The United Front in the New China

• Author: Allan B. Cole
• Published date: 01 September 1951
• Date: 01 September 1951
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/000271625127700105
• Subject Matter: Articles

35

The

United

Front

in

the

New

China

By

ALLAN

B.

COLE

Own

Christmas

Day

1947,

Chairman

Mao

Tse-tung

stood

before

the

Central

Committee

of

the

Chinese

Com-

munist

Party

(CCP)

and

declared

that

the

democratic

revolution

could

not

win

without

a

united

front,

but

that

such

a

combination

must

be

firmly

controlled

by

the

CCP

in

order

to

carry

through

to

victory.

One

of

the

slogans,

coined

by

the

same

committee

f or

the

ensuing

May

Day,

rang:

Laboring

people

of

the

entire

country,

unite;

ally

with

the

intelligentsia,

liberal

bourgeoisie,

all

democratic

parties

and

groups,

social

luminaries

and

other

patriotic

elements;

consolidate

and

expand

the

united

front

against

imperialist,

feudal

and

bureau-

cratic

capitalist

forces;

fight

together

to

destroy

Kuomintang

reactionaries

and

build

a

new

China.1

PHASES

OF

THE

UNITED

FRONT

Heralding

as

it

did

the

latest

phase

of

the

united

front

in

China,

this

met

a

ready

response;

but

for

the

purpose

of

this

study

it

may

serve as

a

reminder

that

the

program

of

a

united

front

of

Chinese

Nationalists

had

already

ex-

perienced

five

major

stages

of

develop-

ment

or

lapse,

the

last

two

punctuated

by

efforts

to

restore

unity

and

institu-

tionalize

it

in

the

form

of

coalition

gov-

ernment.

These

phases

may

be

outlined

as

follows:

1923-27.

Unstable

but

potent

alliance

between

Kuomintang

(KMT)

and

CCP

Soviet

encouragement

and

anti-im-

perialist

orientation.

Linkage

to

popular

movements.

1927-37.

Rift

and

civil

war

KMT

partially

completed

military

unification

of

China.

Japanese

encroachments.

Communists

exploited

KMT

appease-

ment

at

first

to

subvert

Nationalist

gov-

ernment,

but

after

1933

to

attain

an

advantageous

position

in

a

nation-wide

united front.

After

1935

this

was

in

keep-

ing

with

Comintern

anti-fascist

strategy.

KMT

attempted

to

separate

national-

ism

from

revolutionary

reformism,

with

adverse

effects

on

both.

1937-41.

Imperfect

united

front

KMT

adopted

resistance

policy

but

t

was

reluctant

to

promote

political

and

socioeconomic

reforms

to

stimulate

pop-

ular

resistance.

CCP

apparently

made

more

conces-

sions

but

actually

remained

autonomous,

applying

New

Democracy

formulas

and

still

insisting

on

a

&dquo;national

revolution-

ary

campaign

of

resistance.&dquo;

Fluid

politico-military

situation

played

increasingly

into

hands

of

Communists

because

premium

was

on

popular

mobi-

lization

of

peasants

for

guerrilla

resist-

ance ;

grid

of

KMT

controls

was

im-

paired.

Renewed

partial

rift

first

gravely

in-

dicated

by

New

Fourth

Army

incident,

later

by

blockade

and

counter

hostilities

in

the

northwest.

1941-45.

Smoldering

war-within-a-war

triangular

struggle:

KMT-CCP-

Japanese

and

puppets

Communist-led

united

front

expanded

into

nineteen

&dquo;liberated

areas.&dquo;

Increasing

deterioration

of

Kuomin-

tang

administration:

corruption,

profit-

eering,

oppression,

inflation.

1

"Speedily

Call

People’s

Assembly,

Chinese

Communist

Party’s

May

Day

Slogans,"

China

Digest,

Vol.

IV,

No.

1 (May

18,

1948),

pp.

9-10.