The reflection problem in network effect estimation

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12301
Published date01 January 2019
AuthorMarc Rysman
Date01 January 2019
Received: 25 August 2018
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Accepted: 28 August 2018
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12301
The reflection problem in network effect estimation
Marc Rysman
Department of Economics, Boston
University, Boston, Massachusetts
Correspondence
Marc Rysman, Department of Economics,
Boston University, Boston, MA.
Email: mrysman@bu.edu
Abstract
This paper discusses the empirical identification of network effects in light of
the reflection problem of Manski. I argue that models of indirect network effects
present reasonable exclusion restrictions to address the challenges of the
reflection problem.
KEYWORDS
identification, network effects, reflection problem
1
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INTRODUCTION
The literature on platform economics is among the most interesting developments in industrial organization over the
last 20 years. The literature describes some of the most important and dynamic firms in the world and is central to
understanding significant policy issues, such as net neutrality, financial crises, and standard setting. Research on
platforms is far from complete. Indeed, basic questions such as how to evaluate market power in twosided markets are
still up for debate (for different perspectives, see Evans & Noel, 2005; Katz & Sallet, 2018; Weyl, 2010).
A crucial input into the empirical study of platform problems is the estimation of the strength of the positive
spillover from one set of agents to the other. In this paper, I discuss the empirical identification of this spillover. I orient
my discussion around the reflection problem of Manski (1993, 1995). The reflection problem is well known in public and
labor economics, leading to an impossibility of identification in the context of local spillovers between agents. Although
it is always difficult to separate between causal neighborhood spillovers and local correlation driven by unobserved
neighborhood effects, Manksi argues that if we could control for all of these variables, then the model would be
unidentified. This result forces researchers in this area to make strong assumptions on how these effects enter a
problem (if at all) to estimate successfully. The problem should be equally important in the context of identifying
network effects, but I am unaware of a paper that discusses this. For example, Angrist (2014) describes this general
problem in a number of contexts, but does not mention network effects.
I argue that indirect network effects provide a much more natural way to address the reflection problem than direct
network effects. Direct network effects occur when a product is valued directly on how many other consumers use the
product. Communication networks are a standard example, such as fax machines, email, and telephone networks.
Examples of empirical work on these topics are Tucker (2008) and Björkegren (forthcoming). Indirect network effects
exist when consumers care about howmuch of a complementary good is available, and the amount of the complementary
good is determined by the number of consumers using or purchasing the product. For example, consumers care about
how much software is available for an operating system, which is determined by how many consumers adopt the
operating system.Similar examples are consumer andmerchant use of card networks and consumer and advertiseruse of
media, such as Yellow Pages, search engines, and newspapers (for examples, see Rysman, 2004; Fan, 2013; Lee, 2013).
Note that a number of papers study indirect network effect contexts but apply a model of direct network effects, often
because of data limitations. For instance, some early papers on video cassette recorder (VCR) adoption modeled demand
as a function of installed base of consumer adoption rather than on the availability of movie titles. Of course, we would
expect movie title availability to be strongly correlated with installed base.
J Econ Manage Strat. 2019;28:153158. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jems © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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