Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Publication date:
- Nbr. 28-3, June 2019
- Nbr. 28-2, April 2019
- Nbr. 28-1, January 2019
- Nbr. 27-4, October 2018
- Nbr. 27-3, September 2018
- Nbr. 27-2, June 2018
- Nbr. 27-1, March 2018
- Nbr. 26-4, December 2017
- Nbr. 26-3, September 2017
- Nbr. 26-2, June 2017
- Nbr. 26-1, February 2017
- Nbr. 25-4, December 2016
- Nbr. 25-3, September 2016
- Nbr. 25-2, April 2016
- Nbr. 25-1, March 2016
- Nbr. 24-4, October 2015
- Nbr. 24-3, September 2015
- Nbr. 24-2, June 2015
- Nbr. 24-1, March 2015
- Nbr. 23-4, December 2014
- Technological and organizational capital: Where complementarities exist
This study analyzes the complementarities between technological and organizational capital within enterprises. Different components of technological and organizational capital exert distinct—and often opposed—forces on each other. Our empirical results show that greater employee voice promotes firm productivity when combined with information technology, but harms firm productivity when combined with communication technology. On the other hand, flexible work design is positively associated with communication technology and negatively associated with information technology.
- Moral management in competitive markets
The intrinsic motivation of a firm’s management for engaging in prosocial behavior is an important determinant of a firm’s social conduct. I provide the first model in which firms run by morally motivated managers engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a competitive setting. Moral management crowds out a competitor’s strategic CSR, increasing profitability and leading shareholders to strategically delegate moral managers, although necessary for socially optimal CSR is that shareholders be morally motivated as well. Shareholders appoint managers that engage in a socially excessive amount of CSR, counter to existing literature, whenever product‐market competition is sufficiently intense.
- Exporting firms and retail internationalization: Evidence from France
This paper questions the impact of the globalization of the retail sector on the export activity of origin country agri‐food firms. We use an original firm‐level database of French agri‐food exports that identifies the domestic suppliers of French retailers through certification with the private International Featured Standard (IFS). The results show that IFS certified French firms are more likely to export and export larger volumes than noncertified firms to markets where French retailers have established outlets. We also show that when French retailers stop their activities in a market, certified firms reduce their exports to this market in the following years. The results are robust to the use of different sets of firm‐year‐ and country‐year‐specific controls and fixed effects, and are not affected by possible selection and endogeneity biases. The difference in the behavior of certified and noncertified exporting firms on markets where French retailers operate confirms the network effect that benefits retailers’ suppliers, which is lost when French retailers exit from the destination country.
- Repeated interaction in standard setting
Standardization may allow the owners of standard‐essential patents to charge higher royalties than would have been negotiated ex ante. In practice, however, standard‐setting efforts are often characterized by repeated interaction and complementarities among technologies. These features give firms that contribute technology to standards both the ability and the incentive to avoid excessive royalties by threatening to exclude other technology contributors from future rounds of standardization if they charge royalties exceeding ‘fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory’ (FRAND) levels. We show that such an outcome can be sustained as a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of a repeated standard‐setting game and examine how the decision‐making rules of standard‐setting organizations (SSOs) affect the sustainability of FRAND royalties. Our analysis provides a novel justification for super‐majority requirements and other rules frequently adopted by SSOs.
- Biased recommendations from biased and unbiased experts
When can you trust an expert to provide honest advice? We develop and test a recommendation game where an expert helps a decision maker choose among two actions that benefit the expert and an outside option that does not. For instance, a salesperson recommends one of two products to a customer who may instead purchase nothing. Subject behavior in a laboratory experiment is largely consistent with predictions from the cheap talk literature. For sufficient symmetry in payoffs, recommendations are persuasive in that they raise the chance that the decision maker takes one of the actions rather than the outside option. If the expert is known to have a payoff bias toward an action, such as a salesperson receiving a higher commission on one product, the decision maker partially discounts a recommendation for it and is more likely to take the outside option. If the bias is uncertain, then biased experts lie even more, whereas unbiased experts follow a political correctness strategy of pushing the opposite action so as to be more persuasive. Even when the expert is known to be unbiased, if the decision maker already favors an action the expert panders toward it, and the decision maker partially discounts the recommendation. The comparative static predictions hold with any degree of lying aversion up to pure cheap talk, and most subjects exhibit some limited lying aversion. The results highlight that the transparency of expert incentives can improve communication, but need not ensure unbiased advice.
