officer Nichols first noticed Marcus Thornton when Thornton slowed his automobile to avoid driving alongside the unmarked police car. Officer Nichols, suspicious of Thornton's actions, pulled onto a side street and waited for Thornton to pass. After Thornton passed, Officer Nichols ran Thornton's license plates and found that the plates were registered to a Chevrolet two-door, not the Lincoln Town Car that Thornton was driving. Thornton had parked and exited the vehicle before Officer Nichols pulled him over. The officer accosted Thornton, now some distance from his automobile, asked him for his driver's license, and informed Thornton that he was driving with plates that did not match the vehicle.⁴

Thornton was rambling and appeared nervous. His behavior caused Officer Nichols to fear for his safety, so the officer inquired whether there were any weapons or narcotics in the car or on Thornton's person. Thornton said he was not in possession of weapons or narcotics. Officer Nichols patted down Thornton, and the search produced two bags, one containing crack cocaine, the other containing marijuana. Thornton was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the unmarked police car. The officer then searched Thornton's vehicle and found a 9-millimeter handgun under the driver's seat.⁵

Thornton was charged by a grand jury with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony. Thornton attempted to suppress the evidence of the firearm, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.⁶ The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion to suppress and held that the search was valid under New York v. Belton,¹ or in the alternative, it was valid because Officer Nichols could have conducted an inventory search of the vehicle.⁸ Thornton was convicted, and he appealed. Thornton argued that Belton was limited to cases in which the officer first contacted the arrestee while the arrestee remained in the car. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision noting that the need to disarm the arrestee and preserve precious evidence for trial did not limitBelton in the way Thornton argued.⁹ The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to address the issue of the limitations to the search incident to arrest exception.¹⁰

II. Legal Background

The critical issue in search incident to arrest cases is to what extent can an arresting officer search the area around the arrestee. The Supreme Court's record on this issue is not the model of consistency.¹¹ Starting in dictum in Weeks v. United States,¹² the Court approved of warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest.¹³ For more than fifty years, the Court repeatedly switched between limiting and expanding the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest.¹⁴

A. The Immediate Control Standard

The mercuric holdings of the Court acquired some steadfastness in Chimel v. California.¹⁵ Following Chimel, when determining the authority of an arresting officer to search the area around the arrestee, the courts engage in a two-way balancing act. Courts weigh the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights against the concern for the officer's safety, and the desire to protect evidence from destruction.¹⁶

The Court's purpose in Chimel was to firmly establish the permissible scope of warrantless searches incident to arrest.¹⁷ The Court attempted to identify to what extent an arresting officer could search the arrestee and the area around the arrestee.¹⁸ In Chimel police officers arrived at Chimel's home with an arrest warrant for his burglary of a coin shop.The officers knocked on the door and were admitted into the house by Chimel's wife; there they waited for Chimel to return from work. When Chimel entered his home the officers handed Chimel the arrest warrant and asked if he would allow a search of the home. Over Chimel's protests and without a search warrant, the officers proceeded to search the entire three-bedroom home. The forty-five minute search produced coins and several medals that were later admitted into evidence and used to convict Chimel.¹⁹ The Court stated that to search areas not occupied by the arrestee would require a search warrant.²⁰ Along those lines, the Court held that an arresting officer may search the arrestee and the "area within his immediate control" for weapons and for evidence that might be concealed or destroyed by the arrestee but could not search a room apart from the one the arrestee occupied or even the drawers located in the room in which the arrest took place.²¹ The Court reasoned that to allow a search of areas outside of the arrestee's immediate control would too greatly infringe on Fourth Amendment rights.²²

Throughout its opinion in Chimel, the Court emphasized the need to protect arresting officers from harm, as weapons that are close by or concealed can fall into the hands of the arrestee.²³ Implicit in the concern for officer safety and evidence integrity was the assumption that the arrestee was close enough to a weapon to employ it or close enough to evidence to conceal or destroy it. The Court expressly indicated that the reason the searches were allowed was to protect the officer and any evidence from the arrestee.²⁴ Therefore, there was no justification to allow searches of areas to which the arrestee had no access.²⁵ While the standard set by Chimel did establish a more concrete standard for search of the area incident to arrest, the Court stated: "the recurring questions of reasonableness of searches depend upon the facts and circumstances ... of the case."²⁶ The dependency upon facts and circumstances became the ground for expansion of the rule established in Chimel. Search of the arrestee's person incident to arrest had been well established; the contention surrounded the issue of where to draw the line for search of the area around the arrestee.²⁷

B. Search Authorized No Matter the Basis of the Arrest

In United States v. Robinson,²⁸ the Court held that, so long as there was a custodial arrest, a search of an arrestee was clearly authorized even when the arresting officer did not express fear of physical harm or destruction of evidence.²⁹ Robinson involved a police officer who stopped defendant, Robinson, because he suspected Robinson of operating an automobile after the revocation of his operator's permit. When Robinson stopped his car and exited the vehicle, he was arrested. Following department procedure, the arresting officer patted down Robinson and found a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen gelatin capsules of heroin.³⁰ Robinson contested the search and the admission of the evidence it produced, claiming that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.³¹

The Court once again explained that search incident to arrest, the traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, allows for a search of the person of the arrestee following a lawful arrest and a search of the area within the control of the arrestee.³² Rejecting Robinson's argument, the Court held that "all custodial arrests [should be treated alike] for purposes of search justification."³³ The Court's holding was in effect an expansion of Chimel.³⁴ * The Court expressly stated that it was not inclined to limit the authority to search incident to arrest on the assumption that some arrestee's, by nature of their offense, are more dangerous than others.³⁵ If an arrest (on whatever ground) was...