The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and Its Effect on Eleventh Circuit Law - Cristina Harrison Schnizler

• Publication year: 2006

Comment

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and Its Effect on Eleventh Circuit Law

I. Introduction

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA")¹ was enacted by Congress in response to the Supreme Court overruling the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993² ("RFRA") and as an extension of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.³ RLUIPA is intended "to protect religious liberty"⁴ and prohibits discrimination based on religion in two areas: land use regulations and religious rights for institutionalized persons.⁵ Generally, the religious land use provisions prevent state and local governments from creating improper zoning restrictions that unduly prohibit religious organizations from holding meetings, locating in a specific area, or expanding their current building.⁶ The institutionalized persons⁷ provisions prohibit facilities from unduly burdening an inmate's religious practice by, for example, not supplying a diet the inmate can eat, not allowing the inmate to celebrate religious holy days, or prohibiting an inmate from possessing religious property.⁸

The coupling of these two topics into one act was an odd decision on Congress's part, and there appears to be no reason for the pairing other than the fact that RLUIPA's predecessor, RFRA, also addressed both issues. Because of the extreme difference in the topics covered by RLUIPA, most law review articles focus solely on either land use regulations or rights for institutionalized persons. But this Article is intended to broadly address both topics to serve as a type of "one-stop shopping" for anyone needing general information about RLUIPA.⁹ In addition, the Article will specifically discuss the effects of RLUIPA on Eleventh Circuit law.

II. History of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA")

A. Leading Up to RLUIPA: Congress and the Supreme Court Battle Over Whether Strict Scrutiny Applies to Laws of General Applicability

Senator Orrin Hatch introduced RLUIPA on July 13, 2000.¹⁰ The bill proceeded quickly through the legislative process and was signed into law on September 22, 2000.¹¹ RLUIPA is Congress's third attempt to strengthen religious liberty rights in its battle with the Supreme Court over the content of the Free Exercise¹² and Establishment Clauses.¹³ The first attempt was made when Congress overwhelmingly passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").¹⁴ RFRA was Congress's response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment

Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,¹⁵ in which the Court held that laws of general applicability, or laws that do not specifically target a religious practice, cannot be challenged under the Free Exercise Clause.¹⁶

In Smith, two employees at a private drug rehabilitation clinic were fired because of their religious use of peyote. The employees then applied for unemployment benefits, but were denied because an Oregon state law¹⁷ prohibited issuing unemployment benefits to those employees who were fired for misconduct, including use of a controlled substance. The employees challenged the Oregon law, claiming the denial of unemployment benefits violated their Free Exercise rights.¹⁸ The Court held that the Oregon law prohibiting use of controlled substances was not directed at preventing religious practices and, therefore, the law was one of general applicability.¹⁹ Laws of general applicability are not subject to the strict scrutiny standards set out in Sherbert v. Verner,²⁰ which applied strict scrutiny only to those laws of individualized assessment.²¹ Because the Oregon law was one of general applicability, it was not subject to strict scrutiny. The law passed the lower scrutiny level the Court applied and did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.²² Therefore, the State of Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to the employees without fear of violating First Amendment rights.²³ In response to Smith, Congress enacted RFRA, which reinstated the strict scrutiny standard for laws burdening religious practice, whether generally or individually.²⁴

In addition to land use provisions, institutionalized persons provisions were also included in RFRA.²⁵ When the provisions were added, several members of Congress raised concerns that the provisions would open the floodgates of litigation and cause prisons to lose control over prisoners.²⁶ In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") in 1995.²⁷ PLRA was intended to prevent prisoners from bringing frivolous lawsuits against the government and to give courts the power to dismiss such frivolous suits.²⁸