- Issue Information
- The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing
We examine the influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two‐to‐one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three‐to‐two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.
- Can platform competition support market segmentation? Network externalities versus matching efficiency in equity crowdfunding markets
We investigate whether, in spite of the existence of cross‐market network externalities, platform competition can lead to segmentation of the two sides of the market served by the platforms. We address this question in the context of competition between two equity crowdfunding platforms that connect startups looking for capital with prospective investors. Given the heterogeneity in the populations of startups and investors in terms of the riskiness of the former population and the degree of risk aversion of the latter population, we investigate whether there exists an equilibrium where the two populations are segmented to ensure an improved match between them. We find that the segmenting equilibrium can arise only when compatibility in terms of their risk profiles is of high importance to both populations, and compatibility is significantly more important than the size of the network externality considered by startups. Segmentation is likely to improve the welfare of both populations when the basic benefit from any kind of match is relatively high.
- Points mechanisms and rewards programs
I study points programs, such as frequent flyer and other rewards programs, as a revenue management tool. I develop a two‐period contracting model where a capacity‐constrained firm faces consumers who privately learn their valuations over time. The firm cannot commit to long‐term contracts, but it can commit to allocate any unsold capacity through a points program. This points scheme creates an endogenous and type‐dependent outside option for consumers, which generates novel incentives in the firm's pricing problem. It induces the firm to screen less ex interim, and to offer lower equilibrium prices, reversing the intuition of demand cannibalization.
- Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition
In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.
- The USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions, Lessons, and Insights
This article describes the “USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset” of trademark applications and registrations derived from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) main database for administering trademark case files. The dataset provides detailed information on 6.7 million trademark applications ...
- Do discriminatory leniency policies fight hard‐core cartels?
This paper experimentally analyzes the effects of nondiscriminatory and discriminatory leniency policies on hard‐core cartels. We design a mechanism to form a hard‐core cartel, which allows that multiple ringleaders emerge. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of...
- Leveraging of Reputation through Umbrella Branding: The Implications for Market Structure
The Klein–Leffler model explains how fear of reputation loss can induce firms to produce high‐quality experience goods. This paper shows that reputation can be leveraged across products via umbrella branding, but only by a firm with a monopoly on at least one product. Such a firm may be able to...
- Business dynamics of innovating firms: Linking U.S. patents with administrative data on workers and firms
This paper discusses the construction of a new longitudinal database tracking inventors and patent‐owning firms over time. We match granted patents between 2000 and 2011 to administrative databases of firms and workers housed at the U.S. Census Bureau. We use inventor information in addition to the ...
- Optimal Technology Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of R&D
A question central to R&D policy making is the impact of competition on cooperation. This paper builds a theoretical foundation for the dynamics of knowledge sharing in private industry. We model an uncertain research process and ask how the incentives to license intermediate steps to rivals change ...
- Technological and organizational capital: Where complementarities exist
This study analyzes the complementarities between technological and organizational capital within enterprises. Different components of technological and organizational capital exert distinct—and often opposed—forces on each other. Our empirical results show that greater employee voice promotes firm ...
- Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Equity Partnerships: Evidence from Hollywood's Slate Financing Agreements
We use a movie industry project‐by‐project data set to analyze the principal–agent problem in slate financing arrangements. Under this specific film financing regime, which has become a significant mode of raising capital in Hollywood over the past decade, an external investor concludes a long‐term ...
- Business Partners: Complementary Assets, Financing, and Invention Commercialization
This paper assesses the relative importance of the complementary assets and financial capital that business partners may add to the original inventor‐entrepreneur. Projects run by partnerships were five times as likely to reach commercialization as those without business partners, and they had mean ...
- Career Concerns and Product Market Competition
This paper studies the effect of increased competition in the product market on managerial incentives. I propose a simple model of career concerns where firms are willing to pay for managerial talent to reduce production costs, but also to subtract talented executives from competitors. This second...
- Corporate social responsibility and product quality
We study both theoretically and empirically the relationship between different types of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and a firm's product quality. On the one hand, observable external CSR (e.g., a firm's involvement in a social project) can be used as a signal to unobservable product...