The Utopian World of Juvenile Courts
| Published date | 01 May 1969 |
| Date | 01 May 1969 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/000271626938300110 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
101
The
Utopian
World
of
Juvenile
Courts
By
CHARLES
W.
TENNEY,
JR.
ABSTRACT:
Born
in
a
period
of
great
social
reform,
the
juve-
nile
courts
of
the
United
States
promised
a
new
deal
for
chil-
dren
caught
up
in
the
processes
of
criminal
justice.
For
nearly
fifty
years,
the
courts
were
permitted
to
grow,
and
to
develop,
virtually
without
interruption,
practices
and
facilities
to
com-
port
with
the
philosophy
of
the
court
as
a
"social
agency,"
designed
not
to
punish
but
to
help
children
in
trouble.
Examinations
of
the
actual
nature
of
the
court
and
its
pro-
cedures
have,
however,
revealed
that
as
a
"social
agency"
the
court
remains
largely
an
idea
and
an
ideal.
Its
tradition-
ally
informal
procedures,
designed
to
reflect
its
noncriminal
nature,
have
been
criticized
in
recent
Supreme
Court
cases.
The
resulting
return
to
a
more
legalized
approach
may
signal,
therefore,
a
retrenchment
in
the
work
of
the
juvenile
courts.
Charles
W.
Tenney,
Jr.,
Winchester,
Massachusetts,
has
been
Dean,
College
of
Criminal
Justice,
Northeastern
University,
since
1968.
During
1967-1968,
he
was
Chief
Attorney,
Pine
Tree
Legal
Assistance,
Inc.,
State
of
Maine;
during
1965-1967,
Associate
Professor
of
Law,
University
of
Nebraska
Law
College;
and,
during
1963-1965,
Associate
Director,
National
Council
of
Juvenile
Court
Judges.
He
has
also
been
Director,
National
Training
Program
for
Juvenile
Court
Judges,
and
Editor,
Juvenile
Court
Judges’
Journal.
Mr.
Tenney
is
a
member
of
a
number
of
professional
organizations;
serves
as
Vice-Chairman
of
the
American
Bar
Association’s
Family
Law
Section
Committee
on
Juvenile
Law
and
Procedures;
and
has
contributed
articles
on
juvenile
courts
and
family
law
to
a
number
of
scholarly
journals.
102
MARTIN
DUBERMAN,
in
a
recent
Atlantic
Monthly
article
dealing
with
student
rebels,
suggested
that
American
adults
really
do
not
like
their
children.
&dquo;The
young,
it is
becoming
clear,&dquo;
he
wrote,
&dquo;are
regarded
with
considerable
hatred
in
our
country.&dquo;
According
to
Duberman,
it
is
not
so
much
what
young
people
do
or
do
not
do
that
causes
their
elders’
hostility;
it
is
&dquo;the
very
fact
of
their
youth
that
makes
them
the
target
for
so
much
murderous
abuse.&dquo;
1
This
view
con-
trasts
sharply
with
the
generally
stated
love
and
deference
for
youth
displayed
in
American
society.
Duberman’s
view
is
an
interesting
one
and
one
against
which
we
may
measure
our
concern
for
youth,
a
concern
which
is
not
novel
and
which
has,
throughout
history,
manifested
itself
in
a
variety
of
contexts.
One
such
context,
and
an
im-
portant
one,
is
that
of
the
law,
and
in
particular
the
law’s
treatment
of
young
people
in
trouble,
the
subject
of
our
discussion
here.
Our
legal
institution
generically
referred
to
as
the
&dquo;juvenile
court&dquo;
is
the
vehicle
through
which
our
concern
for
young
people
in
trouble
is
reflected
and
practiced.
Throughout
this
discussion
of
juvenile
law
and
the
juvenile
courts,
the
reader
is
asked
to
contemplate
the
nature
of
the
law’s
con-
cern
for
our
youth,
whether
it
is
indeed
a
display
of
our
love
or
of
our
hatred
for
them,
or,
perhaps,
an
ambivalent
admixture
of
both.
EARLY
DEVELOPMENTS
IN
JUVENILE
LAW
The
roots
of
our
laws,
particularly
those
applicable
to
children
and
young
people,
run
deep
in
English
legal
history.
One
such
root
is
the
criminal
law.
Blackstone
reports
that
children
under
the
age
of
ten-and-a-half
were
not
pun-
ishable
for
any
crime;
between
ten-and-
a-half
and
fourteen
years,
they
were
punishable
if
found
to
be
&dquo;capable
of
mischief&dquo;;
and
beyond
the
age
of
four-
teen,
the
child
was
subject
to
criminal
conviction
and
punishment
as
an
adult.
2
In
the
United
States,
the
generally
ac-
cepted
common-law
rules
for
criminal
prosecution
of
juveniles
rendered
them
exempt
if
below
the
age
of
seven, pre-
sumptively
exempt
(because
of
the
child’s
presumed
incapability
of
form-
ing
a
mens
rea,
or
intent
to
commit
a
crime)
if
between
seven
and
fourteen
years;
and
presumptively
capable
of
forming
a
criminal
intent
beyond
the
age
of
fourteen.3
Despite
these
ameliora-
tions,
young
children
were
often
con-
victed
and
sometimes
executed.
Black-
stone
reported
the
execution,
for
exam-
ple,
of
a
boy
of
ten
found
to
be
of
a
&dquo;mischievous
discretion&dquo;
in
murdering
his
bedfellow.4
4
Herbert
Lou,
an
early
historian
and
apologist
of
the
juvenile
courts,
reported
a
case
in
New
Jersey
as
late
as
1828
of
a
boy
of
thirteen
hanged
for
an
offense
committed
when
he
was
twelve .5
It
seems
indisputable
that
the
com-
mon-law
criminal
rules
of
responsibility
were
one
of
the
foundation
stones
of
the
juvenile
courts.
More
debatable
is
the
court’s
linkages
to
the
precedent
of
the
chancery
(equity)
courts.
Partially
in
response
to
the
need
for
some
relief
from
the
strictures
of
a
rigid
common-law
system
of
pleading
and
available
relief,
these
courts
developed
in
England
in
1
Duberman,
On
Misunderstanding
Student
Rebels,
Atlantic
Monthly,
Vol.
222,
Nov.
1968,
p.
63.
2
BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
ON
THE
LAWS
OF
ENGLAND,
Bk.
4,
Ch.
2,
at
21
(12th
ed.,
1793).
3
See,
e.g.,
MILLER,
CRIMINAL
LAW
(1934);
U.S.
PRESIDENT’S
COMMISSION
ON
LAW
EN-
FORCEMENT
AND
ADMINISTRATION
OF
JUSTICE
[hereinafter
cited
as
NATIONAL
CRIME
COM-
MISSION],
TASK
FORCE
REPORT:
JUVENILE
DE-
LINQUENCY
AND
YOUTH
CRIME
(1967).
4
BLACKSTONE,
supra
note
2.
5
LOU,
JUVENILE
COURTS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(1927).
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