In 1997 the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA in City of Boerne ("City") v. Flores,²⁹ holding that Congress overstepped the bounds of its Section Five power of the Fourteenth Amendment.³⁰ In City of Boerne, the City denied a permit application submitted by the Archbishop of San Antonio. In the application, the Archbishop requested permission to enlarge the Saint Peter Catholic Church ("Church") to better accommodate its growing congregation. The city council denied the permit because the Church fell within the ordinances of the Historic Landmark Commission, meaning the Church had to maintain the historic structure of its building. Adding onto the church building would have violated the ordinances. The Archbishop filed suit and claimed the denial violated the Church's Free Exercise rights under RFRA.³¹

The Court assessed whether Congress overstepped its Section Five power of the Fourteenth Amendment "'to enforce' by 'appropriate legislation' the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of 'life, liberty, or property, without due process of law' nor deny any person 'equal protection of the laws.'"³² The Court stated the Section Five enforcement power is remedial rather than substantive in nature.³³ Congress cannot create new constitutional rights through its use of the Section Five power, but may only ensure that states observe and protect the rights already created in the Constitution.³⁴ Congress's response under the Section Five power must be proportionate and congruent to the harm caused by the state laws.³⁵ The Court held that RFRA created new substantive rights instead of protecting those already existing within the Constitution.³⁶ Congress exceeded its Section Five authority by creating a law that infiltrated every "level of government, displacing laws[,] and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter."³⁷ Because RFRA was disproportionate and incongruent to the problems it sought to resolve, the Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional.³⁸

In response to the Court overruling RFRA, the 106th Congress made a second attempt to prevent religious discrimination in land use regulations and apply strict scrutiny to such laws: the Religious Liberty Protection Act ("RLPA").³⁹ RLPA based its authority on the Spending Clause.⁴⁰ The bill passed the House of Representatives, but stalled in the Senate. Some Senators feared the bill, if passed, would supersede and disrupt civil rights, specifically in the areas of employment and housing.⁴¹ As a result of these concerns, the bill failed to pass the Senate and did not become law.

RLUIPA was Congress's third and most recent attempt to create a law restoring strict scrutiny review of generally applicable laws. Senators Hatch and Kennedy, the bill's main sponsors, attempted to mend the problems discovered in RFRA and RLPA, while also staying within the confines of Congress's constitutional limits as defined by the Supreme Court. The First Amendment addresses religion in two clauses: the Free Exercise Clause⁴² and the Establishment Clause.⁴³ Every law Congress enacts must abide by both of these competing clauses. Therefore, when enacting RLUIPA, Congress had to abide by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence interpreting both clauses. Smith and City of Boerne interpreted and outlined the boundaries of the Free Exercise Clause, whereas Lemon v. Kurtzman⁴⁴ set out the limits of congressional power under the Establishment Clause.⁴⁵ The Court in Lemon held that a statute does not violate the Establishment Clause if: (1) the statute has a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute's principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.⁴⁶ Senators Hatch and Kennedy corrected the problems in RFRA and RLPA, ensured all of the tests for constitutionality were met, and introduced RLUIPA.⁴⁷

Upon introduction of RLUIPA, several Senators raised the same concerns about possible floods of litigation if the institutionalized persons provisions remained in RLUIPA as they expressed when debating RFRA. In their joint statement, Senators Hatch and Kennedy countered these arguments by citing reports on the effect of RFRA's institutionalized persons provisions on the amount of prison litigation.⁴⁸ The Senators pointed out that frivolous claims were successfully barred by PLRA and would prevent any frivolous claims brought under RLUIPA. In addition, the Department of Justice reported to the Senators that RFRA, with its similar provisions to RLUIPA, did not result in a flood of litigation, much less in frivolous litigation. In fact, the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported only sixty-five RFRA suits within the six years of RFRA's existence.⁴⁹ Empirical studies also showed that RFRA led to only a slight increase in claims filed. These claims were considered by the study to be more meritorious than other prisoner claims.⁵⁰

Despite these studies and statistics failing to support the notion that litigation would increase dramatically at the passage of RLUIPA, some Senators remained concerned.⁵¹ Specifically, Senator Reid continued to express the concern he harbored from the debate over RFRA that prisoners...